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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines general and specific aspects of the financing of the Mexican
economy during the 1960-1990 period from both internal and external sources. The thesis
focuses on two fundamental questions, the first of which is the analysis of the interrela-
tionship between financial variables and real variables of the economy in order to asses
the scope of the financial liberalisation policy being currently implemented in Mexico.
Secondly, the thesis examines the impact of foreign capital flows on the domestic econ-
omy and the extent to which the expansion of the economy is constrained by the balance
of payments.
Following a general description of the Mexican economy presented in chapter one,
which focuses on the evolution of financial variables and the financial policy imple-
mented during the 1960-1990 period, chapter two analyses the theory of financial liberal-
isation, the hypothesis of which are tested for Mexico in chapters three and four. Chapter
three examines the effects of financial variables, especially of real interest rates, on the
level of total savings, financial savings, the level of investment, and economic growth.
Chapter four takes into consideration the hypothesis that the allocation of resources
through market forces under a liberalised financial system improves the productivity of
investment. For this purpose, the chapter analyses the role of the financial sector under a
liberalised environment and then attempts to measure the productivity of both private and
public investment and examines the relationship between them.
The theoretical and empirical effects of foreign capital inflows on domestic savings,
investment and economic growth are examined in chapter five; in this context, the
chapter develops a model in which both the effects of inflows and outflows of foreign
capital are considered in order to estimate the net effect of foreign borrowing on
economic growth. Finally, chapter six finds that the long-run rate of growth of the Mexi-
can economy is closely approximated by the balance of payments equilibrium growth
rate. Conclusions to be drawn from this thesis are presented in chapter seven.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines the financing of the Mexican economy's growth between 1960
and 1990. The three decades under study describe and analyse at least three phases that
the economy went through, which at various stages coincided with certain turning points
of the country's push towards economic development.
The objective of this thesis is to examine two fundamental questions. The first of
which is to analyse the interrelationship between financial variables and real variables of
the economy in order to assess the scope of the current financial policy and the means by
which it is being implemented. The second question the thesis examines is the impact
that foreign capital flows have on the domestic economy and the extent to which the
expansion of the economy is constrained by the balance of payments.
Both domestic and foreign financing are considered. As far as domestic financing is
concerned, emphasis is given to the role played by the financial sector and to the interre-
lationship that exists between financial variables, such as the real interest rate, and the
real variables of the economy such as savings, investment and growth. The analysis
keeps in view the changes that took place in the financial sector at the end of the 1980's.
As in the rest of the economy, the financial sector was affected by the liberalisation pro-
cess that has been taking place since 1982. There has been a gradual shift in the overall
strategy of economic policy from being state-directed towards a maiket forces-led econ-
omy under which the participation of the private sector in economic activity is enhanced.
In 1982, the economic disorders that resulted in Mexico declaring a moratorium of
payments on its external debt, led to a redefinition of overall economic policy. The
economic development strategy changed from being inward oriented, based on import
substitution, to an outward oriented export-led strategy. This year also marked a change
in the political leadership of the country. Increased state intervention in economic activi-
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ties was seen by the new government as one of the causes of the 1982 economic crisis.
The reduction of the public sector's deficit and of inflationary financing became a priority
objective of economic policy which aimed at increasing the level of total domestic sav-
ings.
In the process of increasing domestic savings, the financial sector was seen as play-
ing a prominent role. The need to increase domestic sources of finance arose when
foreign financing abniptly fell in 1982, marking the beginning of the debt crisis and
bringing to an end more than two decades of continuous net capital inflows. The availa-
bility of external capital inflows has set to a large extent the pace at which the economy
could grow. As in the majority of developing countries, the Mexican economy faces the
financing of necessary imports to increase its productive capacity as the ultimate con-
straint to accelerate the rare of economic growth.
Chapter one sets out to describe an overall perspective of the Mexican economy
over the three decades from 1960 to 1990, highlighting its main characteristics and
shortcomings. It specifically focuses on both the evolution of financial variables and the
orientation of the financial policy followed during the same period.
Within the 1960-1990 period, three phases can be distinguished as far as the sources
of finance for growth are concerned. The first phase - the 1960's decade - was character-
ised by a stable domestic and foreign economic environment in which growth was mainly
financed with domestic non-inflationary resources. During the second phase, from 1971
until 1981, the economy began toy increasingly on foreign capital inflows as a source
of finance. In general, this period is characterised by an expansionary fiscal and monetary
policy and a resort to inflationary finance. Until 1981, the rate of growth of output was
positive. In the third phase, from 1982 onwards, the economy had to adjust to the lack of
foreign financing. Inflationary financing was curtailed while economic policy veered
towards the objective of increasing domestic savings. From 1982 until 1988, low and
even negative rates of growth were experienced as a consequence of the stringent foreign
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conditions, a net outflow of financial resources, and the tight fiscal and monetary policies.
From 1989, the economy showed signs of recovezy after the net transfer of resources
abroad was reduced from representing an average of 6 percent of GDP between 1983 and
1988 to 2 percent after 1989 (OECD, 1992).
Chapter two takes into consideration the theoretical aspects of financial liberalisa-
tion. After introducing the debate on the causality between financial development and
economic growth, the chapter sets out to describe the models of Mckinnon (1973) and
Shaw (1973) in both of which financial liberalisation is considered as a necessary condi-
tion for economic development, based on the classical assumption that prior savings is
necessaxy to finance investment and economic growth. Following from this, both the
models supporting and criticising financial liberalisation are described and analysed.
Among the criticisms, the most significant is probably that of the post-Keynesian school,
which consideis the possibility of financial liberalisation, and the implied rise in real
interest rates, discouraging investment and growth since it assumes that it is not savings
that determines investment but the other way round. Finally, the chapter describes the
capacity of the commercial banking system to create credit, which is not considered in
any of the financial liberalisation models and yet is an important function of banks in the
process of economic development.
Chapter three analyses the interrelationship between the real interest rate, savings,
investment and economic growth in Mexico during the 1960-1990 period. The chapter
distinguishes between financial savings and total domestic savings, for both of which the
determinants are analysed empirically in order to test the hypotheses considered by the
financial liberalisation models. Regarding investment, the chapter develops a model in
which both demand and supply side determinants are considered in order to find the net
effect that changes in the real interest rate have on investment. The last part of the
chapter links the theory of financial liberalisation to the process of economic growth by
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using a savings and growth model in which the effects of financial variables are
highlighted.
Chapter four is related to the analysis undertaken in the preceding chapteis as it
takes into consideration the hypothesis stating that the allocation of resources through
market forces under a liberalised financial system improves the productivity of invest-
ment. While chapter three considers the quantitative effects of financial variables on sav-
ings and investment, chapter four enquires into the qualitative effects that financial vari-
ables might have on investment. For this purpose, the chapter analyses the role of the
financial sector under a llberalised environment. It then attempts to measure the produc-
tivity of both public and private investment in Mexico and examines the relationship
between public investment and private investment. In the last part, the chapter analyses
the determinants of the incremental capital-output ratio.
In chapter five foreign savings are considered. The chapter analyses theoretically
and empirically the effect that foreign savings has on domestic savings, investment and
economic growth. It undertakes an analysis of the debate on foreign savings as either
complementing or substituting domestic savings, and then shows the empirical evidence
obtained in the case of Mexico. Concerning economic growth, the chapter develops a
model in which both the effects of inflows and outflows of foreign capital are considered
in order to estimate the net effect of foreign borrowing on growth.
Finally, chapter six looks at the constraint that the balance of payments imposes on
the long run rate of growth of output. The chapter develops and estimates for the case of
Mexico ThirIwall's (1979, 1982) balance of payments constrained growth model. The
model argues that the rate of growth of output of an open developing economy is deter-
mined, in the long run, by the performance of exports, by the rate of growth of capital
inflows and by the economy's dependence on imports to expand output.
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The main sources of data used in the thesis are the Bank of Mexico and the Mexican
National Institute of Statistics (INEGI). Additionally, data are obtained from the follow-
ing sources: the International Monetaiy Fund's 'International Financial Statistics'; the
IMF's 'Balance of Payments Statistics'; the United Nations Economic Commission for
Latin-America the United Nations 'National Accounts Statistics'; the Statistical Abstract
for Latin-America; Economta Aplicada A.C., and the OECD's Economic Surveys.
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CHAPTER I
THE MEXICAN ECONOMY AND THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: 1960-1990
1.1 Introduction
The objectives of this chapter are two fold. The first is to provide a general descrip-
tion of the development of the Mexican economy since 1960 until 1990, highlighting its
main characteristics and weak points. The second is to analyse the development of the
financial system, the financial and credit policy, and the main financial indicators during
the same period. Within these thirty years, three sub-periods can be distinguished. from
1960 to 1970; from 1971 to 1981; and from 1982 until 1990. The first sub-period, from
1960 to 1970, called the 'Stabilising Development Period' 1 , is characterised by rapid
growth with domestic financial stability and external equilibrium. It is chosen as a point
of departure for the ensuing analysis because during this period the financial sector
played an increasingly important role in achieving both domestic financial stability and
external equilibrium. Further, it was during this decade that many of the so-called struc-
tural problems of the economy originated or deepened.
The second period, from 1971 to 1981, is characterised, in general, by a large
expansion of the public sector, increasing foreign capital inflows and the consequent
accumulation of external debt; high rates of economic growth, and inflation. It is during
this period that the exchange rate, which had been fixed since 1954, was devalued in
1976 after the current account deficit of the balance of payments became unsustainable.
This crisis gave rise to the establishment of contractionaiy economic policies which were
2 The 'Stabilising Development Period' is sometimes considered to include the 1959-1970
penod'.
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implemented in the following two years, and saw the intervention of the International
Monctasy Fund. However, by 1978, the rise in the international price of oil and the
discovery of large oil reserves in Mexico virtually eliminated the external constraint and
marked the beginning of the period known as the 'Oil Boom'. This period lasted until
mid 1982 when the external debt crisis began.
The third period, from 1982 until 1990, is characterised by economic recession.
Since 1982, Mexico has experienced low and even negative rates of growth of GD?, a
sharp fall in the levels of savings and investment, of real personal income, and in the
standard of living of the majority of the population. It is only after 1989 that the rate of
growth of the economy shows some signs of recovery, but still, however, remains below
the average growth rate experienced during the last thirty years.
The three decades spanning from 1960 to 1990 can also be more broadly dis-
tinguished by describing the strategy followed by economic policy as being either inward
or outward oriented. In this sense, the 1960-1982 period can be seen as a period during
which economic policy was inward oriented. Even though macroeconomic conditions
were not the same during this period, the basic industrialisaxion policy followed was
import substitution. After 1982, the economy veered to an outward oriented economic
policy which gave emphasis to the performance of exports. During this period, the econ-
omy gradually became more open (Mexico joined the General Agreement for Trade and
Tariffs, GATF in 1986), culminating in the Free Trade Agreement which is currently
being established between Canada, the United States, and Mexico.
As far as capital inflows are concerned, it will be seen how, to a large extent, the
availability of external capital set the pace ax which the economy could grow, by relaxing
or tightening the balance of payments constraint, a trend which is especially noticeable
during the 1970 and 1980 decades.
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1.2 The Mexican Financiaj Sector
What follows is a brief overview of the Mexican financial sector which will serve as
an introduction to the following sections which discuss and analyse the role of financial
institutions and the evolution of financial and credit policy during the 1960-1990 period
in Mexico.
Beginning in 1988, the government undertook a thorough financial sector liberalisa-
uon programme. The government's task was made easier due to the two earlier phases of
institutional and administrative reforms in the financial sector. In the mid-1970s, the
institutional structure of the financial system was modernised and in addition the govern-
ment initiated the creation of a treasury bill market. After the 1982 devaluation and the
subsequent weakening of the financial position of private sector commercial banks,
which had a large share of dollar denominated deposits, the outgoing administration
nazionalised the commercial banks. Albeit, with the aim of reviving private sector
confidence in the government, the new administration (beginning of 1983) negotiated the
resale of one-third of the banks' assets and invited the recently dispossessed members of
the private banking sector to operate the brokerage houses. The result of this was an
unprecedented growth in the activities of the brokerage houses, which operated in an
unregulated financial framework, i.e. they were not subject to compulsory reserve
requirements. This process led to a two-tiered financial sector, one liberalised composed
of the brokerage houses, and one repressed, composed of the government-owned com-
mercial banks, which were strictly regulated.
The relative success enjoyed by the private brokerage houses in comparison to the
poor performance of government-owned banks was an early justification for a
comprehensive liberalisation of the banking sector, in April 1989.
The government's liberalisanon policies resulted in the eventual re-privatisanon of
the commercial banks, which are the largest financial intermediaries and the main provid-
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ers of credit to the private sector. Section W.3 in chapter N analyses the distribution of
credit given by commercial banks to the public and private sectors during the period
analysed.
At the time of writing, Mexico's financial system consists of the Central Bank
(Banco de Mexico), eighteen commercial banks (of which only three remain
government-owned), seven government-owned development banks, five government-
owned trust funds and twenty eight privately owned brokerage houses.
During the 1970s the government created the basis for a full service commercial
banking system. During the 1960s and early 1970's a wide variety of specialised credit
institutions - commercial banks, mortgage banks and 'financieras' for trade and com-
merce - had proliferated as a result of regulatory market segmentation. In 1974 the
government allowed the merger of these institutions into full-service commercial banks.
Until 1989, commercial banks operated under quantitative credit and interest rate
controls. Extensive sectoral credit targets and a complex system of reserve and liquidity
requirements channelled credit to administratively determined priority uses, leaving less
than fifty percent of credit not subject to sectoral targets and interest rate controls. Addi-
tionally, a system of special loan tranches operated through which commercial banks lent
at subsidised rates a fixed percentage of their deposit liabilities to the agricultural,
exports, industrial and housing sectors. The following table shows the commercial banks'
reserve and liquidity requirements. The table gives as an example the reserve rates for
three years: before commercial banks nationalisation (1980), during the period when
commercial banks were nationalised (1987), and after financial liberalisation (1990).
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Table Li
Compulsory Reserve Requirements *
(%) ____ ___ ___
___________________________ 1980 1987 1990
Cash Reserves	 1.7	 -	 -
Deposits in the Central Bank (1)	 38.8	 10.0	 -
Treasuiy Bills	 -	 -	 30.0
Credit to the Federal Government	 -	 35.0	 -
Credit to Agriculture	 5.4	 4.7	 -
Credit to the Housing Sector	 7.8	 8.5 ____
Credit to the Industrial Sector (2)	 4.1	 4.9 ____
TOTAL	 57.8 63.1	 30.0
Notes:
On the stock of domestic currency denominated deposit liabilities of commercial banks. Foreign curreocy
liabilities were subject to higher reserve rates.
(1) Interest yielding deposits in the Central Bank
(2) Small and medium size enlerpnses
In 1980, 38.8 percent of total commercial banks' deposit liabilities in domestic
currency had to be deposited in the Central Bank (interest yielding deposits); 5.4 percent
had to be allocated in credits to agriculture, 7.8 percent in credits to the housing sector,
and 4.1 percent in credits to the industrial sector (small and medium size enterprises).
After subtracting the above percentages from total credit only 42.2 percent of total credit
given by commercial banks remained to be freely allocated, determined by market forces.
The already controlled credit allocation did not change dramatically after the commercial
banks nationalisation in 1982. The percentage of credit allocated by market forces (not
through selective credit controls) remained on average, similar to the pre-naxionaiisation
period. This may have been partly due to the fact that the incoming administration (end
of 1982, beginning of 1983) acted quickly after banks were nationalised, ensuring that
internal banking practices of the previously private banks would remain unchanged, as
banks were being prepared for re-privatisation.
As the above table shows, with the liberalisation of the financial system the alloca-
tion of credit given by commercial banks changed as reserve requirements and selective
credit controls were reduced. After 1989, commercial banks were required to invest 30
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percent of their deposit liabilities (denominated in domestic currency) in treasuly bills, as
opposed to the complicated scheme of credit loan tranches and compulsory reserve
requirements of the previous years (see Table 1.1).
The major part of credit given by development banks, which are owned by the
government, is given to finance the deficit of the public sector. Section W.3 in chapter W
analyses the distribution of credit given by development banks to the public and the
private sectors. Development banks are subject to much lower reserve requirements than
commercial banks as the major part of their lending is to the public sector. Government
owned development banks and trust funds (which are financed by the Central Bank) had
served partly overlapping functions and provided credit for housing, mining, tourism,
infrastructure projects, agriculture, exponers and a variety of large - often stale owned -as
well as sin all and medium sized enterprises. After the liberalisation of the financial sys-
tem, the number of development banks and government trust funds was reduced through
mergers and closures. Of the nine government-owned trust funds existing in 1985, only
five remain ax present. These trust funds provide credit at subsidised rates to the agricul-.
lure sector, the housing sector, commercial activities and to the tourism sector.
The role of the Central Bank in credit allocation and financial policy is analysed in
detail in chapter 1. Additionally, chapter IV section 2 analyses the changes in the role of
the central bank from a regulated financial system to a market-forces led economy.
1.3 The Stabilising Development Period: 1960-1970
Given that domestic financial stability and external equilibrium were under control,
the main goal of economic policy during this period was to achieve a rapid rate of growth
of the economy. In fact, the average real rate of growth of output was 6.6 percent This
was to be reached through a fast process of industrialisation since it was believed that
industrialisation was the only means by which Mexico could grow and the standard of
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living of its population could be increased by increasing its productivity. For this pur-
pose, private and public investment were favoured. The industrial sectors considered as
the most important for economic development enjoyed a favourable fiscal, financial and
external environment with a high level of protection.
As stated earlier, the strategy to follow for industrialisation was via import substiru-
tion. For example, it was necessary to substitute durable consumer goods which required
for their production imported capital and intermediate goods that kept the current account
of the balance of payments in a deficit situation (VillalTeal, 1977). Even though exports
from the agricultural and manufactured goods sectors rose, the counny had to borrow
from the external sector to finance its deficit. The public sector's external debt rose from
US$384 million in 1965 to US$983 million in 1970, and the ratio of the public sector's
external debt to GNP rose from 2.0 percent in 1965 to 3.5 percent in 1970 (Source of
data: IMP, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1992).
The role played by the agricultural sector was of major importance. Priniaiy good
exports financed the imports of capital and intermediate goods. However, it is argued
that the agricultural sector began to be neglected by economic policy during this period.
This is reflected in the proportion of credit received by this sector, which fell from 14.6
percent of total financing given by the banking system in 1960 to 9.6 percent in 1969.
This process, it is argued, led the country to cease to be self sufficient in agricultural pro-
ducts. On the other hand, credit given to the industrial sector averaged 50 percent of total
credit given by the banking sector from 1960 until 1970.
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Table 1.2
Main Indicators of the Mexican Economy 	 ________
Real Rate Inflation	 M4	 Public	 Current
Year of Growth	 Real Stock	 Senor	 Account
of Output	 Deflcit/GDP	 Deficit
	
(%)	 (%)	 (BilL Pesos)	 (%)	 (%)	 (Mill. Dollars)
______ ____________	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 _______________
1960	 8.0	 4.8	 110.1	 18.2	 0.3	 -419.7
1961	 4.9	 0.0	 126.4	 18.9	 -0.8	 -343.7
1962	 4.7	 2.3	 145.7	 20.7	 -0.7	 .2.49.6
1963	 8.0	 0.4	 174.1	 22.3	 -0.7	 -226.1
1964	 11.7	 5.5	 197.6	 22.6	 -0.7	 -444.7
[1965	 6.5	 0.2	 2273	 23.9	 -3.1	 -442.9
1966	 6.9	 2.9	 2663	 26.0	 -1.2	 -447.8
1967	 6.3	 1.7	 310.7	 28.2	 -1.6	 -603.0
	
1968 - 8.1	 2.0	 356.0	 29.8	 -13	 ____________
1969	 6.3	 4.9	 404.7	 321	 -23	 -708.4
1970	 6.9	 4.7	 457.0	 34.0	 -1.4	 -1187.9
I1971	 4.2	 5.0	 495.9	 35.0	 -2.5	 -928.9
1972	 83	 5.6	 553.8	 35.7	 -4.9	 -1005.7
1973	 8.4	 21.4	 520.6	 j 33.2	 -6.9	 -1528.8
1974	 6.1	 20.6	 509.7	 1 29.9	 -7.7	 -3226.0
1975	 5.6	 11.3	 580.6J 30.9	 -10.0	 -4442.6
1976	 4.2	 27.2	 5213	 28.2	 -9.9	 -3683.3
	
3.4	 20.1	 563.2	 27.4	 -6.7	 -1596.4
1978	 83	 16.2	 6573	 29.2	 -6.7	 -2693.0
1979	 9.2	 20.0	 758.1	 30.6	 -7.6	 -4870.5
1980	 8.3	 29.9	 838.7	 313	 -7.9	 -10739.7
1981	 8.8	 28.7	 953.3	 33.9	 -14.8	 -16052.1
1982	 -0.6	 98.8	 687.4	 37.2	 -17.8	 -6221.0
1983	 -4.2	 80.8	 692.9	 34.1	 -9.0	 5418.4
1984	 3.6	 59.2	 782.7	 353	 -8.7	 42383
1985	 2.6	 63.8	 732.6	 33.3	 -10.0	 1236.7
1986	 -3.8	 105.8	 737.1	 41.2	 -16.8	 -1672..5
1987	 1.7	 159.2	 737.0	 43.7	 -163	 39663
1988	 1.4	 51.7	 792.9	 343	 -13.0	 -2442.6
1989	 3.2	 19.7	 999.7	 40.2	 -6.2	 -3960.2
1990	 3.9	 25.2	 11793	 43.7	 -33	 -5234.2
Notes:
(1). December-Dectmbezlnflation. National Consumer Price Index Base 1978=100
(2). The Real Stock M42 is the Nominal M4 Stock deflated with the National Consumer Price Index




(3).The	 ratio is calculated considering the nominal values of M4 and GDP
(4).Public Sector nominal financial deficit over nominal GDP
Source of Data: The public sector's deficit data for the 1960-1970 period were obtained from Gomez Oliver
(1981). The rest of the data were obtained from Banco de Mexico, and INEGL
1.3.1 Financial and Credit Policy
It is well documented that the financial system played a decisive role in economic
growth during the 1960's. The countiy's economy grew with very low levels of inflation
(4 percent on average) and with a fixed exchange rate that eliminated financial specula-
tion associated with uncertainty over future movements in the price of currency. The
exchange rate was kept fixed at the level of 12.49 Mexican pesos per dollar from 1954
until 1976.
The rapid growth in economic activity required a greater degree of financial inter-
mediation, a process that led to the expansion and consolidation of the financial system.
The establishment of a fixed exchange rate and the low levels of inflation experienced
during this decade gradually enhanced the confidence of the wealth holders in the domes-
tic financial system.
Before the Stabilising Policy was implemented and the exchange rate was fixed,
devaluations of the Mexican peso had a strong effect on the public's expectations.
Devaluations increase expectations of further devaluations and spur the withdrawal of
financial resources away from the institutional financial system. Thus, the pegging of the
exchange rate, among other monetary policy measures, permitted the expansion of the
financial system by creating a stable domestic financial environment.
It is worthwhile so mention that the Mexican financial system is relatively new. It
was not until 1925 that the Central Bank, Banco de M6xico, was created with the puipose
not only of controlling and coordinating the financial system but also of forming and
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organising one (Brothers and Solis, 1966). After the foundation of the Central Bank
many development banks and trust funds were created with the purpose of channelling
resources to specific sectors of the economy, mainly funded by the Central Bank. By
1960 the financial system was expected to provide 'an institutional framework for the
mobilisation of savings and the channelling of these savings into productive investment,
as well as to promote continuous augmentation of the aggregate volume of savings and
capital formation while at the same time serving as a principal vehicle for exercise of
control over resource allocation. The system also bears primaiy responsibility for mainte-
nance of stability in the domestic economy and in the countiy's international financial
relations' (Brothers and Soils, 1966).
The above mentioned factors reflect the contribution of the financial system to
overall economic growth and development. That is, by providing conditions of domestic
financial stability and an equilibrium in the balance of international payments, the finan-
cial system can create an appropriate environment to generate or increase financial
resources and improve the allocation of credit.
The positive trend and increasing level of the monetary aggregate M4 (which is the
broadest monetary aggregate) during the entire decade is shown in Table 1.2, measured
both in realtermsand asaproportionof GDP,andin graph 1. Theincreasingtrendof
the monetary aggregate, which is an indicator of the degree of financial intermediation,
reflects the financial policy and environment of the period, as the rise in the level of
financial savings became a major objective of the monetary authorities. For the purpose
of financing growth, the rise in the level of savings, and more precisely, the deviation of
savings towards the financial system was pait of the economic policy objectives. During
this decade, non-inflationary domestic financing was the main source of financial
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Vanous factors can be distinguished to explain the dynamic behaviour of financial
savings. Firstly, the level of total net domestic savings, public and private, rose from 7.7
percent of GDP in 1959 to 12.7 percent in 1970. Secondly, economic policy instruments
were oriented to attract savings into the financial system. For this purpose two main van-
ables were used: the real rate of interest offered by the banking system on deposits and
the degree of liquidity of the fInancial system. During the whole decade the banking sys-
tem offered a positive real rate of interest on its deposits suggesting a high correlation
between financial savings and the real interest rate. The annual real rate of interest3
moved between the range of 3 percent to 10 percent, averaging 5.4 percent in the decade.
The teal izuerest rate considered is the annual accumulated one. The method of calculation is
shown in Appendix Ifl.Al in the third chapter.
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The capacity of the financial system to redeem almost any obligation at any time, regard-
less of its maturity, was another factor that attracted resources towards financial institu-
tions. In the 1960's, when the lack of liquidity of the financial system of many develop-
ing countries acted as a major obstacle to channelling potential resources to investment
(Brimmer, 1971), 'in at least one developing countiy -Mexico- the lack of liquidity [was]
not a problem because the financial institutions [stood] ready to repurchase most of their
financial instruments at par at any time'. (Brimmer, 1971, p.783). The Central Bank
guaranteed that financial obligations could be paid to savers at any tune by financial insti-
tutions.
While some argue that a high degree of liquidity of the financial system represents a
threat to the stability of prices (Brothers and Solis, 1966), others argue that the rise in the
demand for interest bearing financial assets acts as a restraint on inflation since the public
gradually demands more long term financial assets, which are less liquid, instead of
increasing their monetary balances (Thompson, 1979).
Even though increased liquidity of the system was probably a threat to the stability
of prices, since redemption of a significant amount of financial assets could augment
monetary balances and increase the pressure on prices, it only remained as a threat since
inflation did not rise to serious levels.
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Table 1.3
Percentage Stncture of Financial Assets
___ ______	 (%)
Year	 Interest Bearing Financial Assets
Monetary
Assets	 Total	 Short Tenu	 Non-Banking	 Long term
Ml (1)	 Banking	 Financial	 Financial
Financial	 Assets (3)	 Assets (4)
___ ______ ________	 Assets (2)	 ____________ ______
1960	 62.9	 37.1	 37.1	 -	 -
1961	 58.5	 41.5	 41.5	 -	 -
1962	 56.1	 43.9	 43.9	 -	 -
1963	 54.1	 45.9	 45.9	 -	 -
1964	 52.6	 47.4	 47.4	 -	 -
1965	 48.4	 51.6	 51.6	 -	 -
1966	 44.6	 55.4	 55.4	 -	 -
1967	 40.4	 59.6	 59.6	 -	 -
1968	 38.9	 61.1	 61.1	 -	 -
1969	 36.1	 63.9	 63.9	 -	 -
1970	 33.7	 66.3	 66.3	 -	 -
1971	 31.9	 68.1	 68.1	 -
1972	 32.3	 67.2	 67.2	 -	 -
1973	 36.4	 63.6	 63.6	 -
1974	 37.0	 63.0	 63.0	 -	 -
1975	 35.3	 64.6	 64.6	 __________________	 -
1976	 42.0	 58.0	 58.0	 -	 -
1977	 40.2	 59.8	 54.8	 -	 5.0
1978	 39.1	 60.9	 51.8	 0.3	 8.8
1979	 37.8	 62.2	 50.9	 1.9	 9.4
1980	 35.2	 64.8	 53.9	 2.8	 8.1
1981	 31.6	 68.4	 60.2	 3.3	 4.9
1982	 27.7	 72.3	 61.7	 7.2	 3.4
1983	 23.5	 76.5	 63.1	 6.8	 6.6
1984	 22.3	 77.7	 64.0	 7.0	 6.7
1985	 22.6	 77.4	 60.5	 6.9	 10.0
1986 - 18.8	 82.2	 59.4	 9.0	 12.8
1987	 16.7	 83.3	 56.1	 14.6	 12.6
1988	 16.6	 83.4	 48.5	 25.9	 9.0
1989	 15.5	 84.5	 4.6.2	 28.5	 9.8
1990	 17.2	 82.8	 44.4	 25.4	 13.0
Notes:
(1) Coins, currency and demand deposits (Ml). (From the end of 1989 view deposits yield interest)
(2) Banking financial assets under one year redemption period
(3)Treasury Bills and other government bonds
(4) Banking financial assets and government bonds over one year redemption period
Source: Banco de M6xico
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On the other hand, and in relation to the second argument presented above, the
effects of a stable financial environment together with a positive real interest rate were
reflected in the public's demand for financial assets as it shifted from monetaiy (Ml) to
interest bearing financial assets (M2, M3 and M4).
Table 1.3 shows the gradual shift in demand from monetazy assets to interest yield-
ing financial assets, which, during the 1960's were all bank financial assets with a
redemption period of less than one year.
It must be mentioned that the attractiveness of bank financial instruments resulting
from the high levels of liquidity and positive real interest rates inhibited the development
of a stock market, since it was difficult for private enterprises to compete with the finan-
cial instniments from the banks given their virtually risk-free nature and their high yields.
The fact that the stock market failed to expand left banking credit as the main source of
finance to the private sector (besides self-financing).
1.3.1.1 The Monetary Base
Considering the asset position of the Central Bank, the monetaiy base can be
divided into two components: the domestic and the external component. The domestic
component consists of total credit given by the Central Bank to the public sector and to
other financial intermediaries which consist of: development banks, commercial banks
and official trusts. The external component consists of the international reserves held at
the Central Bank.
Table 1.4 shows the monetary base components in real terms. The expansion of
credit to the public sector is outstanding, increasing from 32.1 billion pesos (in constant
1980 prices) to 210.0 billion in 1971, and increasing its share in the monetary base from
39.5 percent in 1960 to 68.7 percent in 1971. On the other hand, the level of gross inter-




____ ________	 Billion Pesos (at constant 1980 prices)	 ______
Year Monetaiy International	 Financing to	 Financing to	 Net
____ Base	 Reserves	 the Public Sector Other Fin. Imerm. Position
1960	 81.4	 31.6	 32.1	 21.6	 -3.9
1961	 88.1	 30.5	 32.7	 32.7	 -7.8
1962	 100.0	 31.0	 33.2	 43.5	 -7.6
1963	 118.0	 37.9	 49.8	 37.4	 -7.0
1964	 142.0	 39.5	 67.1	 36.4	 -1.0
1965	 157.8	 36.8	 114.9	 12.8	 -6.6
1966	 172.8	 35.8	 130.6	 12.4	 -6.0
1967	 198.2	 39.1	 137.2	 19.0	 2.9
1968	 224.9	 41.1	 158.4	 12.9	 12.4
1969	 249.1	 42.5	 197.2	 8.5	 0.9
1970	 269.9	 47.7	 207.9	 14.4	 0.0
1971	 305.8	 61.8	 210.1	 19.7	 14.0
1972	 347.7	 74.1	 251.0	 16.7	 5.9
1973	 383.2	 70.9	 302.2	 23.5	 -13.4
1974	 396.4	 56.9	 334.0	 27.7	 -22.3
1975	 458.9	 54.7	 391.1	 27.7	 -14.7
1976	 522.6	 63.8	 433.9	 83.5	 -58.6
1977	 514.4	 78.4	 454.7	 531	 -71.9
1978	 562.7	 78.1	 476.6	 440	 -36.0
1979	 642.9	 88.9	 525.4	 49.0	 -20.3
_____ 718.1	 93.1	 559.1	 695	 -3.6
i981	 814.0	 103.2	 646.8	 65.0	 -1.0
1982	 975.4	 86.8	 979.1	 187.4	 -277.6
1983	 763.9	 172.6	 726.0	 25.1	 -159.7
1984	 711.7	 229.9	 551.5	 143	 -84.0
1985	 530.0	 199.5	 535.2	 -29.1	 -175.6
1986	 4203	 311.4	 494.3	 -701	 -315.0
1987	 308.8	 655.1	 213.3	 -90.0	 -4693
1988	 2093	 151.7	 317.6	 -45.2	 -214.6
1989	 193.1	 152.4	 320.1	 .38.0	 -241.3
1990	 206.8	 201.0	 266.1	 -15.7	 -244.6
Source: Banco de Mexico
Notes Nominal values deflated with the National Consumer Price Index 1980=100
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decreased from 38.8 percent in 1960 to 20.2 percent in 1971. The rising trend in the
stock of credit given to the public sector reflects the expansionaiy credit policy imple-
mented during this period.
1.3.1.2 Credit Policy
The amount of total credit given by the banking sector to both the public and the
private sector increased simultaneously with financial savings. Although credit given by
the Central Bank to the public sector increased, the proportion of public debt financed by
the Central Bank decreased from 73.1 percent in 1955 to an average of 29.7 percent in the
1962-1970 period (Gomez Oliver, 1981), while the proportion financed by private com-
mercial banks increased. The following table shows the levels and the percentage struc-
ture of total financing from the banking sector to both the Federal Government and the
private sector, from 1960 to 1970.
Table 1.5
Noes: Nominal values have been deflated with the Nanonal Consumer Price Index, 1980=100.
Source: Banco de Mexico
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Total financing grew at an average rate of 15.1 percent per year in real terms;
financing to the private sector grew, on average, 12.1 percent per year; and financing to
the Federal Government grew at an average rate of 23.1 percent per year, increasing its
share in total financing from 14.2 percent in 1960 to 24.2 percent in 1970.
Concerning external financing, data for the 1960-1970 period show that the ratio of
the public sector's external debt to GNP rose to 3.5 percent in 1970. If, however, this
value is compared with a ratio of public and publicly guaranteed external debt to GNP
equal to 16.5 percent in 1976; 25 percent in 1982; and 50 percent in 1986, ii can be said
that during the Stabilising Development Period, the external debt of the Federal Govern-
ment did not represent a financial burden. In nominal terms, the external debt of the
Government rose from 4.8 billion pesos in 1965 to 123 billion in 1970 (source of data:
IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1992)
It has been recognised that the expansion of credit to both the public and private
sectors encouraged economic growth during the 1960's. Through credit controls and the
reserve requirement, the financial system directed public investment towards the indus-
trial, agricultural and commercial sectors of the economy to promote development of
economic activities considered as priority and into which private investment was not
attracted. Public investment was mainly oriented to the promotion of industry. Within
this sector, the oil indusuy (including petrochemicals) received half of total credit to the
industrial sector.
The expansion of credit is reflected in total investment, which increased at an aver-
age real rate of 7.5 percent per year. This relationship suggests a coirelation between
financial savings, the financing given by the banking sector, and investment - a relation-
ship which will be further analysed in the third chapter.
The reserve requirement is the basic instrument of control of the amount of credit.
It was established as a legal obligation of commercial banks to keep reserves in the
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Central Bank in cash and securities equal to a specific percentage of their deposits and
other selected liabilities. Its use allows the Central Bank to control the composition of
claims acquired by commercial banks and thereby to influence the allocation of credit
resources between alternative applications. Throughout the 1960's, the Central Bank used
the reserve requirement as a fundamental instrwnent of its monetaiy and credit policy,
with the purpose of 'regulating the level of liquidity and deviating or channelling the
banking system resources towards national priority fields' (Banco de M&ico, 1969).
Through this means it was possible to encourage productive activities of both the public
and private sectors. Fixed percentages of banks' liabilities were compulsorily channelled
ax subsidised rates to activities to which the government gave priority. At the same time,
however, reserve requirements were remunerated by the Central Bank at market rates
covering the financial and administrative costs to banks. In this sense, the reserve require-
mem can be thought of as a risk-free (compulsory) credit from commercial banks to the
government.
Development banks, which belong to the public sector, are subject to less strict
reserve requirement regulations than private commercial banks. Credit given by develop-
ment banks was mainly channelled to the public sector at subsidised loan rates. On the
other hand, development banks could compete with commercial banks in attracting finan-
cial savings from the private sector. The difference between the interest rate offered on
deposits and the subsidised rate charged on loans, i.e. the financial margin of develop-
ment banks, caused significant losses to development banks which were covered by the
government (Ghigli". 1990).
It is argued by some authors that the single most important financial innovation of
the Stabiising Development period was the use of the private banking system to finance
the government debt (Thompson, 1979). As mentioned above, the burden of financing
the government debt shifted from the Central Bank to the private banking system. This
was done through the flexible reserve requirement scheme, which empowered the Central
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Bank to vary average reserve requirements on average deposits of the banks and to
impose a reserve requirement of up to 100 percent of increases in deposits. During this
period the reserve requirement could be lowered if private banks invested in specified
assets such as government bonds, which were acquired mainly as an official procedure
since they did not offer attractive yields. The Central Bank was capable of regulating the
monetary base according to the government's deficit financing needs. The government
enjoyed priority access to the banking system. Thus, when public debt financing needs
grew, commercial banks were squeezed through the imposition of higher levels of reserve
requirements. In this sense it can be said that monetaiy policy was subordinated to fiscal
policy.
During the 1960's the idea of intervention from the financial authorities in the econ-
omy, through reserve requirements, the employment of differential discount rates and the
interest rate, was fully supported. It was argued that in an economy with a narrow finan-
cial market, as compared to the developed countries, the only way to make financial
resources reach basic areas for the development of the economy was via an explicit inter-
vention of the authorities. For example, it was said that 'monetary policy is the most
appropriate means for subsidising the public sector and thereby for influencing the alloca-
tion of investable resources in a manner deemed appropriate for promoting the desired
rate and type of economic growth' (See Brothers and Soils, 1966). In this way the activi-
ties of the financial institutions, mainly of the Central Bank, consisted of more than the
'traditional' ones concerned only with the regulation of commercial banks and the money
supply. Through its intervention the financial system played a crucial role by allocating
credit for development puiposes.
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1.4 The Period of Public Sector Expansion: 1971-1982
The 1971-1982 period covers two six-year presidential administrations during
which the economy went through several different phases. However, a common denomi-
nator of the economy during this period was the fast expansion of the public sector cou-
pled with high rates of economic growth. The 1971-1981 period can be sub-divided into
two periods marked by the duration of the political administrations, which coincided with
significant events in the economy. The first period ended in 1976 with the devaluation of
the peso after more than twenty years of a fixed exchange rate. The second period, begin-
ning ax the end of 1976, covers the 'Oil Boom' period and ended in 1982, when the debt
crisis began. The analysis of this period will be undertaken in two different stages, first
from 1971 until 1976 and then from 1977 until 1982, in order to simplify the study of the
main characteristics of the economy during this period.
1.4.1 The Inflationary Financing Period: 1971-1976
The 1960's was the last period of financial stability and external eqiilibrium experi-
enced in Mexico. Nevertheless, the decade finished with a deteriorated agricuhural sec-
tor, a weakened balance of payments4, and, as argued by Lustig (1990), with a protected
industry that somehow failed to increase productivity in spite of the economic dynamism
created by the import substitution process. This failure, Lustig argues, was due to the lack
of pressure from the government to demand industries to 'meet performance criteria in
exchange for the benefits of protected markets' (Lustig, 1990, p.78).
With the new administration, beginning at the end of 1970, the economy entered a
period of recession during 1971, which can be explained by both internal and external
factors. The main external factor was economic recession in the United States in 1971,
The deficit on current account increased from $708.4 million in 1969 to $1187.9 million in
1970, representing the sharpest rise and the highest figure of the decade.
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the year in which the fixed parity system established at Bretton Woods in 1944 broke
down (Gomez Oliver, 1978). The main internal reason seems to have been the sharp
reduction in public expenditure and in public investment during the year. The reduction
in public expenditure was implemented, together with other economic policy measures,
in order to slow down import growth, to reduce the current account deficit and inflation
(Banco de Mexico, 1971).
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The real rate of growth of output fell from 6.9 percent in 1970 to 4.2 percent in 1971
(measured at constant 1980 prices). This fall in the rare of growth, which averaged more
than 6 percent in the 1960's, worried the government and led them to react with a
significant increase in public expenditure in order to resume economic growth. The
expansion of public expenditure remained the main characteristic of economic policy
until 1976. The public sector's financial deficit doubled between 1971 and 1972, and
increased from 2.5 percent of GDP in 1971 109.9 percent in 1976. The real rate of growth
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of output remained high during the whole period, averaging 6.2 percent; inflation aver-
aged 15.5 percent, and the exchange rate was kept fixed until 1976 when it could no
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Concerning the behaviour of real variables of the economy, several points can be
emphasised. The first is that the real rate of growth of output was high during the whole
period, ranging from 4.2 percent in 1971 and in 1976, to 8.4 percent in 1973. The second
is that although there exists an argument among different authors surrounding the issue, it
can be said that growth was mainly led by the increase in public investment, since its real
rate of growth, 12.4 percent per year on average, was higher than for private investment,
which averaged only 5 percent per year. It is often argued in this context that the public
sector had to increase expenditure on investment because of the stagnation of private
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investment. Thirdly, external disequilibriwn began to accentuate in 1973, and became
unsustainable in 1976. Finally, there was a broad expansion of the public sector and
increased public sector intervention in economic activity.
The expansion of output and the real appreciation of the peso (as the exchange rate
was fixed and inflation accelerated) caused the deficit on cunent account to increase from
US$929 million in 1971 to $4443 million in 1975, financed mainly by long term capital
inflows. It is argued that inflation, the appreciation of the peso and the accumulation of
external debt triggered capital flight from 1973 onwards. By 1976, the increasing capital
outflow made the maintenance of the fixed exchange rate unsustainable and the peso was
devalued.
1.4.1.1 Financial and Credit Policy
The period under analysis marks the beginning of strong fluctuations in financial
variables. For the first time since 1960, the stock of financial assets fell in real terms in
1973. The ratio of broad money (M4) to GDP had a lower value in 1976 than in 1971.
This process, also known as financial disintennediation, has been attributed by some
authors (GhigIia r ia. 1990) to the negative real interest rates that prevailed after 1973.
According to our calculations, financial savings were negative during 1973, 1974 and
1976 (see Table 3, chapter Iii). However, financial savings increased significantly in
1975 when the nominal interest rate offered on deposits was raised for this purpose
(Banco de Mexico, 1975).
The correlation between the real interest rate and financial savings seems to be
apparent during this period. The real interest rate became negative in 1973 and remained
negative until 1976. Even in 1975, when the interest rate rose, it remained negative in
real terms. The negative real interest rate after 1973 also explains the shift from interest
bearing financial assets to monetary assets that took place especially in 1976, as shown in
Table 1.3.
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Some authors argue that the decline in financial assets held in the banking sector
narrowed the supply of credit available to the private sector (Gomez Oliver, 1978), which
in turn, negatively affected private investment during this period.
Concerning credit to the public sector, it can be seen in Table 1.4 that the behaviour
of the monetary base is characterised by the expansion of credit from the Central Bank
to the government. The expansion of internal credit to the government represented 78.7
percent of the total monetary base on average from 1971 to 1976, reaching a maximum of
85.2percent in 1975.
The reserve requirement continued to be the main instrument through which credit
from the banking sector was allocated either to the public or private sector. It was first
lowered in 1972 as part of the expansionary policy in order to release resources to the
private sector, but from 1973 onwards, the reserve ratio was raised as commercial banks'
liabilities fell. As stated in the Central Bank's annual repoit 'reserve requirements were
not higher only because a higher percentage of bank liabilities devoted to finance the
government's deficit with non-inflationary resources would have left the private sector
without credit' (Banco de M&ico, 1975).
It was compulsory for commercial banks to have cash deposits in the Central Bank.
As part of the requirement, banks could invest in public bonds. The percentage of invest-
ment in public bonds depended orn the kind of financial intermediaries (for example,
development Banks virtually had no reserve requirements), the part of the country in
which the bank is situated, and the type of deposits (deposits in foreign currency are sub-
ject to much higher reserve ratios). Until 1978 government bonds had a fixed price, but
in 1978, Treasury Bills were introduced with a variable price fixed in open market opera-
tions. Concerning commercial banks' reserves kept in interest yielding deposits in the
Central Bank - the interest rate paid by the Central Bank was set periodically in a nego-
tiation process with commercial banks and according to the interest rate that commercial
banks paid on the public's deposits (Calderón, Cárdenas and he, 1981).
30
1.4.2 Economic Crisis and the 'Oil Boom' Period: 1977-1982
After the economic crisis of 1976, the economy underwent a brief adjustment pro-
cess. During 1977, the aim of economic policy was to reduce both the public and the
external deficit and to control inflation. For this purpose, the peso was further devalued
and public expenditure was reduced. Another important policy change in this year was
the rise in nominal domestic interest rates to curtail the capital flight that had been occur-
ring since 1973.
The year ended with: a reduced current account deficit, which decreased from
$3683.3 million in 1976 to $1596.4 million in 1977; inflation that dropped from 27.2 per-
cent in 1976 to 20.1 percent in 1977; and a reduction of the public sector deficit from 9.9
percent of GDP in 1976 to 6.7 percent in 1977. It is not coincidental that this year
recorded the lowest rate of growth of output since 1960. The gross domestic product
grew 3.4 percent and the ratio of gross fixed investment to GDP fell from 21.6 percent in
1976to 19.3 percent in 1977.
By the end of 1977, expectations about future economic growth changed with the
discovery of major oil-reserves. The magnitude of this was enormous; the proven oil-
reserves rose from 6.4 billion barrels at the end of 1975 to 16 billion by 1977 (Zedillo,
1986, p. 970). From this year, the dependence of the economy on oil revenues increased.
By 1977, crude oil exports had doubled to $987.3 million from $420.0 million in 1976.
By 1981, Mexican crude oil exports amounted to $13,305.2 million and by 1982, they
represented 74 percent of total exports. Together with the increasing volume of exported
oil, there was a rise in its international price. The price of oil rose from $13.4 per barrel
in 1977 to $19.6 in 1979 reaching its highest level, $33.2 per barrel, in 1981. The
government became too confident and optimistic about the international price of oil.
These facts explain why the period from 1978 to 1981 is known as the 'Oil-Boom'
period. The economy grew at more than 8.0 percent per year during these four years,
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averaging 8.6 percent. The ratio of Gross Capital Formation to GDP rose from 22.1 per-
cent in 1978 to 26.4 percent in 1981. GDP per capita rose from $1143 in 1975 to $1426
in 1981 (Dollars at l97Oprices, source of data: ECLAC, 1981).
Economic policy during this period successfully accomplished its main goals: to
expand and diversify the productive sector of the economy and to create employment at a
faster rate than the growth of the active population. The main economic instrument used
by the government was public expenditure, or more precisely, public investment expendi-
ture, of which the major part was invested in the oil sector. The Central Bank in its 1979
Annual Report states that the goal of economic policy was the consolidation of output
growth, employment and investment. This goal was accomplished with the expansion of
public expenditure and the positive reaction of private investment. The effects of the
expansion of investment on the rest of the economy were the main cause of the general-
ised growth in demand experienced during this period (Banco de Mexico, 1979). The real
rate of growth of public expenditure was over 17 percent per annum on average for the
As far as the composition of public expenditure is concerned, the share of public
investment in total expenditure rose from 253 percent in 1977 to 323 percent in 1981.
On the other hand, the percentage share of interest payments on public debt (a payment
that is part of the current expenditure of the public sector) was kept around 10 percent
during the whole period, rising to 18.5 percent in 1982.
The public sector financial deficit as a proportion of GDP rose from 9.9 percent in
1976 to 14.8 percent in 1981, reaching its highest level in 1982 when it rose to 17.8 per-
cent of GDP.
During this period the increase in the public sector's expenditure was accompanied
by an increase in the private sector's expenditure in investment and consumption, which
Data on public sector expendituie from 1977 to 1990 aze shown in Tables W.4 P13 and P1.6
inchapterlV.
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showed high rates of growth from 1977 until 1981. According to Banco de M&ico,
private investment was encouraged by the expansion of the public sector's spending.
Also, the increase in the level of profits of the private sector, the increase in bank credit
to the private sector, and the expansion of the internal market made possible the high lev-
els of private investment reached during this period (See Banco de Mexico, 1979). Every
component of demand expanded during these four years. It must be highlighted that this
expansion, particularly public investment, was mainly due to the expansion of the oil
industry.
However, the expansion of the economy worsened both the internal and external
balances. The public sector's financial deficit almost trebled in real terms between 1978
and 1981 and the balance of payments current account deficit also increased enormously,
in spite of the rapid growth of oil exports. The rate of growth of imports was much
higher than the rate of growth of exports. The expansion of imports is explained by the
fast rate of growth of output, the overvaluation of the peso and the reduction of tariffs
that took place from 1977 until 1981. Concerning exports, although oil and oil-derived
products increased significantly, non-oil manufactured goods exports did not increase.
Furthermore, the international competitiveness of non-oil manufactured goods eroded
during this period 'because production and investment were geared to satisfying the inter-
nal market' (Lustig, 1990, p.8!).
One of the most important aspects of the economy during this period was the availa-
biity of foreign credits. The international financial situation, characterised by an excess
of liquidity, together with the enhanced expectations of the international banking system
about the future evolution of the Mexican economy, made Mexico an attractive location
for foreign capital. Indeed, the external debt more than trebled during this period, rising
from $29111 million in 1977 to $87600 million in 1982 (Source of Data ECLAC, 1985).
In 1981 both the public deficit and the current account deficit were accentuated, and
as a consequence the external debt rose. In 1981 alone, the external debt increased more
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than $27 billion. The level of inflation remained high from 1977 until 1981, at levels
between 20 and 30 percent per year, but soared in 1982 to 98.9 percent.
The combination of the above mentioned facts and the overvaluation of the peso
gave rise to a massive capital flight. In February 1982, the peso was devalued with the
aim of reducing imports and controlling capital flight. Nevertheless, capital flight contin-
ued and the exchange rate was sustained at the expense of foreign exchange reserves and
the 'last voluntary credit available to Mexico' (Zedillo, 1986, p.978).
By mid 1982, Mexico had lost its credit worthiness with private foreign banks and
the supply of international loans fell sharply. Between August and September 1982, the
peso was again devalued from 48.2 to 69.5 pesos per dollar. Dollar denominated deposits
in the Mexican banking system were made payable only in domestic currency, and, hav-
ing completely exhausted the supply of foreign currency, Mexico declared a three month
moratorium on payments of principal on its external debt.
Moreover, in an attempt to regain control of the financial market, especially of the
foreign exchange market, the private commercial banks were nationalised and foreign
exchange controls were established for the first time during the period under analysis.
1.4.2.1 Financial Policy
The main objective of monetary and financial policy during this period was to pro-
vide the necessary flow of financial resources for the expansion of the productive sector.
Between 1978 and 1981, both internal and external financial resources increased,
and so did credit to the public and private sector. The financial sector expanded as total
financial resources deposited in the financial sector, especially in the banking sector,
grew, and as total credit given by the banking sector increased. It is also during this
period, after 1974, that the banking system is reorganised, passing from a specialised
banking system to a 'multibank' system which intensified the integration of different
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types of bank activities into a single unit.
The positive rates of growth of the real stock of M4 and of the	 ratio show an
enhanced activity of financial intermediaiies and a recovery of the financial intermedia-
tion process.6
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An outstanding feature of the behaviour of financial savings during this period is its
increase in spite of me real interest rate having negative values throughout the period
(except in 1981). That is, even though the real interest rate on deposits was negative,
financial savings grew in real terms. Increasing financial savings despite real interest
6 The process of financial miennediazion is defined by Fzy (1989) as the 'activity of obtaining
funds from lenders to pass on to borrowers' (p.234). Smith (1978) defines it as 'an essential feature
of the borrowing-lending process' (p.124). Other works also use this term, see for example Zedillo
(1986), or the Annual Repoils of the Bank of Mexico.
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rates being negative, seem to contradict one of the main hypotheses of the theory of
financial liberalisation - which supports the need for positive real interest rates offered on
deposits in order to increase savings and, more specifically, to increase financial savings
which would be further channelled into investment projects.
It is nevertheless true that during 1978 and 1979 one of the objectives of both mone-
taiy and financial policy was to 'simplify and make more effective the instruments of
monetary and credit regulation' as well as to 'increase the flexibility of the financial sys-
tem' (Banco de Mexico, 1979). The measures taken towards achieving this objective
included the substitution of direct control mechanisms on key variables such as the rate
of interest. Indirect mechanisms were established by the Central Bank. These consisted of
weekly revisions of the interest rates offered on bank deposits, which would allow the
interest rate to approach its market level (See Banco de Mexico, 1979). However, the real
interest rate did not become positive. Ghiglia (1990) argues that although the real
interest rate did not become positive, the mechanism established by the Bank of Mexico
fundamentally transformed 'a system of infrequent and isolated adjustments to one of
periodic revisions, taking the first step towards introducing interest rate flexibility' (Gbi-
gliazii, 1990, p.34l).
Interest rates offered on deposits rose in nominal terms becoming less negative in
real terms in 1977 and 1978; decreasing in 1979 and 1980; and becoming positive only in
1981. In 1982, the real interest rate fell due to the high level of inflation.
However, financial savings increased in real terms from 1977 until 1981, showing
the highest increase in 1981 when the real interest rate had its highest and only positive
level. In 1982, financial savings collapsed as did the rest of the economy.
A possible explanation of the evolution of financial savings could be the high rates
of growth of economic activity, income and savings during this period. It must be men-
tioned that both total savings and private savings as a proportion of GDP reached their
highest level in three decades in 1980 and 1981.
36
The relevant issue to be highlighted here is the coincidence of growing financial
savings with negative real interest rates on the one hand, and a fast growth of income and
of savings on the other. The combination of high levels of inflation, negative values of
the real interest rate offered on deposits, rising levels of financial savings in real terms
and the expansion of financial intermediation 7, show that the fast growth of economic
activity during this period seems to have offset the effect of negative real interest rates on
the financial system.
As far as the structure of monetaiy aggregates is concerned, it can be seen that the
public's demand for monetaiy assets decreased throughout the whole period. Meanwhile
the demand for interest bearing financial assets increased. Demand for long term financial
assets (with a redemption period of over one year) fell, as the percentage of total mone-
tary demand decreased in the years that inflation reached its highest levels. It seems that
thereinthelevelsofinflationandtheexpectationsderivedfromitcausedashiftin
monetary demand from long term assets to short term assets.
In 1978 Treasury Bills were introduced for the first time as an alternative source of
finance of the public sector's deficit. Even though during the period analysed they were
still not significant compared to banking finance, their participation increased.
An important factor that allowed the growth of financial savings, especially during
the years of high inflation, was the acceptance of deposits in foreign currency in the
domestic banking system. The overvaluarion of the peso against the dollar increased
throughout the period since the exchange rate was kept fixed and inflation was increasing.
The domestic currency's overvaluation enhanced expectations about a future devaluation
and spurred capital flight. Foreign currency deposits inside the country partially helped to
control the capital flight. After 1976 deposits in dollars in the domestic banking system
began to grow. The proportion of foreign currency-denominated financial assets to total
7 The financial iz*ennediazion ratio 	 rose from 27.4 percent in 1977 to 37.2 percent in
1982.
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interest bearing financial assets rose from 13.4 percent in 1976 to 25.4 percent in 1981.
As the proportion of dollar denominated deposits increased, so did the vulnerability of
the banking system to external shocks. As Ghigliazza (1990) argues: by creating dollar
denominated deposits, the financial system was in effect issuing dollars which the ulti-
mate borrower, i.e. the Mexican government, may not have for repayment.
Since 1973 the Mexican economy has suffered from private capital flight which was
strongly accentuated in 1981 and 1982. Pastor (1990) estimates a capital outflow from
Mexico in the period from 1973 to 1987 of $60,970 million, equal to 63.9 percent of the
change in external debt during the same period. Zedillo (1986) estimates $28,950 million
between 1977 and 1982. The above estimates indicate that more than half of the external
debt was used in effect to compensate for private capital flight.
The combination of high inflation, an overvalued exchange rate, the differentials in
yields between domestic and external financial assets and the expectations of future
devaluation, caused massive capital outflows in 1981. Nevertheless, internal financial
savings increased during this year. In fact, the stock of M4 money had in 1981 its highest
increase in real terms. This is a striking result in the sense that financial savings might be
expected to decrease when capital flight occurs especially to the extent it did in 1981.
The events that happened in 1982, particularly the nationalisanon of private banks
and the cessation of dollar denominated deposits, which were made payable only in
domestic cunency at a rate that implied a loss to savers, eroded the private sector's
confidence in the government and in the financial sector.
1.4.2.2 Credit Policy and the Monetary Base
The monetary base expanded during the 1978-1982 period due to higher levels of
credit required by the public sector and increasing international reserves. In real terms,
the monetary base grew between 9.0 and 12.0 percent per year. Despite high levels of the
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external deficit, gross international reserves increased until 1981 because of foreign capi-
tal inflows. Internal credit to the public sector remained high even though its participation
in the monetazy base decreased (except in 1982); its real rate of growth averaged 10.8
percent per year. In 1982, when foreign capital inflows fell, internal financing recorded
its highest rate of growth, 21 percent in real terms, and reached higher nominal levels
than the monetaiy base itselL Furthennore, the monetary base decreased in real terms
during 1982, due to the exhaustion of international reserves.
In its 1979 Annual Report, the Central Bank stated that the main objective of mone-
taiy policy was to satisfy the demand for credit to finance investment projects. Both
internal and external credit expanded between 1978 and 1981. The inflow of foreign
credit, together with the revenues obtained from oil exports, practically eliminated the
foreign exchange constraint. Foreign exchange resources were enough to support the
huge external deficit on the current account, to increase the level of international reserves
and, in addition, to finance the capital flight.
The reserve requirement of commercial banks was lowered between 1977 and 1981
and its procedure was simplified by establishing a fixed rate differentiating only between
domestic and foreign currency deposits. In 1980, for example, commercial banks had to
deposit 70 percent of their foreign currency deposits in the Central Bank, Out of which
3.5 percent would be used to finance exports and 26.5 percent could be used to finance
other activities. Domestic currency deposits were subject to a lower ratio equal to 37.5
percent.
Selective credit controls continued to be an important credit instrument during this
period. A fixed percentage of commercial banks' liabilities was directed to finance indus-
try and agriculture with subsidised interest rates. In 1980, for example, 4.7 percent of all
commercial banks' domestic currency liabilities was used to finance the agricultural sec-
tor, 2.3 percent was used to finance small industries and 4.2 percent for housing projects.
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Credit channelled through the official trusts also increased. Administered by the
Central Bank, official trusts' subsidised credit was directed mainly to the agricultural and
industrial sectors, to finance export activities, housing projects, and tourism.
LS The Period of Adjustment and Structural Change: 1983-1990
Since 1982, the Mexican economy has experienced low and even negative rates of
growth in some years. The average rate of growth of output from 1983 to 1990 was
approximately one percent, the lowest rate was -4.2 percent in 1983 and the highest rate
3.9 percent in 1990 when the economy started to recover. Both domestic and external
factors explain the long recession. As far as the domestic causes is concerned, the con-
tractionaiy fiscal and monetary policy imposed after 1982 was soon reflected on negative
and low razes of growth of output Concerning the external causes, two main factors
explain the crisis: the abrupt end of external financing and the fall in the international
price of oil on which economic growth was so dependent. The adjustment of the econ-
omy to these events meant years of recession that deeply damaged the standard of living
of the majority of the population.
1982 represents a turning point for Mexican economic policy. The import substitu-
tion strategy was abandoned, and the development strategy changed to outward orienta-
tion. Exports were expected to undertake a leading role, and legal and administrative
requirements were relaxed in order to attract foreign private investment.
The structural adjustment implied a reduction of the state's participation in
economic activity and a major reliance on the private sector. One of the objectives of
economic policy became to allow market forces to allocate resources in order to increase
the 'general efficiency of the economy' (Banco de M&ico, 1990). The major part of the
public sector's enterprises was to be sold to the private and foreign sectors. The struc-
tural change implied that the rules derived from protectionism and state interventionism
Source: Banco de Mexico
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in the economy were to be replaced by liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation.
In late 1982 an agreement was signed with the 1MF. For the first time in the post-
war period, Mexico was required to generate a net annual transfer of resources abroad of
nearly 6% of GDP (Ghigliazza, 1989). The main objectives of economic policy became
to re-establish macroeconomic equilibrium and to reduce inflation, for which contraction-
ary fiscal and monetary policies were implemented. The exchange rate was depreciated in
nominal and real terms. Its nominal value passed from 80.51 pesos per dollar in
December 1982 to 3000.00 pesos per dollar in 1990. Associated with the depreciation of

























An immediate result of the contractionary economic policy was a drastic fall in
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imports. A surplus on the current account of the balance of payments during 1983, 1984,
1985 and 1987 was a consequence of the slowdown in economic activity and the real
exchange rate depreciation.
During 1986 the collapse of the international price of oil (dropping from $25.4 per
barrel in 1985 to $11.9 in 1986) caused export earnings to decrease, leading to a further
reduction in foreign currency resources and thus a further reduction in economic activity.
The slowdown in economic activity was widespread. To recover from the sharp fall of
the oil price, the peso was substantially devalued against the dollar to favour non-oil
exports.
As far as the public sector's fiscal deficit is concerned, despite the fact that its reduc-
tion stood at the core of the adjustment policies, high levels of public deficit persisted
until 1988. Even though a surplus in the primary fiscal balance was obtained, the finan-
cial deficit remained high (the primary fiscal balance excludes all interest payments, both
internal and external). Real interest payments on the public debt increased sharply
between 1983 and 1988. Between 1987 and 1990 interest payments accounted for almost
half of total public expenditure. Interest paid on the public sector domestic debt became
larger than the interest paid on the external debt. The lack of external financing forced
the government to rely on internal resources to finance its deficit. The sources of internal
finance of the public sector's deficit required exceptionally high interest rates; hence, the
high level of internal interest payments, and the further growth of the public sector's
domestic debt.
Meanwhile, the share of public investment in total public expenditure was continu-
ally decreasing. Total public investment declined in real terms throughout the period
from 1983 to 1988. The drastic fall in public investment might have damaged economic
growth since the economy's growth suategy had relied heavily on public investment and
expenditure for more than two decades.
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Concerning private investment, the data show that its real rate of growth fluctuated
markedly and averaged less than 2.0 percent per annum, which is much lower than in the
preceding periods analysed.
Thus, until 1987 the contractionary economic policy, aimed at reducing both the
external and internal deficits and to control inflation, proved to be successful only as far
as the current account deficit is concerned, mainly because of the fall in imports. The
fiscal deficit and the inflation rate were not reduced. By the end of 1987 a new
disinflation programme was introduced. Its main target was to reduce the public sector's
financial deficit and to reduce inflation, for which strict monetary and fiscal policies were
emphasised. Towards the end of 1988, a general freeze was placed on the prices of a
wide range of goods and services. Moreover, the main instrument to control inflation was
the establishment of a fixed exchange rate from April to December 1988, and then con-
trolled depreciation from 1989 onwards. In addition, trade liberalisation was accelerated
with the purpose of 'allong internal prices to be governed by external prices and in this
way reduce inflation' (Ghiglia, 1989). It must be mentioned that the conjunction of a
fixed exchange rate (which implied a revaluation of the real exchange rate) and the pro-
gressive elimination of the trade barriers (in 1986 Mexico joined the GAiT), caused
imports to grow and a subsequent deficit on the current account.
During 1988 and 1989 inflation was reduced from almost 160 percent in 1987 to 20
percent in 1989. In 1988 nominal interest rates were reduced and the public sector's
financial deficit decreased from 16.5 percent of GD? in 1987 to 6 percent in 1989 and to
3.5 percent in 1990, since its borrowing requirement decreased.
13.1 Financial Policy
The relative lack of external resources from 1983 forced Mexico toy on domestic
resources to finance economic growth. Economic policy was oriented to increase both
public and private internal savings and to encourage a major participation of the private
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sector in all economic activities. The financial system was affected by the privatisation
tendency throughout this period. The banking system was nationalised in 1982 and for a
long period of time, until 1990, it was believed that the banking system could not be
privatised again. Commercial banks had to get rid of their brokerage houses as a result of
the 1982 nationalisation. These brokerage houses later became the major private sector
financial institutions. The overall tendency of economic policy towards privatisation
affected the nationalised banking system by contracting its participation in the financial
intennediation market and allowing a spectacular growth of the stock exchange and the
brokerage houses. The latter became increasingly important as a parallel banking system
and as agents for the sale of government bonds to the private sector.
The enhancement of the unregulated financial institutions (mainly brokerage
houses) was to some extent encouraged by the financial and monetary policies of this
period. Interest rate ceilings on traditional banking financial assets were maintained and
high reserve requirements were imposed on the commercial banks. At the same time
brokerage houses were allowed to offer non-banking instruments, mainly government
bonds, ax market detemiined rates of return, normally higher than those offered on bank-
ing deposits. This caused a shift in monetary demand from traditional banking financial
assets to non-banking financial instruments dealt by the private brokerage houses. This
process took place from 1984 until late 1988, but accelerated especially after 1987.
In 1984, considerable alterations were made to the regulations affecting the banking
system. These alterations included the establishment of an annual maximum ceiling for
public sector financing from the Central Bank, and the virtual replacement of the reserve
requirement by operations on the open market as an instrument of monetary regulation.
Both measures pointed towards further reliance on open market operations as the main
instrument of monetary control. Moreover, they tended to strengthen the capital market
and to encourage the development of brokerage houses. Even though the elimination of
reserve requirements did not take place until April 1989, their effectiveness and impor-
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tance kept decreasing as banking deposits declined. Thus, it can be said that during this
period two different financial markets coexisted. On the one hand, the 'repressed' bank-
ing system, and on the other hand, a 'liberalised' private financial system which consisted
mainly of brokerage houses.
Banks worked under interest rates ceilings, while at the same time reserve require-
ments were raised both to limit liquidity, with the aim of controlling inflation, and to
channel a larger portion of bank resources to the public sector. The remuneration that the
Central Bank offered on the reserve requirement was raised, so whenever commercial
banks had excess liquidity due to a poor credit demand from the private sector, banks
increased their deposits in the Central Bank and obtained a profitable margin. In this way,
the rare of remuneration on the reserve requirement deposited in the Central Bank
became a subsidy to the narionalised banking system.
Meanwhile, the government bond market expanded. Among government bonds
offered the most important until 1988 were the Treasury Bills (CETES). The CETES rate
of return became the leading rate in the financial market Its value was decided in an auc-
tion after the government announced the amount to be issued. The rate of return offered
on the CETES was thus more flexible than the interest rate offered on bank deposits. In
fact, it was used by the monetary authorities to fix the interest rate ceilings.
In spite of the efforts made to retain financial savings in the domestic market (a
positive real interest rate was offered on deposits from 1984 until 1986), and despite the
growth of non-banking financial assets in the hands of the public, total financial resources
collected from the public (M4) contracted in real terms from 1983 and did not rise above
the level reached in 1981 until 1989. Possible explanations for the decline in financial
assets held in this period are the slow rate of growth of output and/or the capital flight
that continued throughout the period.
Under the extreme volatility of the real exchange rate and the real interest rates, the
continuous depreciation of the nominal exchange rate and the high rates of inflation, the
45
private sector's expectations did not favour the internal financial system as capital flight
continued. Estimates of capital flight show a figure of more than US$30 billion between
1983 and 1988 (see Pastor, 1990). Capital flight worsened in 1987 and 1988 after the
stock exchange collapsed in October 1987. The real rate of return on the limited
equity-investment market increased disproportionately during 1987 even though one
third of the companies registered in the stock exchange incurred losses according to the
ECLA's estimates. Financial speculation took place against a background of declining
economic activity (ECLA, 1987).
At the end of 1987 a major devaluation of the exchange rate took place and a new
disinflation programme was established. The most important measures adopted, as far as
monetaiy and financial policies are concerned, were: the elimination of the Central
Bank's financing of the public sector's fiscal deficit; a ceiling to commercial banks'
financing of the private sector, and an increase in interest rates. It must be highlighted
that the main anchor of this disinflation programme was a fixed exchange rate. These
measures reinforced the role of open market operations. Moreover, they left the Central
Bank only with the role of regulating the money market but not as a source of finance of
the government's fiscal deficit. The contraction of credit from the Central Bank to the
government can be seen in the fall in the monetary base from 979.1 billion pesos in 1982
to 266.1 billion in 1990 (at constant 1980 prices). As far as the commercial banks are
concerned, from 1988 they were allowed to issue 'bank acceptances' with a market deter-
mined interest rate. This measure was taken in order to enable commercial banks to com-
pete with the brokerage houses. The only restrictions imposed on these acceptances was
that 30 percent of the resources collected through these should be invested in government
securities. The issuance of bank acceptances further restrained the traditional tools of
monetary control: interest rate ceilings and the reserve requirement. By April 1989, the
monetary authorities decided to engage in a major liberalisation programme, providing
free determination of interest rates on all types of bank liabilities and eliminating the
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reserve requirement. Thirty percent of total bank deposits had to be allocated freely
between government bonds and deposits at the Central Bank. Moreover, directed credit
controls and bank obligations to grant subsidised credit to preferential sectors were virtu-
ally abolished. 'if banks aie to operate under a profit rule, they must have the freedom to
invest their resources in the most profitable sectors and to adjust interest rates as neces-
saiy to attract savings' (Ghigliazza. 1990).
During 1988 and 1989, in an effort from the monetary authorities to attract financial
resources, the real interest rate offered on deposits reached its highest level in three
decades, rising from -4.1 percent in 1987 to 26.7 and 29.4 percent in 1988 and 1989
respectively, as a result of the rise in nominal interest rates and the decline of inflation.
Financial savings reacted positively to the rise in real interest rates. The financial inter-
mediation ratio	 rose above 40 percent after 1986 (except in 1988) and the real
stock of M4 reached its highest level in 1989 and 1990.
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CHAPTER II
THE THEORY OF FINANCIAL LIBERALISATION
ILl Introduction
Based on the original models of Mckinnon and Shaw (1973), several developing
economies undertook a financial liberalisation process in the 1970's and 1980's,
motivated primarily by the need to increase the internal sources of finance. Also the
liberalisation process reflected an increasing role of the private sector in the economy.
The larger the reliance of the economy on the private sector, the larger the need for an
efficient financial sector.
The success of the financial liberalisation process in some countries and its failure
in others has provoked an intense theoretical discussion about its nature and content.
RI. Mckinnon states (1988): 'Without retreating to the older view which elevates
repressive financial measures to being potentially desirable instnimenxs of public policy,
we now recognize that our knowledge of how best to achieve financial liberalization
remains seriously incomplete' (p.9). Even though the essential theoretical issues remain
unchanged, he stresses the importance of the order in which the monetaiy system is sta-
bilized in comparison to the pace of deregulation of banks and other financial institutions.
There are two economic approaches to the relationship between financial develop-
ment and the overall economic growth and development: the prior-saving approach and
the investment-led approach. The prior-saving approach argues that financial develop- -
ment encourages economic growth by increasing the amount of lendable funds, increas-
ing credit, and thus increasing investment. 'It stresses the importance and the need for
policies to raise the level of savings which would automatically find investment outlets'
(ThirIwall, 1989, p.266). The investment-led approach argues that growth of the financial
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sector is a function of real output growth: as the economy grows it generates additional
and new demands from the financial system.
The major part of the critical discussion remains within the prior-saving approach,
where investment is determined by the level of savings. It may be said that even the
'neo-structuralist approach' to the financial liberalisation model is also within this analyt-
ical framework. As will be further analysed in this chapter, the neo-structuralist's (Van
Wijnbergen (1983) and Buffle (1984) for example) main criticism is limited to the argu-
ment that financial liberalisation might reduce the amount of loanable funds of the whole
financial sector (including the curb markets 1 ). A higher real interest raze offered by banks
on deposits can attract the funds deposited in the curb market into the formal banking
sector. While banks are subject to reserve requirements (or other forms of compulsory
lending to the public sector through the acquisition of Treasury Bills for example) the
curb market is not subject to any restrictions imposed by the monetaxy authorities. Thus,
the total amount of lendable funds might be reduced if financial resources are withdrawn
from the curb market and deposited in the banking sector. The curb market can freely
lend all of its funds to the private sector whereas the banks are restricted by reserve
requirements and compulsory credit allocations. By reducing the amount of loanable
funds, the financial sector constrains productive investment and slows economic growth.
The recent appearance of the Keynesian criticism to the financial liberalisarion
model, focuses on more traditional matters. The basic argument of the post-Keynesian
authors (such as Burkett (1991), Davidson (1986) and Dutt (1991)) concerning the finan-
cial liberalisazion model is that investment is not supply determined but, on the contrary,
the level of investment is what determines savings via the income multiplier effect. They
argue that high real interest rates negatively affect the growth of output by discouraging
both aggregate consumption and investment, therefore reducing the level of aggregate
demand.
Curb market is defined as an unofficial money and capital market (World Bank, 1989).
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Although the discussion of the causality between financial development and
economic growth remains unresolved (see Patrick 1966, and Mckinnon 1988), the gen-
eral tendency in many developing economies, among them Mexico, has recently shifted
towards the support of the prior-saving approach (see World Bank, 1989). Despite the
uncertainty of a successful result, financial liberalisation stands as a central policy
prescription to developing economies from international funding institutions such as the
IMP and the World Bank. The implications of this shift of economic policy are clear and
direct. Developing economies have been directing their economic policy towards the
liberalisation of their financial sector in order to: restrict the regulation imposed by the
government on the financial system; encourage the participation of the private sector, and
allow the free operation of market forces.
In this chapter we review, analyse and discuss the approach to financial liberalisa-
tion from different theoretical frameworks. The chapter is organised as follows. Firstly,
the original Mckinnon and Shaw theory is reviewed. Then the extensions of the original
model are analysed. Following this, a study of the neo-stnicturalist models is carried out,
the basic argument of which relies on the importance of cuib markets in developing
economies. The neo-structuralist models assume, as the neo-classical models, a prior-
savings approach to investment and economic growth. For this reason both sets of
models have been grouped under the liberalisation framework.
In section three, the so-called 'renewed' debate on financial liberalisaxion is
analysed. This debate takes into consideration bank lending behaviour under risk situa-
tions. In a way, it deals with more operative matters. It is argued that financial markets
are subject to implicit market imperfections because of the nature of the 'goods' they
deal with. Credit is not a normal good, but a 'promise' of payment. As will further be
seen, this gives credit markets special characteristics. In section four we consider the
post-Keynesian approach to financial liberalisation models. Although of recent appear-
ance, they present the consequences of financial liberalisation on investment and growth
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under the assumption that investment is not supply determined but determined by effec-
tive demand. The post-Keynesian view highlights the effect of real interest rate move-
ments on effective demand and output growth. In section five the possibility of commer-
cial banks creating credit, without a prior need to increase their deposits, is discussed.
This possibility is not considered in any of the models analysed.
Before undertaking the major analysis, the concepts of financial repression and
financial liberalisation must be defined. The former is understood as a situation in which
government and Central Bank regulations tend to distort financial markets. These regu-
lations mainly refer to: reserve requirements on commercial banks, interest rates ceilings
and compulsoiy credit allocations with or without subsidised interest rates. It is argued
that the consequences of financial repression constrain the growth of savings, investment
and growth. Financial repression causes the flow of lendable funds to decrease in the for-
mal financial sector, forcing potential investors to rely more on self finance. It distorts
credit allocation and causes inefficiencies in the productive sector. It encourages wealth
holders to acquire physical assets instead of financial assets. It encourages capital flight.
And the process of self-finance is itself impaired. If the real yield on deposits is not
attractive, firms cannot accumulate liquid assets to undertake investment.
In contrast, financial liberalisanon signifies a substantial reduction of government
intervention in setting interest rates and allocating credit either by doing away entirely
with the interventionist regime or by gradually reducing it. The objectives of financial
libera]isaxion are mainly to increase both the total level of savings and financial savings,
with the aim of making this saving available for productive investment purposes. Market
forces are supposed to maxiznise the availability of savings for investment as well as its
allocative efficiency, a prescription which, as argued by FitzGerald (1993), is a 'logical
consequence' of the neoclassical assumption that 'the market mechanism is the best
mechanism for an efficient allocation of resources' (p.9).
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11.2 The Liberalisation Models
11.2.1 The Mckinnon and Shaw Theories
Based on the assumption that a repressed financial system hampers economic
growth and development, RI. Mckinnon (1973) and B. Shaw (1973) wrote in support of
financial liberalisation in developing economies. They argued that by fixing nominal
interest rate ceilings the monetary authorities slowed the growth of the financial system,
and impaired savings, investment and economic growth.
In a financially repressed economy, it is assumed that the growth of output is con-
strained by savings. Nominal interest razes ceilings might lead, in an inflationaxy environ-.
men!, to low or even negative real interest rates that encourage present consumption and
reduce savings. A low level of savings constrains the level of investment and of capital
accumulation. 'The real raze of interest as the return to savers is the key to a higher level
of investment and as a rationing device to greater investment efficiency' (Fry, 1988,
p.19). Under this line of thought, the effect of a rise in the real interest raze is two-fold: it
increases savings and, by discouraging low yielding investment, it raises the average
efficiency of investment (efficiency meaning a high rate of return and productivity). Both
effects interact to achieve a higher quantity and quality of investment.
RI. Mckinnon wrote in 1973 on the importance of a unified capital market in less
developed economies. Market fragmentation, intra- and inter-sectoral, is a characteristic
of developing economies. Individual firms or households are so isolated that they face
different prices, including interest rates, and have an unequal access to technology. The
existence of a fragmented economy (including capital market fragmentation) leads to an
inefficient allocation of capital since the isolation of economic agents retains economic
resources mainly within the firm-household sector, and surplus units cannot allocate their
resources in more productive areas. Capital market fragmentation, by constraining firms
and households to self finance, distorts the allocation of resources, hence the importance
52
of a unified capital market.
Together with economic agents being confined to self-finance, the 'lumpiness' of
investment expenditures and their indivisibility leads Mckinnon to formulate a Corn-
plementarity Hypothesis between money and capital. Potential investors must accumu-
late money balances prior to their investment expenditure. In turn, money (broadly
defined) accumulation is encouraged by high interest rates offered on deposits. The
money demand function can thus be expressed as a function of income, investment, and
the real raze of interest as follows:
(MIP)'=f(Y, flY, dne )
	
(2.1)
where: MIPis the real stock of money (using the broadest definition of money); Y is real
gross national product and represents the transactions motive for holding money; flY is
thcratioofgmssinveszznenttoGNP;and(dit')istherealdepositinterestrate(iif is
expected inflation). If r, the return on capital is included in the money demand function,
the partial derivative of (MIP)' with respect to r, would be positive,
	 f/p)d 
>0,
because a rise in r is associated with an increase in the investment ratio.
It has been argued that Mckinnon's Complementariry Hypothesis is difficult to test
empirically due to the correlation that both the stock of financial assets and investment
have with the level of income.2
Complementarity between money and capital runs both ways: a rise in desired
investment increases money demand and a rise in the real return on holding money will




2 p ) (1988) conejudes that empirical suppozi for Mckinnon's Complementarity Hypothesis is
'tenuous at best'.
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Nevertheless, the positive relation between investment and the real deposit interest
rate is maintained only up to the point where the 'conduit effect' offsets the 'competing










Up to point A money acts as a conduit to investment, and the relation between the
real interest rate and investment is positive. After point A the real interest rate turns more
attractive than the real yield on investment, hence investment is reduced. Complementar-
ity between money and capital exists only if the real interest rate is lower than the real
return on investment, otherwise, money and capital are substitutes. Mckinnon stresses
the importance of positive real interest rates to enhance self-financed investment. Positive
real interest rates fulfill several functions concerning savings and investment: first, as a
store of value because wealth held as financial assets at least keeps its real value; second,
to increase the proportion of savings held as financial assets; and third to increase private
savings and inve.tment given their sensitivity to the real return on holding money. Furth-
ermore, positive real interest rates, through the 'competing asset effect' will reduce
investments whose rates of return are negative 'because individuals will not hold non-
monetaly assets on which the return is less than that earned on highly liquid balances'
54
(Mckinnon, 1973, p.62). By increasing the average rate of return on investment the qual-
ity of the capital stock is increased.
Edward Shaw (1973) argues that in a financially repressed economy investment is
constrained by a shortage of savings. He proposes that financial deepening -the process
of increasing the size of the financial sector relative to the rest of the economy- resulting
from financial liberalisation and development is a way to eliminate the savings con-
straint: 'Measures to raise real rates of return on financial assets, to reduce the variance of
returns, and to improve financial technology, along with measures in non-financial areas,
extend savers horizons over both space and time' (Shaw, 1973, p.73). According to
Shaw, the scarcity of wealth in less developed economies gives no reason to expect that
the substitution effect of interest rates on savings will be offset by the income effects.
Further, financial deepening permits unification of a segmented capital market by reduc-
ing differences in investment yields. The unification of the capital market makes large
investment projects feasible by pooling savings into the same market
Shaw's Debt Intermediation View develops an alternative theory3 of the role of
the financial system in economic development, where he stresses the importance of a
liberalised financial system as a means to increase savings, investment and investment
efficiency. It strongly opposes any kind of government intervention in the financial sys-
tem and criticises the argument that market forces do not work in LDCs: 'Market forces
are ready to work toward development if given the opportunity' (Shaw, 1973, p.107).
Although both Mckinnon and Shaw argue that real interest rates should be positive
and that interest rate ceilings should be abolished, their reasoning for doing so is dif-
ferent. Mckinnon states that the accumulation of money balances is a necessary condition
for investment expenditure, given the assumption that investment in less developed
The Debt Intermediation View contradicts the Neoclassical and Keynesian assumption of
substitutability between money and capitaL If it is assumed that money and capital are substitutes,





economies is mostly self-financed. Accumulation of money balances is encouraged by
high real interest rates. On the other hand, Shaw argues that the increased liabilities of the
banking system resulting from higher real interest rates enable the banking system to lend
more resources to productive investment. Shaw doesn't consider investment to be pn-
manly self-financed.
Fry (1988) illustrates the essential common elements of the Mckinnon and Shaw
models in the following figure:
Figure 2
Savings, Investmeii
Financial repression, through interest rate ceilings (depicted by the horizontal line
F) sets the real interest rate r0 below its equilibrium level Te. Investment is constrained
by savings to If the loan interest rate is not subject to a ceiling the borrower would
face a loan interest rate equal to r2 . In this case the supply of funds would be short and
expensive. The rise of the real deposit interest rate from r 0 to r 1 increases the quantity of
savings (and hence the quantity of investment) and also shifts the savings curve from S10
to S. The shift of the savings curve occurs when the rate of economic growth increases
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(from go to g 1) as a consequence of the improvement in the productivity of investment:
the rise of the real interest rate increases the productivity of investment by making attrac-
tive only those investment projects with a yield higher than r 1 . Investment projects that
yield a lower rate than r 1 cease to be profitable. With no financial repression the real
interest rate achieves its equilibrium level r, further increasing savings, investment and
groWth to S, 4 and ge respectively.
11.2.2 Extensions of the Mckinnon-Shaw Model
In this section the common features of the neo-classical 4 models of financial liberal-
isation will be analysed.
The Mckinnon-Shaw model and those developed by Kapur, Mathieson and Fxy
among others, consider that the output growth maximising deposit rate of interest is the
competitive free-market equilibrium rate. The rise in the real rate of interest will increase
financial savings thus raising the real supply of credit and hence the rate of economic
growth by increasing investment.
11.2.2.1 The Demand for Money Function
The money demand function is specified as a positive function of both the real




Even though Mckinnon and Shaw contradict ibe neo-classical assumption of substitutability




where:	 is real monetary demand, (d - Ire) is the real deposit rate of interest and Y is
the level of income.
In order for the money demand to be positively related to the real interest rate,
'money' must be considered in its broad definition so as to include interest yielding depo-
sits. If the definition of money was limited to narrow money (Ml) the relationship
between the demand for money and the real rate of interest could be expected to be nega-
tive since coins and currency do not yield interest. The demand for broad money (M2,
M3 or M4)5 in real terms varies positively with the nominal interest rate and negatively
with inflation. If interest rates ceilings exist, the real interest rate can become negative
with inflation and discourage the demand for money (broadly defined). Some authozs
include other explanatory variables besides income and the deposit rate of interest in the
demand for money function. For example, Shaw includes a trend term to reflect the
stimulating effect on the demand for money that technological improvement in the
money industry has. As well, he includes the rate of return on physical wealth to indicate
the opportunity cost of holding money. Since physical wealth is heterogeneous due to
market segmentation (or fragmentation), the rate of return on physical wealth should be
interpreted as a vector of rates of return. (Shaw, 1973, p.62).
1L2.2.2 Supply of Credit Functions
Within the financial liberalisation models the supply of loans or credit offered by
the banking sector is determined by the financial resources procured by the banking see-
tor. The resources procured by the banking system - coins and currency, view deposits,
time and savings deposits plus other financial assets - are the liabilities backing the assets
Ml includes coins, currency and view deposits; M2 includes Ml plus short term banking
financial insinunents; M3 includes M2plus noo-baz*ing financial instruments (such as Treasury
Bills and other government bonds); includes M3 plus long term banking financial instruments. Ml
is a narrow definition of money and does not consider money as a store of value.
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of the banks (i.e. credit and reserves). Thus, the amount of loanable funds is determined
by the liabilities of the banking system, that is, by the monetary aggregate that includes
all monetary and financial assets deposited in the banking system. The supply of loans




Thus the supply of loans can be maximised if the real interest rate offered on deposits is
at its market determined equilibrium level in order to increase the banking sector's liabil-
ities.
The reserve requirement imposed by the Central Bank on the commercial banks'
liabilities lowers the amount of credit available to the private sector. The reserve require-
ment has been commonly used by Central Banks in developing countries as an important
source of finance (if not the most important) of the public sector's deficit (Welsh, 1986).
If (l—q) is the reserve ratio, the supply of loans is equal to the proportion q of the mone-
tary stock M: L = qM. The higher the reserve ratio (1—q) the lower is the proportion of
financial resources that is available to be lent to the private sector. These models consider
that the diversion of resources to the public sector through the reserve requirement leads
to its inefficient allocation since it is not determined by the market. The reserve require-
mern, as an instrument of financial repression, reduces and niisallocates savings (Qianda-
varkar, 1990). Considering an economy in which credit supply is restricted, 'government
reliance on this source of financing is likely to squeeze the private sector from which the
bulk of investment must come' (Brimmer, 1971).
The reserve requirement sets an upper limit to the deposit interest rate. This can be
seen in Kapur's model (1976) in which it is assumed that banks are in competitive
equilibrium with zero profits; the government pays no interest on bank reserves; and the
costs of the monetary system are a constant fraction z of the real money stock MIP.
Under these circumstances, the deposit rate of interest is determined by the reserve
requirement q, the loan rate of interest 1, and the banks' intermediation costs z
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d = qi - z
	
(2.6)
It is further assumed that the real loan interest rate (1— it) has to be lower than the
real rate of profit r since otherwise loan demand would fall to zero:
(1 - it) <r
	
(2.7)
The latter implies that the deposit raze of interest has an upper bound determined by:
d <q (r + it) - z
	
(2.8)
Thus the higher the reserve ratio, the lower is the deposit rate.









ccr cc ce	 Lendable Funds
The supply of credit S is a positive function of the interest rate offered on deposits i.
The demand for credit D is a negative function of the loan rate r. Equilibrium at point e
exists if there are no regulations and no transaction costs; in this case, the loan rate would
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be equal to the deposit rate: r e = e The costs implied by financial intermediation shift
the supply curve to the left to S c . To cover transaction costs financial intermediaries
charge r C on loans and pay i on deposits. The intermediation ratio is then (rC - jC) The
amount of credit supplied is reduced to C c . if the Central Bank does not pay any interest
on reserve requirements, commercial banks are forced to increase the spread between the
lending and the deposit rate to cover the higher costs (price effect on credit) at the same
time that the supply of credit is reduced (quantity effect on credix).EThe existence of non-
interest yielding reserve requirements further shifts the supply curve to the left to S°;
increases the spread to (r - ia), and lowers the supply of credit to C01(
It is thus suggested as a growth-enhancing economic policy either the reduction of
the required reserve ratio (l—q) or the payment of the market clearing loan rate on
required reserves. It has been argued, therefore, that the abolition of the reserve require-
ment will maximise the rate of growth of output (Fry, 1988).
112.2.3 Savings Functions
One of the objectives of financial liberalisation is to increase the aggregate level of
savings. The higher real interest rate achieved through financial liberalisation is intended
to increase savings by discouraging present consumption. It is assumed that the substitu-
tion effect on savings caused by a change in the real interest rate will be larger than the
income effect.
Although the encouragement of savings is clearly stated as an objective of financial
liberalisazion policy, some models, such as Kapur's (1976) and Marhieson's (1980), do
not explicitly state a savings function. In their models, it is the money demand that is
affected by the real interest rate and not the level of savings. There seems to be a confu-
sion about three different concepts: money demand (broadly defined), financial savings
and total aggregate savings. Some models consider the three concepts as the same thing.
For the neo-classical models (Mathieson and Kapur), financial savings equal total aggre-
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gate savings. Fry introduces a definition of financial savings as the process of accumulat-
ing financial assets. He defines financial savings as the difference in the real stock of
money (broadly defined) held in the financial sector between period t and period t-1:
M, - M,_1 . Hence financial savings is defined as a 'change in stock' and might be com-
parable to the 'flow' of savings. The World Bank defines financial savings as 'the portion
of total wealth held in the form of financial assets' (World Bank, 1989). Nevertheless,
financial savings, either defined as the stock or as the change in the stock of money
deposited in the financial system, is only one of the forms in which the flow of savings
can be held. While saving is defined as the difference between disposable income and
consumption, financial savings can be thought of as the proportion of total savings that is
channelled through the domestic financial system.
The analysis of financial liberalisation models is sometimes confusing in the sense
that often it is not clearly specified which relevant variable, financial savings or aggregate
savings (private or total), is to be affected by interest rate movements. It must be stressed
that the behaviour of financial savings is not necessarily the same as private or total sav-
ings. Financial savings respond faster to movements in the interest rare than total savings.
There is wide evidence that financial savings have been strongly responsive to real depo-
sit rates of interest (see Chandavarkar, 1990). However, since aggregate savings is sub-
ject to two opposite effects (income and substitution effects), the total effect of changes
in the real interest rate on savings is indeterminate. 'Changes in real rates of interest
affect the two major types of savings (i.e. financial and real) differently and to some
extent these effects may neutralise each other' (i.e. no significant change in aggregate
savings arises) (Gonzalez Arrieta, 1988, p.597). As Dombusch and Reynoso (1989)
argue: '...it is surprising, therefore, to find so strong a belief in the ability of higher
interest rates to mobilise savings' (p.205).
It cannot be assumed that the rise in financial savings implies an increase in total
savings. Furthermore economic policies that encourage financial savings might deter say-
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ings growth if they adversely affect investment. Thus it must be cleariy specified if the
relevant variable is either total savings or financial savings, since it is mistaken to con-
sider them as being the same concept.
Fxy develops a life-cycle type savings function (Fly, 1988). The life-cycle
hypothesis of consumption and savings preswnes that changes in population growth
should have substantial effects on the level of savings through changes in the age struc-
ture of the population. Under the life-cycle hypothesis savings takes on a general age-
specific form. The utility maximisation behaviour leads the individual to dissave during
youth and old age in order to maintain the level of utility, and to save when the level of
income is high. The life-cycle's savings ratio function is assumed to be influenced by the
following variables: the growth of real income (g); the dependency ratio (DR); foreign
savings as a proportion of GNP (); the real deposit interest rate (d - ire); the world
real rate of interest (r); the expected real return on investment (Te), the ratio of net
domestic credit to the government sector to total domestic credit (DCGR); and the ratio
of external debt to GNP (DTIY). These last variables are included to test the effect of the
government's budgetary position on national saving. The savings ratio function can be
expressed as:
S,=SIY=f(s, DR, S1IY, dite, re,.., re, DCGR, DTIY)	 (2.9)









aDCGR > or <0 aDTIY
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The dependency ratio (DR) (defined as the ratio of people below and above a certain
age that do not earn any income, over the total of the population 6) is likely to negatively
affect the savings rate. A higher foreign savings ratio (S1/Y) will tend to reduce the
domestic interest rate, probably because the public sector's borrowing requirement
declines. The decrease of the domestic real interest rate causes the saving ratio to fall.
The real rate of interest on financial assets (d - lte) will increase the savings rate if
the substitution effect outweighs the income effect. It is possible, theoretically, that the
income effect could outweigh the substitution effect causing consumption to increase.
'There is, however, no plausible basis for expecting such a preference structure; conse-
quently one anticipates that a rise in the domestic real interest rate would increase the
rate-of-growth effect' (Fiy, 1988, p.50). He defines the rate-of-growth effect as the situa-
tion in which the lifetime resources of young savers exceed those of old dissavers and
there is positive aggregate saving.
Following this argument,, the author does consider the possibility of the income
effect outweighing the substitution effect on savings caused by a change in the real
interest rate. In this case he argues that 'a higher real interest rate may not raise the true
saving rate but rather free more resources for productive investment. Its true effect may
be on the average efficiency of investment, not on its volume' (Fry, 1988, p.50). Thus,
the effect of the real interest rate on investment and growth will be positive despite its
effect on savings, due to its effect on the average efficiency of investment.
In Fzy's argument it is not clearly stated if the relevant variable to be affected by a
higher real interest rate is total savings or financial savings. He clearly specifies that sav-
ings must be prior to investment: 'Domestic investment can be financed from both
national and foreign saving, but everywhere national saving provides the bulk of
resources for investment. Hence saving behavior is a crucial element of the process of
6 An age limit is not specified since in some developing countries the average age of consuming
and the average age of earning an income are not well defined.
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economic growth' (Fry, 1988, p.l3l). He does, however, then argue that 'any observed
association [between real interest rates and savings] may indicate that there is substitu-
tion between saving embodied in physical goods that are not recorded as investment in
the national income accounts and saving embodied in financial assets which does finance
investment' (Fry, 1988, p.50). Therefore, in accordance with the above argument finan-
cial savings appear as the relevant variable to be affected by changes in the real interest
rates, since financial savings do finance investment while real savings do not. When the
savings ratio equation is empirically tested, Fry reaches the conclusion that the national
savings rate is increased by about 0.1 percentage point for each I percentage point rise in
the real deposit rate of interest, implying thus that the substitution effect caused by a
change in the real interest rate is greater than the income effect.
Considering the effect of the 'world interest rate' (r, which could be LIBOR or
Prime Rate) on the savings rate, the expected sign of the partial derivative is negative.
Since a higher external real interest rate (compared to the domestic one) might provoke
capital outflows, legal or illegal, it may reduce national saving.
To the extent that investment is self-financed, the expected real return on investment
r 1 affects the savings rate. A higher re will cause investors to accumulate financial assets
to undertake an investment project. The relevant variable in this case might be financial
savings and not the savings ratio. This argument reflects Mckinnon's Complementarity
Hypothesis.
The effect of the government's domestic budgetary position (DCGR) on the savings
ratio is expected to be negative. As the government's domestic debt increases, he argues
that taxes are expected to increase thus causing households to remove their savings
abroad to evade taxation. The same argument applies to the government's external debt
(DT). If the external debt rises, households may well anticipate increased future tax bur-




It is not the objective of increasing savings per se that interests economic theory,
but increasing savings as a prior condition to increase investment. As in classical theory,
the models of financial liberalisation rely on the assumption that savings is a pre-requisite
of investment. They are also characterised by 'a belief that savings will readily find
investment outlets' [through variations in the rate of interest] (rhirlwail,, 1989, p.266)
and that all investment should be financed from voluntary and/or involuntary savings
without inilazionaiy finance involved.
In classical theory, investment is specified as a negative function of the rate of
interest. An increasing interest rate means a higher price of funds and therefore a decline
in the demand for investment. Savings, or the supply of funds, is a positive function of
the interest rate. The level of investment (and savings) is determined in the lendable
funds market at the level at which the interest rate equals the supply of and the demand
for lendable funds. If the interest rate is below its equilibrium level, investment demand
is constrained at a lower level by the supply of savings. Under these circumstances, a rise
in the interest rate would increase the supply of funds and therefore investment. A posi-
tive relation exists between the interest rate and investment up to the point where the
interest rate, or the price of lendable funds, reaches its equilibrium level. If the interest
rate is above its equilibrium level, investment falls as the price of lendable funds
increases. The relationship between the level of investment and the interest rate becomes
negative if investment is not constrained by the supply of savings.
In financial liberalisation models, the equilibrium interest rate is not explicitly con-
sidered as a switching point in the relationship between investment and the interest rate.7
Mckinnon (1973) does consider the equilibrium real interest rate as a switching point in the
relationship between self-financed investment and the interest rate, as be distinguishes between
the conduit effect of the interest rate on investment when the interest rate is below its equilibrium
level, and the competing asset effect when the interest rate is above its equilibrium level.
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Complementarity between money and capital is the concept backing the positive relation-
ship between investment and the real interest rate. As opposed to the classical and the
Keynesian theories of investment, both of which consider money and capital as being
substitutes and not complementary, financial liberalisation theorists assume that the accu-
mulation of money (or financial asset) stocks is a precondition for investment.
Financial liberalisation models consider that there are two ways in which financial
repression can negatively affect investment: firstly, since financial repression deters sav-
ings, the resources available for investment decline. Hence the quantity of investment is
affected. Secondly, artificially low real rates of interest and selective credit controls lead
to an inefficient allocation of the existing savings, affecting the quality of investment.
The positive impact of financial liberalisation on investment is through the freeing of
resources to be mobilised through market forces in order to increase both the quantity and
the quality of investment.
First the theoretical impact of financial liberalisation on the quantity of investment
will be analysed. As previously explained, interest rate ceilings and reserve requirements
lower the amount of lendable funds. In practice, this means a reduction in credit availa-
bility to the private sector and hence lower investment. Investment, assumed to be supply
determined, is stated as a function of credit.
In Kapur's model (1976), for example, the supply of loans appeals as the main
determinant of investment. He assumes that there is unused fixed capital in the economy
and that output is constrained by working capital. 8 The ratio of working capital to total
utiised capital K is (1— ct). Banks provide a fraction 0 of the cost of replacing depleted
working capital. The cost of keeping working capital at a constant level is expressed as:
P 0(1 - ct)K, where t.P is the change in the price level. The net addition of total utilised
capital or investment is:
$ Working capital includes: labour, intermediate inputs and raw materials.
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1	 [lLL.Pe(1a)K]	 (2.10)i.K =Jnv =
(1—a)	 P
where bL is the nominal increase in bank loans. The term in brackets can be interpreted
as the net quantity of real credit available for total capital expansion (fixed and working
capital). The higher the proportion of working capital to total utilised capital (1 - a), the
lower the accumulation of capital.
Given that commercial banks' liabilities consist only of deposits while assets consist
of loans and reserves, the amount of money held in the banking system is a determinant
variable for the supply of loans. The elimination of credit ceilings increases the supply
of loans. There is a positive relation between the deposit rate of interest, credit and the
quantity of investment. On the other hand, the lower the proportion of required reserves
out of total assets, the higher the credit supply.
Mathieson (1980) assumes that a percentage e of all additions to capital (fixed and
working capital) are financed by borrowing from the financial system (composed only of
banks). This determines the total real demand for loans:
P
	 (2.11)
where L' is nominal demand for loans, P is the price level and Kis the capital stock. In
addition to this financing decision, capitalists must decide on what additions they will
make to the existing stock of capital. It is assumed that additions to the stock of capital
are explained as a function of the level of income and of the firms' savings ratio. Given
that firms finance 0 percent of all capital stock additions through bank borrowing, the
savings ratio will be sensitive to changes not only in the return on capital (rk) but also to
the real loan rate (r1 - it') (Mathieson, 1980):
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IKInv=s(rk —rl +ir')Y	 (2.12)
a(rk—r,+,r') >0
This relationship determines not only the growth of the total capital stock but also the
demand for new loans. The supply of loans is determined by the real demand for depo-




Considering that demand for deposits is a function of the real deposit rate (d - lte)
and of real output (Y):
DIP =f(d - ire) Y	 (2.14)
equilibrium in the loan market and money market is achieved when the supply of loans






To support the level of loans OK, deposits must equal -. 'The deposit rate should
be set at a level that yields not only the level of savings that will allow the financial sys-
tem to satisfy the initial excess demand for credit but also to generate a sustained flow of
financial savings over time' (Mathieson, 1980, p.3W7). A higher reserve ratio (1—q)
lowers the proportion of bank assets devoted to the supply of loans to the private sector q
and hence the supply of loans Ls. Since the total real demand for loans is interest inelas-









the shift to the left of the supply of loans curve, from S j to S2 caused by a rise in the
reserve ratio increases the loan rate from 1 1012 and lowers investmem iK.
Fry (1988) includes credit to the private sector as an explanatory variable in the
investment ratio equation. He specifies the following equationi
flY /lr y -	 TIC, 7TG,- i . DC,ly,_ 1 , DT/Y, DC,IDC, r,1., (IIY),_ i ]	 (2.18)
where: (y) is the rate of change of real output; (ITG) is the terms of trade 9; (DCi) is
credit to the private sector, (DTIY) is the ratio of government's public debt to GNP;
(DC/DC) is the ratio of public credit to total credit; and (ri,. ) is the external real interest
rate. 'One prediction of this model of financial repression is that a rise in the deposit rare
towards its free-market equilibrium level will increase the availability of private sector
domestic credit in real tenns and hence stimulate investment' (Fry, 1988, p.56).
The terms of trade are supposed to affect investment in three ways: first, a terms of trade im-
provement that is anticipated raises investment in the period before the improvement occurs
(modelled by including the next period's terms of trade variable 7TG, + ); the contemporaneous
effect ( lrGj; and the subsequent adjustment (TrG,..1).
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Financial repression also affects the quality of investment. The inefficient allocation
of savings in a financially repressed economy leads to investment's inefficiency since low
real loan interest rates (subsidised rates) allow low levels of marginal return and produc-
tivity in the sector or industry where they are allocated. By inefficient allocation of sa y
-ings it is meant that the market forces are not being allowed to reflect the scarcity of capi-
tal; thus savings are not channelled where the productivity of capital is highest. Raising
the real interest rate to its equilibrium level will deter investment projects with low yields
and will raise the average productivity of investment. If the levels of marginal produc-
tivity and of the marginal return on investment are equalised among different sectors of
the economy it implies that savings are being allocated efficiently.
The nature of this hypothesis makes it difficult to test empirically since the marginal
return on capital is difficult to measure. Nevertheless, there are some studies that support
this hypothesis. Oo (1988), for example, argues that the best way to measure the afloca-
tive efficiency of savings is to compare the marginal rates of return on capital investment
across different sectors. Due to the difficulty of measuring the marginal rates of return on
investment, Cho assumes that the marginal rate of return on investment is equal to the
firm's marginal cost of borrowing. This assumption leads him to conclude that a reduc-
tion in the variance of the average cost of borrowing in different sectors of the economy
reflects a major efficiency in savings (credit) allocation.
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11.2.3 The Neo-Structuralist Models
This section will analyse the main aspects of the neo-structuralist models (Van
Wijnbergen (1983) and Buffle (1984)) of financial liberalisation. Although the neo-
siructuralist models question the advantages of financial liberalisation, describing finan-
cial liberalisation as 'a risky undertaking, a step in the dark given the present state of
empirical knowledge' (Buffle, 1984, p.306); we consider that these models can be placed
under the liberal theoretical framework since they do not dispute the essential arguments
of the financial liberalisarion model, in the sense that they do not question the prior-
savings approach and assume that savings is a prior step to investment. These models
mainly deal with the relative role of the curb market in the financial system and its
impact on real sector variables of less-developed financially repressed economies.
Financial repression rations credit availability from the banking sector to the private
sector. This credit rationing causes the curb market to grow as the increasing demand for
credit needs to be satisfied. The domestic financial system hence consists of the regulated
banking sector and the non-regulated curb market. In the banking sector, the supply of
loans is determined by deposits and the required reserve ratio. Bank loan rates are pegged
ax low real rates and it is assumed that finns are more than willing to absorb the available
supply of subsidised finance, as it is offered at below market interest rates. Loans in the
curb market make up the difference between the demand and supply of bank credit.
In Buffle's model, a rise in the required reserve ratio (1—q) exerts a contractionaiy
effect since it reduces the supply of loans, thus increasing the demand for loans in the
curb market, which, in turn, raises the curb market interest rate.
The elimination of interest rate ceilings will increase the demand for deposits from
the banking system, as stated in the function:




where: DIP is real demand for deposits; 1d is the deposit rate of interest; i, is the curb
market interest rate; Y is output; and W is total wealth. The increase in the deposit rate of
interest will attract savings kept as non-banking financial assets 10 into the banking sys-
tem. The substitution from non-banking financial assets constitutes an increase in the
total supply of loans if the funds transferred into the banking sector were not formerly
kept as curb market loans. If financial resources are transferred from the curb market into
the banks, the total supply of loans will be reduced because banks are subject to reserve
requirements. 'If curb loans constitute a large share of total loanable funds and are rela-
tively good substitutes with demand deposits, the total supply of credit in the economy
can contract. For financial liberalisarion to succeed, demand deposits must be much
better substitutes with currency and foreign bonds than with curb loans' (Buffie, 1984,
p.312).
Focusing on the different effects that financial liberalisation has in the long-run and
in the short-run, Buffle considers the possibility of financial liberalisation yielding suc-
cessful results in the long run. It is possible that in the long run total savings may
increase as a result of higher deposit interest rates, which in turn causes total wealth to
increase. The increase in total wealth, and hence the increase in the demand for both curb
market loans and bank deposits, might be enough to offset the unfavourable substitution
that takes place from curb market loans to bank deposits which cause the total supply of
loans to contract. Nevertheless, it is implied that in the short run total savings cannot
increase so as to affect the total amount of wealth.
Van Wijnbergen (1983) develops an IS-LM model in which, in the steady state, the
banking interest rate offered on deposits does not affect the IS curve (the locus of points
depicting equilibrium in the goods market), but does change the financial asset portfolio
people are willing to hold, as asset holders move out of currency and curb market loans
10 Buffie assumes that wealth is kept either in currency, deposits, foreign bonds or curb loans.
Curb loans are modelled as the demand for an asset stock.
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into time deposits. The direction of the shift of the LM curve (the locus of points depict-
ing equilibrium in the money market) will depend on the relative sensitivity of the
demand for the two alternative assets (currency and curb market loans) to changes in time
deposit interest rates.
Since loans are modelled as an asset, the demand for loans in the curb market is:
L d f(iiY)W	 (2.20)
iL <0 L>0
where: (La) is the demand for loans in the curb market; (ii) is the interest rate offered on
bank deposits; (Y) is real income; and (W) is wealth.
If people shift mainly out of curb market loans after a rise in the time deposit rate,
the total supply of funds to the private sector will decline 'as funds are shifted from the
curb market which provides one for one intermediation (no reserve requirements) into the
banking system which provides only partial intermediation partial because a fraction is
syphoned off into required and free reserves rather than passed on to firms' (Van
Wijnbergen, 1983a, p.439). As a result of this substitution the curb market interest rate
rises to I' and economic activity decreases to g' (see figure 5)•h1 If people shift from
currency (or any other unproductive financial asset) into banking deposits, then the bank-
ing sector will partially pass these funds into the private sector and the supply of funds
will increase. This increase causes the interest rate in the curb market to fall to i" and the
rate of growth to increase to g".












Interest raze policies affect investment and growth through the supply of loans.
Neo-structuralisz models stress the importance of credit in less developed economies: 'It
is an institutional fact in most LDC's that commercial bank credit is used almost
exclusively for business loans to finance working and fixed capital requirements. This
results in a direct transmission mechanism between domestic credit and production' (Van
Wijnbergen, 1983b, p.63).
Neo-structuralist models have been criticised for presenting the same propositions
as the Mckinnon-Shaw models (see Cho, 1990). Both seek the expansion of a liberalised
financial sector to promote savings and growth both argue that liberalised financial sys-
tems are more efficient and both suggest the elimination of reserve requirements. 'The
difference is that the Mckinnon-Shaw group wants to liberalize a repressed sector (the
banking sector) on the grounds that it is the only organized ma±et, and that the organized
market is more efficient than the unorganized sector. The neo-structuralists, on the other
hand, argue that there is already a liberalized and efficient sector (the curb market) and
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that more funds flow through it' (Cho, 1990, p.478).
It must be mentioned that the neo-structuralist models completely neglect the possi-
bility of reserve requirements having productive uses through financing public expendi-
ture. It is well known that in developing economies reserve requirements are one of the
main sources of financing the public sector's deficit. Reserve requirement funds might be
used to finance public investment. In this case, the diversion of funds through reserve
ratios would increase the stock of capital and economic growth. There is no a priori rea-
son to argue that funds diverted through reserve ratios are unproductive. Reserve ratios
might reduce the total supply of loans to the private sector but not the whole credit sup-
ply if we consider that credit given to the public sector can have productive uses.
E. Shaw (1973) estimates that savings channelled into the curb market into inven-
tories of real assets and into foreign assets 'must be a multiple of savings that flow on a
voluntaxy basis to repressed monetaiy systems' (p. 136). U Tun Wai (1980) argues that
curb markets or unorganised credit markets predominate in rural areas. Moreover, he says
that curb markets can be equated with rural credit markets (p. 169). He estimated for thir-
teen developing countries that a proportion of between thirty and forty percent of credits
given by the curb market were given to finance consumption expenditures and the rest
was used for productive puiposes in the agricultural sector at very high interest rates.
Even though little information is available regarding the curb market in developing
economies, it is sensible to think that the curb market is more important in rural areas
where financial institutions' branches are sparse. As well, it is difficult to assume that
curb market loans are mainly used to finance industrial working capital as assumed by
the neo-stnicturalist models. If, curb market loans are used to finance consumption, the
neo-structuralist argument of a decrease in the aggregate supply of loans and hence of
investment as a consequence of financial deepening, is weakened.
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11.3 Market Failures, Macroeconomic Stability and Bank Supervision
Much of the failure of financial liberalisation has been explained by some authors
(Mckinnon (1988), Villanueva and Mirakhor (1990), Sundararajan and Balino (1990) for
example) as the result of macroeconomic instability and weak bank supervision. It is
argued that certain characteristics were common to the relatively successful countries that
liberalised their financial sector firstly, an appropriate macroeconomic framework (low
inflation and low public deficit); secondly, the prudential supervision of the banking sys-
tem; and thirdly a proper pace of deregulation. Countries in which these characteristics
were present avoided sharp increases in interest rates, bankruptcies of financial institu-
tions and loss of monetary control, for example Singapore, Korea and Taiwan (See Vii-
lanueva and Mirakhor, 1990).
The 'renewed' debate on financial liberalisation states that the removal of credit and
interest rates ceilings, rather than leading to a more efficient, healthy and dynamic finan-
cial system will open up the possibility of greater market imperfections. Regulation
imperfections are replaced by market imperfections such as imperfect information and
banking distress, which are implicit in the financial system.
113.1 Imperfect Information
In the credit market, borrowers have greater information about their own default
risks than lenders (banks) do. Stiglitz and Weiss develop a model to show that this asym-
metric information limits the rise in interest rates and the supply of loans (See Gibson
and Tsakalotos (1991), and Villanueva and Mirakhor (1990)). 'The basic intuition of Sti-
glitz and Weiss is that, while moderate increases in the lending interest rate normally
would elicit a higher volume of lending, further rate increases beyond a certain level
would prompt a lower level of lending activity by changing adversely the quality of the
pool of borrowers in favor of those in the high risk category' (Villanueva and Mirakhor,







might lower overall banks' returns by triggering two effects: firstly, credit worthy bor-
rowers would be discouraged, and, secondly, borrowers would be induced to choose pro-
jects with a higher probability of default because projects with higher expected profits are
riskier. There is a limit to the real interest rate charged on loans beyond which the bank's
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As observed in figure 6, the loan supply L is a positive function of the real loan
interest rate up to r = rP. At this point banks maximise profits (7t). Profits are a function













The bank profit maximising interest rate r might coincide with the market clearing
interest rate if loan demand is Lf. If, however, loan demand is higher, say L, the market
clearing rate rm is higher than r. In this case, there will be an excess demand for loans
equal to (L 2 —Li). The profit maximising interest rate r is both 'optimal and efficient,
because bank profits are at a maximum level and because risky borrowers are rationed
out' (Villanueva and Mirakhor, 1990), even though it is below the market clearing level.
'It therefore appears that although credit rationing is a potentially adverse effect of finan-
cial repression, it is also a problem in liberalised financial markets' (Gibson and Tsakalo-
los, 1991).
It is interesting to notice that the inverse U-shape of the supply of loans curve forces
the market clearing interest rate r" (see figure 7) to be higher than the equilibrium rate if
the probability of default is not considered by the banks (as in the traditional literature).
The supply of loans L does not consider the probability of default by borrowers. In this
case the real interest rate is lower (re <r M ) and the amount of loans is higher (L e > Lm)
at the market clearing level than if risk is considered in the loan supply function. There-
fore, market failures tend to constrain the supply of loans.
Figure 7
Loans
Real Loan Interest Rate
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It is worthwhile to mention that these studies (Mckinnon (1989) and Villanueva
and Mirakhor (1990) for instance) do not mention the positive effect that high interest
rates have on the productivity of investment projects (an argument that stands at the core
of the financial liberalisation models). It can be said that this 'renewed' debate deals with
a more operative view of the functioning of credit markets.
11.3.2 Macroeconomic Stability and Bank Supervision
Financial liberalisaxion implies a structural refonn of the banking system. This
reform has led several developing countries to financial or banking crisis 12 (for instance
Argentina, Chile, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Uruguay). The failure of banking
deregulation has been associated with an unstable macroeconomic environment, banking
distress and weak bank supervision.
A banking crisis is characterised by some or all of the following: first, an intense
demand for reserve money that could not be satisfied for all parties simultaneously in the
short run; second, credits must be liquidated; third, a condition where borrowers, who in
other situations were able to borrow without difficulty, become unable to borrow on any
terms (a credit market collapse); fouith, a forced sale of assets due to liability structures
that are out of line with market determined asset values and the consequent further
decline in assets values; and last, sharp reduction in the value of banks' assets resulting in
the apparent or real insolvency of many banks (see Sundararajan and Balifio, 1990).
Banking distress, which might cause a banking crisis, is defined as the situation
where the advent of deposit insurance or implicit guarantees has allowed an insolvent
financial institution to stay in business so long as its liquidity position remains manage-
able (mainly because of Central Bank assistance). Continuing banking distress perpetu-
ates situations in which banks alone could not stand without the intervention of the
When dealing with developing economies, the tenns financial and banking system are used
indistinguishably because of the predominance of banks in the financial system.
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Central Bank. If banks do not behave efficiently, distress prolongs resource misalloca-
tions that might have precipitated the distress conditions. This provides incentives for
further risk taking. The decision of banks to undertake risky lending in the presence of
deposit insurance is sometimes referred to as moral hazard. If banks are insured, or oth-
erwise protected by the government, they undertake riskier loans than if they were not.
The larger the share of risky loans, the bigger the possibility of default and of bank crisis.
Inadequate bank supervision can lead to moral hazard. The role of banking supervi-
sion is to develop procedures for both creditors and supervising institutions to monitor
financial fragility and vulnerability to shock, identify the exposure to moral hazards, and
formulate standards for evaluating the appropriateness of particular levels of risk expo-
sure (see Sundararajan and Baliño, 1990).
The combination of an unstable macroeconomic environment and inadequate bank
supervision can lead to a financial crisis when the financial sector is reformed (liberal-
ised). When the financial sector is liberalised under the circumstances described above,
loan interest rates might rise to excessively high risky levels, especially under an
inflationary environment. Moreover, the institutional structure of the banking system
emerging from regulatory changes could lead to monopolistic or oligopolistic structures.
The liberalisation of interest rates implies a change of instruments for monetary
control. It is argued that 'monetary authorities might lack an adequate set of instruments
of monetary control to influence interest rates or might follow a hands-off policy in the
erroneous belief that domestic rates would automatically converge to international rates'
(Sundararajan and Baliño, 1990, p.15). Moreover, if reserve requirements are not elim-
inated, forcing banks to hold low-yield reserves or government securities, credit to the
private sector can be tightened and cause excessively high real lending interest rates.
Furthermore, it is argued that the supervisory institutions might not be prepared to deal
with a more liberalised financial system. Therefore, the administrative infrastructure must
be adapted to deal more with bank solvency and credit risk than with organising selective
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credit regulations and maintaining interest rates ceilings. The authors conclude that
'sound financial policies, vigilant bank supervision and well designed prudential regula-
tions would limit financial crisis and help reduce the vulnerability of a financial system to
the vagaries of the macro-environment' (Sundararajan and Baliño, 1990, p.17).
In Chile, for example, the combination of high inflation, high real loan rates and
inadequate bank supervision resulted in defaults of outstanding bank credits that led to
bankruptcy of virtually all of Chile's financial intermediaries. As far as macroeconomic
stability is concerned, Mckinnon (1988) concludes that 'sustained stability in the domes-
tic price level is a necessaiy condition for achieving high real financial growth without
undue risk of some major financial panic or collapse (Mckinnon, 1988, p.26). Concerning
bank supervision, he even suggests that 'the government should probably impose a ceil-
ing on standard loan (and deposit) rates of interest to overcome banks' tendency to pro-
vide risky loans at high interest rates in the expectation that large losses will be covered
by deposit insurance provided by the government' (Mckinnon, 1988 b, p.408).
Macroeconomic stability also implies a low and controlled public sector deficit. If
financial liberalisation takes place when the public sector's internal debt is high and ris-
ing, the rise in real interest rates will increase the public deficit. This could lead to a
vicious circle of rising public deficits and macroeconomic instability. 'The financial
liberalisation literature itself now argues that control of the public deficit is a precondi-
tion to successful liberalisation' (Gibson and Tsakalotos, 1991). High interest rates paid
on the domestic debt will cause inflation if money is created to pay the interest charges.
The consequences of financial liberalisation on the public sector's role in financing
development will be further considered in chapter four.
The analysis developed above can be summarised as follows. The failure of finan-
cial liberalisation in several countries has been attributed to market failures and to an
inadequate bank supervision. Under unstable macroeconomic conditions, firms will prob-
ably need to borrow credits no matter what the loan interest rate is, for instance to
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refinance maturing debts. When moral hazard is present and bank supervision is weak,
banks are willing to lend at high and risky interest rates, because the government would
rescue them from bankruptcy. At the end, it seems, banks do go bankrupt and the govern-
ment does have to rescue them. Therefore, the policy to follow is, first, to liberalise the
financial sector under a stable macroeconomic environment and second, to establish an
adequate bank supervision.
11.3.3 The Case of Non-positive Market Clearing Real Interest Rates
The possibility of non-positive market clearing real interest rates is considered in
Beckerman's article 'Upward Financial Repression' (1988). Market clearing real interest
rates can fall to non-positive values when: investment demand is low and the propensity
to save is high; when price dispersion is severe due to inflation; and when wealth holders
face discouraging prospective yields on alternative assets to money. 'Where there are
anticipations of non-positive future yields on existing capital assets, the economy's
desired capital stock may be less than what exists. Dissaving and net capital depreciation
would then be what the market wants, and non-positive real rates would signal the
appropriate incentive' (Beckerman, 1988, p.235).
Beckerman (1988) argues that forcing real rates above anticipated inflation (upward
financial repression) cause financial institutions to am-act more resources than they can
lend, increasing the commercial banks' liabilities. He further argues that the capacity of
banks' to meet interest payments on their liabilities can be doubtful and can lead banks to
require injections of inflanonaiy resources to maintain their liquidity. Hence, the conse-
quences of upward financial repression could be stagflation and the financial system's
decapitalisation. If high real interest rates are funded with inflationary resources, the
attempt to achieve positive real rates might become 'futile as well as counterproductive':
a forced rise in nominal interest rates increases inflation and lowers the real interest rate,
a process that might develop into a vicious cycle.
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Economic non-financial distortions can be the cause of non-positive market clearing
real interest rates. These distortions may cause expectations which induce a decline in
credit demand (for instance, no desire to invest because of a narrow market). Beckerman
gives the example of an overvalued exchange rate that causes expectations of a sharp
devaluation, which reduces the demand for credit. Once expectations are restored, then
real rates should come under upward pressure, when the demand for investable funds
rises again. In this case, the negative real interest rate might be appropriate given the dis-
toned exchange rate.
Upward financial repression can be used by governments to retain financial
resources in the domestic financial system and to avoid capital flight. 'If funds are
retained within a nation by paying yields above their market clearing level, then, by
definition, the financial system cannot acquire sufficient domestic assets to fund the
interest. The financial system can pay the higher yields only by decapitalising itself,
acquiring questionable assets, or obtaining inflationaiy finance. To the extent that
inflation is used to finance the higher rates, the real rates will be correspondingly
reduced' (Beckerman, 1988, p.244).
This argument leads the author to actually 'support' capital flight by arguing that
placing the funds abroad when they are not used internally can be a good thing, since
wealth will increase in real terms and will be available for investment when prospects
improve.
When speaking of financial liberalisation, a positive level of real interest rates is
implied. This study shows that the market clearing level, where the supply of funds
equals demand, might be non-positive under certain circumstances. Although seen from
the opposite side, financial liberalisation is supported as the means to avoid upward
financial repression: 'the appropriate principle for administering financial rate levels is
that they should be set as nearly as possible where responsible, undistorted markets
would equilibrate the supply of and demand for financial resources'.
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11.4 The Post-Keynesian Models
The Post-Keynesian models consider the effects of financial liberalisation under the
assumption that investment is not supply determined but demand determined. It is not
savings that determines investment but, on the contrary, investment determines aggregate
savings through the income multiplier effect or income redistribution. The Keynesian
view is opposed to the belief that investment and output growth are constrained by sav-
ings.
Under the Keynesian theoretical framework, the level of income of the economy is
determined by effective demand. Effective demand is the sum of aggregate consumption,
investment and the government's deficit (plus exports minus imports in an open econ-
omy). Savings is determined by the level of income and will equal investment er-post.
Economic policy is oriented towards the rise of effective demand, as opposed to the
neo-classical view that stresses the importance of arising the level of savings. Moreover,
under the Keynesian framework 'inflation itself can encourage investment by raising the
nominal rate of return on investment and by reducing the real rate of interest' (Thiriwall,
1989). Since capital assets and financial assets are substitutes and not complementary, a
reduction in real interest rates will encourage investment as a consequence of the real
return on investment being higher than the real yield of financial assets. The effect of
high real interest rates and of economic policies promoting savings might deter invest-
ment, consumption, effective demand and economic growth.
Burkett and Dun (1991) develop a model to analyse the effects of an increase in the
real deposit rate of interest. Interest rates affect both consumption and investment. As
opposed to the liberalisazion models, they highlight the relevance of the possible negative
effect on consumption, on demand, and hence on economic growth. Consumption (C) is




It is assumed that interest rates do affect savings:







where: r is the rate of profit and i is the loan interest rate. Investment decisions are not
directly affected by an increase in the supply of loans but by its effect on the loan interest
rate. In the credit market, the supply of loans L' is a function of the level of deposits
held in the banking system, D, the reserve ratio (l–q) 13, and the proportion of free





Deposits held in the banking system are a function of wealth and of the real deposit
interest rate:
D = b (id)W	 b'(ia) > 0	 (2.26)
The model follows the assumption that a higher interest rate will increase the availa-
biity of credit. The demand for loans is fixed in the short run by the difference between




Investment is either self-financed or financed through bank credit. Loan demand is
inelastic to the loan interest rate in the short run. Nevertheless the loan rate can affect

















The equilibrium interest rate varies positively with the loan demand and the reserve ratio
(l-q) and negatively with the proportion of free reserves lent to firms, the deposit
interest rate and wealth. An important result is that an increase in the deposit rate of
interest will cause the equilibrium rate to fall (because it increases the supply of loans).













Once the equilibrium interest rate is set, equilibrium in the goods market is deter-
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Both an income and a substitution effect caused by a rise in the deposit rate of
interest on consumption are implicit in this equation 14. An increase in I will increase
total income (w + i D), causing consumption and output to grow. The substitution effect
causes an increase in the propensity to save and decreases consumption. The total effect
on consumption will depend on the relative magnitude of these effects.
A rise in the deposit rate increases the supply of loans and causes the loan interest
rate to decrease. This causes expectations of net returns on capital to increase hence
investment grows. The effect on total output depends on the magnitude of these three
different effects. The effect on output can be negative if consumption decreases more
than investment increases. In turn, the effect of interest rate movements on consumption
depends on the propensity to save, and the effect on investment depends on its sensitivity
to the loan interest rate. A lower sensitivity of investment to the loan interest rate
increases the likelihood of a negative effect on output. As well, if investment is more sen-
sitive to changes in the rate of profit than in the loan rate of interest, then the effect of a
rise in I can be negative on investment.
The relevance of the effect of a rise in the real deposit interest rate on consumption
distinguishes the post-Keynesian models from the neo-classical ones. The post-
Keynesian models explicitly state the possibility of a reduction in effective demand as a
consequence of a rise in the real deposit rate of interest. Nevertheless, the possibility of
an increase in the real deposit rate to increase output also exists. This happens because of
three assumptions taken in the model: firstly, the assumption that savings and consump-
tion axe interest rate elastic allows the possibility of an increase in consumption as a
consequence of a rise in the real deposit rate (income effect on consumption). Secondly,
the supply of loans increases when the real deposit rate increases. And thirdly, the real
These effects are not explicitly considered in the modeL
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loan rate decreases when the supply of loans grows.
There are several aspects worthwhile mentioning concerning the post-Keynesian
models. Firstly, financial liberalisation can have the same positive results on savings,
investment and growth as claimed by the neo-classical models because of the assump-
tions highlighted above. Secondly, financial liberalisation implies an increase, not a
decline, in the real loan interest rate. Interest rate ceilings apply to both deposit and loan
rates hence the neo-classical argument stating that investment's productivity increases
when the financial sector is liberalised. A decline in the loan rate, as supposed by the
post-Keynesian models, actually abolishes one of the advantages proposed by the pro-
financial liberalisation models. Thirdly, Keynesian theory opposes the view that prior-
savings are needed for investment. There is no need to increase the funds available for
investment via increases in the real interest rate. 'Prior saving has no more tendency to
release funds available for investment than prior-spending has' (Keynes, 1939). Even
though credit is needed for investment, credit is not determined by savings: 'Credit
expansion provides not an alternative toin savings, but a necessary preparation for
it. It is the parent, not the twin, of increased saving' (Keynes, 1939).
An increase in savings will probably be needed in the long term to finance
investznent...'thc provision of long term finance at reasonable terms and thus the achieve-
ment of higher investment, may, in certain circumstances, be contingent on the expecta-
tion of a substantial increase in the flow of savings into the securities market' (Asimako-
poulos. 1986, p.88). Credit from the banking system will generate the flow of savings
through the growth of investment and income. These savings will be needed to finance
investment in the long run.
This section can be concluded by quoting Asimakopoulos: 'The possible relations
between finance (credit), investment and saving in the post-Keynesian approach are thus
complex. They very much depend on particular historical circumstances, and no general
statement about their relationship which does not recognise these circumstances ade-
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quately represent the post-Keynesian position'.
11.5 Credit Creation by Commercial Banks
Banks have the capacity to create credit. 'The ability of an economic system to
create credit is important because: first, it can compensate for the failure of the economic
system to equalise planned saving and investment; second, it provides the means by
which growth is financed. This is the real significance of the invention of paper money
and credit: permitting the economic system to expand in response to the continual oppor-
tunities for growth provided by technical progress' (Thirlwall, 1989, p.271).
The capacity of commercial banks to create credit according to its demand by the
private sector means that investment can be liquidity constrained, not savings con-
strained, if banks refuse to create bank loans. The function of the banking system is to
create additional finance when investors wish to increase the flow of real investment.
None of the models analysed so far consider this capacity. As argued by Davidson
(1986) all that is needed to initiate additional real investment is finance provided by an
increase in total bank loans with no need of increased savings '...as long as the banker
can create new finance via acceptable bank accounting practices' (Davidson, 1986,
p.105). Or, as argued by Asimakopoulos (1986), the investment market can become
congested through shortage of cash but it can never become congested through shortage
of saving. As soon as the producing firm hires unemployed resources paid out of
increases in bank credit, aggregate real investment increases. 'The mere fact that previ-
ously idle resources are now producing real investment goods which cannot be used by
households for consumption means that, out of the increased income flow, a greater real
savings flow must be pari-passu occurring' (Davidson, 1986, p.105). The production of
capital goods implies that savings are generated since these goods cannot be consumed.
The author concludes that 'the solution to any scenario in which liquidity constraints
limit investment no matter how much the public desires to save out of income ex-ante,
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ex-post or ex-anything, is for the monetary authorities to provide via the banking system
all the liquidity the public desires'.
Chick (1986) argues that the different views that explain the determination of bank
loans (if they are determined by deposits or if they can lend money 'they haven't got')
depends on the stage of development of the banking system. She distinguishes five dif-
ferent stages of development. It is only in the first stage, when banks are only used as
savings depositaries but are not involved with transaction purposes, that the supply of
loans is dependent on the deposits held by the bank. In this case the supply of credit is
exogenous. After stage two, when banks keep money also for transaction purposes they
adopt a means-of-payments function. Loans given by banks will end up deposited in
banks to a large extent. This means that it is not the amount of deposits which deter-
mines loans, but the reverse, it is the amount of loans given which determines deposits.
The supply of loans becomes endogenous. From stage three onwards, the Central Bank
assumes the responsibility of lender of last resort. Reserves virtually disappear as a con-
straint on bank behaviour and banks become able to meet any reasonable demand for
loans. Banks can expand their loans despite their reserves and their deposits.
According to this argument, it seems to be that financial liberalisation models sup-
pose the banking system in less developed economies is still at stage one of development
It is indeed a necessity of a country, especially in an inflationary environment as in many
developing economies, to use the banking system as both a savings depositary and for
transaction purposes. Nevertheless, banks might be constrained by reserve requirements
and this might represent a shortage of funds to be lent to the private sector, especially if
reserves diverted to finance the public sector are interest yielding, since banks earn profits
without any risk involved.
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11.6 Conclusions
This chapter has undertaken a review and analysis of financial liberalisation
theories. The main issues of the different theoretical models and their criticisms have
been outlined.
There are several conclusions to be derived from the analysis. One of the main
hypotheses of the pro-financial liberaiisation models is the rise of total savings and
investment as a consequence of financial liberalisation. It has been seen that theoretical
support for the hypothesis that savings increase as a consequence of high real interest
rates is weak. However, theoiy argues that the positive cozrelation between real interest
rates, investment and growth is due, also, to the effect that high real interest rates have on
the quality of investment. It is supposed that high real interest rates will exclude low-
yielding (hence low productive and inefficient) investment projects. Nevertheless, we
have seenthat real interest ratesmaynotrise aftcrbeingrepressedevenifthemarketis
not regulated. Credit markets are subject to imperfections that set limits to the loan rate
of interest and to the amount of credit supplied.
The above argument leads us to conclude that the hypothesis of increased savings
and investment as a consequence of having liberalised the financial system does not have
a strong theoretical support and has been severely weakened. Furthermore, imperfect
information and a weak bank supervision do justify a government's intervention in the
financial system to prevent a banking crisis. There is no evidence that market forces will
operate more efficiently than regulated financial systems because market forces have to
be supervised by an entity. Usually this entity is the Central Bank. Past experiences from
different countries show that no regulation of the financial system leads to financial dis-
tress and to financial crisis under weak supervision and unstable macroeconomic environ-
ments. In this sense, the government's intervention is justified in order to prevent a finan-
cial crisis that might trigger or aggravate an overall economic crisis.
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One effect that a rise in the real interest raze does seem to have is to increase finan-
cial savings. Financial savings do increase with higher yields offered on financial assets.
If financial savings are considered as total savings (as in some neo-classical models),
then total savings do rise. Nevertheless, total savings and financial savings are not the
same concept; it is a misconception to consider them the same. A rise in financial savings
does not imply an increase in total savings.
An increase in financial savings can have a positive impact on the supply of credit to
the private sector. Especially if the banking system is at an early stage of development,
an increase in real deposits means an increase in the supply of loans. But when banks are
capable of creating new credit without having to increase their deposits before, an
increase in financial savings may not make any difference to the amount of total credit
given to the private sector. This means that the total amount of credit given is deter-
mined not by the supply of loans but by its demand. In turn, demand for loans is deter-
mined by investment decisions. How the supply of credit responds to the interest rate,
and how investment is affected by the supply of credit and interest rates becomes very
much an empirical question which is investigated in the next chapter for the specific case
of the Mexican economy.
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CHAPTER III
FINANCIAL LIBERALISATION, SAVING, INVESTMENT AND GROWTH
IIL1 Introduction
The lack of external credit since 1982 has led developing economies such as Mexico
to implement economic policies directed to raise the internal level of savings and with it,
to increase the non-inflationary internal sources of finance. In this process the financial
sector plays a fundamental role.
Long periods of economic growth in Mexico were achieved with interest rate ceil-
ings, credit controls and high reserve requirements. After the debt crisis in 1982, interest
razes were allowed to move more flexibly and ceased to be negative 1 after a whole decade
of negative real values. Despite the real interest rate being negative, the value of total
financial assets held in the financial sector increased (see Data Appendix).
Nevertheless, it was not until April 1989 that the financial system was fully liberal-
ised. One reason for the liberalisarion, apart from the theoretical one, was the fast growth
of an unregulated financial sector, mainly Brokerage Houses, between 1982 and 1989
(see Marcos, 1990). Furthermore, with the aim of enhancing the role of the private sector,
the commercial banks are cunendy being re-privatised after their nationalisation in 1982.
This chapter undertakes an empirical analysis of the basic hypothesis considered by
the financial liberalisation models in order to assess the scope of implementing a success-
ful financial liberalisation policy. It examines the determinants of financial savings; the
total level of domestic savings of the economy the level of private savings; the level of
investment and of economic growth for the case of Mexico. In order to specifically test
Since 1982 the real interest raze offered on bank deposits has been positive, except in 1983
and 1987.
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the effect of financial variables on the 'real' variables, such as savings, investment, and
growth, special interest is given to the responsiveness of these variables to movements in
the real interest rate.
All variables are measured in real terms. Total savings, private savings, investment
and the Gross Domestic Product are deflated by the relevant implicit deflators. It should
be mentioned at the outset that the way in which domestic savings is calculated may
reduce the statistical significance of the estimates (see Balassa, 1990). As Balassa
argues, in developing countries such as Mexico, estimates of savings are usually obtained
as the difference between domestic investment and foreign savings, both of which are
observed with error. Fixed investment is customarily estimated from data on the impor-
tation and the domestic production of machinery and on materials used in construction,
which are subject to error. Whereas foreign saving is derived as the difference between
exports and imports of goods and services which are also subject to error. Thus calculat-
ing domestic savings as a residual can 'magnify the error of estimate' and may result in a
reduced statistical significance of estimated coefficients in a regression where domestic
savings is the variable to be explained.2
The interest rate used is the average interest rate offered by the banking system on
the different bank deposits (short and long term deposits). The real interest rate used in
the estimations is the twelve month accumulated one.3
The period of estimation begins in 1960 and ends in 1990, using annual observa-
tions. The source of the data is Banco de México and the National Institute of Statistics
(INEGI). All the regressions are estimated using the Ordinary Least Squares technique,
and corrected with the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure in cases where auto-correlation of the
2 A long iime-senes of savings from the Nauonal Accounts System does not exist in Mexico.
The savings series considered in this paper were constructed by the Central Bank on the basis of
the Nauonal Accounts System.
The calculation of the twelve month accumulated real interest rate is shown in Appendix
mAA.
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errors was found. The t-statistics are reported in brackets in all the equations. In addition
to the R 2 , Durbin-Watson and 'F' statistics, we report the Chi-square values for the diag-
nostic tests of: autocorrelation, functional form, normality and heteroscedasticity. This
last set of tests can improve the reliability on the estimators found, since they test the
validity of the assumptions taken with respect to the econometric model. The estimated
Oil-square values for each test must be lower than the respective critical values 4 to con-
sider the assumptions as valid. It must be mentioned that when using the Cochrane-
Orcutt procedure to correct auto-correlation of the errors, the diagnostic tests are not
reported.
111.2. The Determinants of Financial Savings
Firstly, financial savings -the process of accumnl2ting financial assets- can be
defined as the change in the real stock of the broadest monetaiy aggregate (M4 5 in this
case) without considering coins, currency and time deposits (Ml). That is, we define
financial savings as:
FS, =(M4RS —M1RS), —(M4RS —M1RS) (1_l)	(3.1)
where: M4RS is the real stock of M4 deflated by the National Consumer Price Index
(NCPI) and M iRS is the real stock of Ml deflated by the NCPL
The rationale for not including Ml (Coins, Currency and Time Deposits) in the
definition of financial savings is that, since it does not yield any interest there is no rea-
son to expect a response of Ml to changes in the real interest rate compared to interest
yielding financial assets. Including Ml as part of financial savings might reduce the
The Oil-square critical values aie 3.84 and 5.99 with cue and Iwo degrees of freedom respec-
tively at the 5 perceri significance level.
M4 includes: Coins, Currency and Demand Deposits (Ml) + Short term banking insinnnents
(M2) + Non-Banking Financial Instnirnents (M3) (such as: Treasury Bills, other government
bonds and commercial paper) + long term banking instruments and government bonds.
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estimated effect that the real interest rate has on the demand for financial assets.
If domestic credit is the primary asset backing the monetary liabilities of the bank-
ing system, then it is financial savings, the change in the real stock of the monetary
aggregate, (A (M4RS—M iRS)), which indicates the extent to which the supply of credit
given by the financial system can be increased in the period considered (see Fry, 1988).
Financial savings measure the amount of total real savings that is channelled via
financial assets. Since total domestic savings is a flow, it is the change in the stock of the
monetary asset A (M4RS - M iRS) that measures the 'flow' of savings into the financial
system.
The following analysis will test the sensitivity of financial savings to both the level
of real income (GDP) and the domestic real interest rate (r). To take account of the
attractiveness of holding domestic financial assets relative to foreign financial assets, the
differential between the domestic real interest rate and the real yield on foreign financial
assets6 is included as an explanatory variable. Since the real yield on foreign financial
assets is equal to the real interest rate abroad r plus the real rate of
depreciation/appreciation of the domestic currency with respect to the dollar (Mexican
pesos per dollar), , the real yield differential is expressed as: (r - r, - è). Uncertainty
about the future yield on domestic assets may also discourage financial savings. Financial
instability, as represented by high inflation rates and depreciation of the currency, under-
mines the holding of savings in domestic currency. Therefore, uncertainty, here approxi-
mated by the standard deviation of the monthly inflation rate in Mexico (year by year),
1v. is also included as an explanatory variable of financial savings. Its inclusion in the
equation picks up the effects of the economic crisis after 1982 and the consequent down-
turn of expectations.
6 The real interest rare on foreign financial assets is approximated by the real return on six
months U.S. government bonds (taken from the IMP Financial Statistics).
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Since financial saving is part of total saving of the economy, we expect it to be posi-
tively correlated to the level of real income. As income increases, savings increase given
the propensity to save. The domestic real interest rate and the real interest rate differential
are expected to have a positive and statistically significant coefficient in explaining
changes in financial savings, since the public's allocation of savings reacts to changes in
the yield of different forms of holding savings. As the real interest rate offered on domes-
tic deposits increases so does the attractiveness of holding savings as domestic financial
assets. On the other hand, if the real yield on foreign assets is higher than the domestic
yield, domestic financial savings can be reduced while capital flight increases. The esti-
mation results are the following:
FS = —20.9 + 0.025 GD? + 1.85 r + 1.41 (r - r,, - è) - 38.70/i,,	 (3.2)
(-1.36) (4.89)	 (2.17)	 (3.12)	 (-4.59)
R 2 = 0.80 DW = 2.31 F(4) = 24.91 n =30
Serial Correlation : X1) = 0.97
Functional Form :	 = 1.99
Normality: X(2) =21.45
Heteroscedasticity: X1) = 0.001
where: FS is financial savings expressed in billion pesos; r is the annual real interest rate
(%); GD? is real GDP (in billion pesos); (r - r - e) is the yield differential (%); and ji,,
is the uncertainty variable.
The results obtained show that the explanatory variables have the expected signs
and are statistically significant. The coefficient on r shows that a one point increase in
the domestic real interest rate yields, on average, to a 1.85 billion pesos increase in finan-
cial savings when the differential between the real return on Mexican and U.S. financial
assets is held constant7, while the positive estimated coefficient on the real interest rate
Excluding the interest rate differential from the financial savings equation gives an estimated
coefficient on the real interest raze of 3.97, with a t-statistic value of 6.71.
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differential, equal to 1.41, indicates that domestic financial savings are sensitive to real
financial yields abroad, leading to substantial capital flight movements. On the other
hand, the estimated coefficient of GDP shows that a one million pesos (in constant terms)
change in real income will induce, on average, a 25 million pesos change in financial sav-
ings. Uncertainty, measured by the standard deviation of inflation, adversely affects the
level of financial savings. It indicates that if the confidence of the public in the capability
of the financial system to increase or maintain the real value of the assets held within the
financial system is undermined, financial savings, which can be highly volatile, can leave
the domestic financial system and turn into capital flight, as happened especially during
1982 and after (see Chapter I).
When testing a dynamic specification of the equation, we found the lagged depen-
dent variable not to be statistically significant, which suggests a relatively rapid adjust-
ment process of financial savings to changes in the real domestic interest rate, in the real
interest rate differential and in income.
Considering the results of the diagnostic tests, it can be seen that the normality test
is not satisfied since the Chi-square value of the test is higher than the critical value,
X) > 5.99. The normality test is based on the skewness and kurtosis tests, which test
the third and fourth moments of the residuals. (see Harvey, 1990, p.159). If the
specification fails the normality test, it could probably mean that the residuals cannot be
assumed to be normally distributed and it could undermine the confidence we have in the
results of the tests of hypothesis. Nevertheless, when the assumptions of linearity and
homoscedasticity of the residuals (the first and second moments) are maintained, as in the
case of this equation, there is an error of specification only in the third and fourth
moments of the residuals. It is argued that the optimal strategy to follow in such a case
would be to propose a different kind of statistical distribution of the errors, which goes
beyond the scope of this thesis (see Cassoni, 1990).
Thus, considering the equation as being correctly specified we can conclude that
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financial savings is positively correlated with the real domestic interest rate, the real
interest rate differential and real income, and adversely affected by uncertainty. For the
purposeofthiswodisimportanttohighlightthatariseintherealinterestrateisa
potent instrument to attract resources into the financial system.
111.3. The Determinants of Total Domestic Savings and of Private Savings.
The financial liberalisation models emphasise that the real level of domestic savings
increases with a higher real interest rate, particularly private savings (See Fry, 1988 or
World Bank, 1989, for example). Many empirical studies have been done concerning the
determinants of real savings and the results show that 'if the effect [of the real interest
rate on savings] exists ax all ii is relatively small' (Fiy, 1988, p.132).
Fry (1978), for instance, finds that the real interest rate exerts a positive influence on
the ratio of domestic savings to GM' for a sample of seven Asian less developed coun-
tries during the 1962-1972 period. He estimates an equation for the savings ratio using as
explanatory variables: the rate of growth of income, the level of per capita income, the
real interest rate, the foreign savings ratio and the lagged domestic savings ratio. Giovan-
nini (1983) estimates the same specification as Fry (1978) for the same countries but for a
different time period. He finds that the coefficient of the real interest rate is never statisti-
cally significant, and is negative in six out of eight cases, not reproducing the results Fry
obtained for a different time period. As Giovannini argues, these results cast serious
doubts on the view that the interest elasticity of savings is significantly positive and easy
to detect in developing countries' (p.603).
Gupta (1987) tests real aggregate savings as a function of permanent real income,
transitory real income, the expected rate of inflation, the nominal rate of interest and the
financial intermediation ratio. Using pooled time-series cross-section data, he estimates
the model for twenty two Asian and Latin American countries for the 1967-1976 period.
He finds that in terms of the total sample, there is little support for the 'repressionist
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hypothesis' which asserts that the positive substitution effect dominates the negative
income effect of real interest rates on savings in developing countries. When considering
the Asian countries separately, he finds that the nominal interest rate did show a positive
and significant sign in explaining aggregate real savings but that the inflation coefficient
showed the wrong sign, thus finding only partial support for the repressionist hypothesis
in this case. In the case of the Latin American countries, the nominal interest rate
coefficient and the inflation coefficient had the correct sign (positive and negative respec-
lively) but neither were statistically significant. In the case of both sets of countries,
Gupta finds that income growth is an important determinant of real savings.
Ocaznpo et.al. (Gonzalez Arrieta, 1988) test the importance of financial conditions
in explaining aggregate savings performance for Colombia during the 1950-1980 period.
The explanatory variables they include axe: real income, transitory income, the real rate
of interest, the money supply ratio to GNP as a measure of liquidity and the rate of
inflation. The authors conclude that the hypothesis of higher interest rates affecting sav-
ings is not supported for the Colombian case: although the estimated coefficients were
positive, the i-values were never higher than 1.4.
Another study referring to a Latin American economy was done by de Melo and
Tybout (1985-86) for the case of Uruguay during the 1962-1983 period. The specification
they use is the following: they test the domestic savings ratio to GDP as a function of real
growth of income, the real deposit interest rate, the foreign saving ratio and the lagged
dependent variable. When the whole period is considered, 1962 to 1983, they find a posi-
tive but weak correlation of the real interest rate and the savings rate (the t-rario of the
estimated coefficient is 1.41). When they consider the sample period to be from 1962 to
1973, before the financial reform in Uruguay took place, they find a positive and
significant coefficient of the real interest rate, but not so for the period after the financial
reform. Dc Melo and Tybout conclude that although the propensity to save increased in
Uruguay after financial liberalisation took place, it was not entirely as envisioned by the
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proponents of financial deregulation, since no evidence was found of a positive effect of
the real interest rate on aggregate savings after the 1973 financial reforms.
Despite the weak empirical evidence, the positive effect of the real interest rate on
savings is a basic assumption behind the financial liberalisation theozy.
In the following equation the hypothesis to be tested is that the level of real domes-
tic savings in Mexico is significantly determined by the level of real income and by the
real interest rate. In addition, the real interest rate differential between the U.S. and the
Mexico as well as the variable measuring uncertainty are included in the equation to test
if the effect these variables have on financial savings is reflected in the level of domestic
savings. We expect total domestic savings to be highly and positively correlated with
real income. Nevertheless, the expected sign and significance of the coefficient on the
real interest rate variable will depend on the net result of the income and substitution
effects of the interest rate on savings. In this equation a dummy variable is included for
the year 1986 when the level of both private and total domestic savings fell sharply
owing to the intensification of the austerity measures imposed by the government as a
consequence of the fall in the price of oil to half its value in 1985. The equation was
estimated in logarithms8 instead of levels because the statistical tests indicated a better
specification.
The estimation results are the following:9
S Excj* for the real interest rate and the differential yield because they include several negative
values.
9 The equation was estimated using the Cochrane-Oituu procedure to conec* the first order an-
tocorrelation of the errors. The diagnostic tests are not reported in the case when the Cochrane-
Orcutt technique is used.
102
IogDS = —2.79 + 1.09 logGDP - 0.003 r - 0.0006 (r - r, - è)	 (3.3)
(-3.29) (10.38)	 (-1.02) (-.0.039)
- 0.08Ji - 0.82 DU 86
(-4.03) (-9.08)
R 2:: 0.97 DW=1.98 F(623) = 139.9 n=31 =0.64
(3.69)
where: DS is the real total net domestic saving (public and private) expressed in billion
pesos, and the other variables are as before.
The results obtained show the dominating effect of the level of income in determin-
ing domestic savings, while neither the domestic real interest rate or the real rate dif-
ferential between the domestic and the external interest rate are statistically significant.
Inflation volatility, however, measuring uncertainty, has a negative and significant
estimated effect, as in the financial savings equation, and the dummy variable for 1986 is
negative and significant as expected. The evidence does not support the hypothesis that a
higher real interest rate raises domestic savings and suggests that the income effect of a
change in the real interest rate at least offsets the substitution effect on savings.
It is interesting to notice that the estimated income elasticity of domestic savings is
almost 1 in the period analysed. According to this result, the average propensity to save
(SlY) is equal to the marginal propensity to save ()10• In turn, this result implies a
constant propensity to save over time. To support this result we estimated the average
and marginal propensity to save by regressing domestic savings on real income for the
1960-1990 period. The estimated equation is the following:
10 IfS f(r, Y), wheze S is savings,r is the zeal intezest rate, and Yis income, then the income





R 2 = 0.83 DW = 1.74 F (1,29) = 137.7 n =30
The results of this equation are consistent with the estimated income elasticity of
savings and support the result of a constant propensity to save out of income, equal to
0.12 for the 1960-1990 period, since the constant term is not significantly different from
zero.
Changes in the real interest raze affect public savings. The higher the domestic pub-
lic debt, the greater the impact of changes in the real interest raze on public savings. An
increase in interest razes will increase the government's debt service payments and
further increase the budget deficit, thus reducing public savings. Since the private sector
receives the interest paid by the public sector on its domestic debt, total domestic savings
will remain constant if the propensity to save out of income is the same for both the pub-
lic and private sectors.
To test this hypothesis we limit the period of estimation of the last equation to the
1973-1988 period, when the public sector's deficit was at its highest levels (see Table 2
in Data Appendix). The results obtained are:
logDS = —7.34 + 1.61 1ogGDP - 0.009 r + 0.001 (r - r - è)	 (3.5)
(-4.45) (8.20)	 (-1.77) (0.49)
- 0.10 log - 0.70DU86
(-2.16)	 (-4.49)
R 2 = 0.92 DW = 1.88 F(5,lO) = 24.5 n = 16
Serial Correlation : Xi = 0.01




in this equation it can be seen that the real interest rate coefficient is negative and
statistically significant at a 5 percent level of significance when the sample period is
reduced. 11 A one point increase in the real interest rate reduces total domestic savings, on
average, by 3.8 billion pesos. This result is probably due to the effect of a higher real
interest rate on public savings, and suggests that the propensity to save out of income is
lower for the private sector than for the public sector.
In neither of the equations considered using domestic savings as the dependent van-
able, was the lagged dependent variable statistically significant, which suggests a rela-
tively fast adjustment of total domestic savings to changes in the real interest rate and in
real income.
The relevant results for our purposes are: firstly, that the relation between the real
interest rate and the real level of total domestic savings is either not statistically
significant or negative; and secondly, that savings is strongly determined by the level of
real income, supporting the Keynesian savings function.
To examine the determinants of real private savings (households and enterprises) we
run the same regression with real private savings as the dependent variable. A dummy
variable is introduced for the year 1986 for the same reason as in equation (3.5):
logPS = —2.04 + 0.91 1ogGDP + 0.007 r - 0.05 (r - -	 (3.6)
(-1.12) (4.13)	 (0.81)	 (-0.93)
- 0.18 1ogi - 5.57DU86
(1.73)	 (-16.39)
R 2 =0.94 DW= 1.99 F(520) =68.6 n=26
When the vañables (r - - e) and (ji,) aze excluded from this equation, the t-staxistic on
the domestic real inteies* rate is -2.43.
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Serial Correlation :	 = 0.00
Functional Form : 	 = 1.55
Normality: X%) = 59•7
Heteroscedasticity: X1) = 0.54
where PS are real private savings in billion pesos.
We find that private savings do not seem to be sensitive to changes in the real
interest rate but again are strongly determined by the level of real income. When testing
the dynamic specification of the equation, the following result is obtained
logPS = -1.75 + 0.75 logGDP + 0.004 r - 0.001 (r - r, - )- 0.07 logi (3.7)
(-1.40) (4.88)	 (0.62)	 (-032)	 (-1.08)
+ 0.20 logPS(, —1) - 5.54 DU86
(5.53)	 (-25.46)
R 2 = 0.98 h-durbin = 1.45 F (618) = 144.1 n =25
Serial Correlation : X1) = 2.44
Functional Form : 	 =0.40
Normality: X) = 4.29
Hereroscedasticizy: X1) = 2.63
In the case of real private savings, the highly significant coefficient of the lagged
dependent variable and the improved results in the tests of hypothesis suggest that private
savings adjust slowly to changes in real income and the rate of interest. The long run
income elasticity of private savings 12 is equal to 0.93 while the short run income elasti-
city is lower, equal to 0.75.




Even though the real interest rate is not significant in explaining changes in the real
level of private savings, it must be mentioned that it is possible for increases in the real
interest rate to have a negative effect on private savings through the effect that interest
rates have on the private sector's debt with the financial sector. A rise in real interest
rates increases interest payments on accumulated debt from the private sector to the
financial sector and might cause the former's savings to decrease.
The main results obtained concerning real savings behaviour show that the effect of
the real interest rate is either not statistically significant in explaining the level of real
savings (total or private), or is negative, when limiting the estimation sample to the
period when the public sector's deficit was at its highest levels. Although it can be
argued that the relevant variable is private savings, since financial liberalisation is
intended to encourage the private sector to save, it seems that the effect of the real
interest rate on public savings cannot be neglected. Since the real interest rate does not
seem to affect private saving and can have a negative effect on total real domestic saving,
it implies that real public savings decreases when the real interest rate rises. This might
be due to the higher real cost of financing the public sector's deficit when the real interest
rate increases. Nevertheless, the relevant result for this paxt of the analysis is that a rise in
the real interest rate does not increase the level of real savings, private or total. There
seems to be no reason to expect a rise in the real level of savings as a consequence of a
higher real interest rate. This result contradicts one of the main propositions of the finan-
cial liberalisation theozy. On the other hand, more saving is channelled through financial
assets due to the rise in the real interest rate. This process does increase the availability
of non-inflationary resources, and can improve the efficiency of their allocation in the
sense that non productive holdings of wealth could be invested productively through
financial intermediation.
A plausible explanation of the simultaneous process of increasing financial savings
while total internal savings are not rising is that a substitution process between assets is
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taking place. That is, a higher domestic real interest rate attracts some of the capital
deposited abroad or non-financial forms of savings into the domestic financial sector.
Another explanation can be that although total savings is not rising, there is a transfer of
resources from the public sector to the private sector through the high real interest the
government pays on its internal debt to the private sector. The process of income redistri-
bution, not only from the public sector to the private sector but also within the private
sector from borrowers to creditors, can explain the simultaneity of rising financial sav-
ings and decreasing total savings.13
111.3.1 The Financial Deepening Hypothesis.
Shaw's financial deepening hypothesis argues that financial deepening, or the accu-
mulaxion of financial assets at a pace faster than the accumulation of non-financial
wealth, will tend to increase real savings: 'Measures to raise real rates of return on finan-
cial assets, to reduce the variance of returns, and to improve financial technology, along
with allied measures in nonfinancial areas, extend the saver's horizons over both space
and time' (Shaw, 1973, p.72). A positive and significant relation between the 'size' of
the financial system, measured by the ratio of M4 to GDP, and real domestic savings
would be expected. However, the interpretation of the financial intermediation ratio's
(M4/GDP) coefficient in explaining the level of savings remains ambiguous. Quoting
Gupta (1987): 'The difficulty with this variable [the financial intermediation ratio] lies in
the interpretation of its coefficient. What meaning can be attached to it? Even if the sign
of the coefficient could suggest the direction of the effect of financial development on
13 Borrowers are forced to borrow more when interest rates rise to cover their debt payments in
favour of creditors, thus causing both financial assets and liabilities to rise. In this case there is nei-
ther an increase in total savings nor a favourable shift from idle resources to financial assets. The
UNCFAD report (UNCrAD, 1991) goes further by arguing that 'there is no reason to view in a
positive light an increase in the debtor-creditor relationship if it is not associated with rising levels
of production and investment: it may indicate, rather, increased fragility in the financial system'
(p. 122).
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savings, it is not clear whether we could go further and say that if financial assets as a
proportion of GNP increase by a certain amount, aggregate savings will increase by a
specific amount. Given this ambiguity we use [this ratio] as indicating only a directional
effect rather than attaching any meaning to the size of its coefficient' (p. 304).
To test the financial deepening hypothesis, the ratio of M4 (the broadest monetary
aggregate) to Gross Domestic Product (as a measure of financial deepening) is introduced
as an explanatory variable in the total real domestic saving equation:14
logDS = —1.48 + 0.94 1ogGDP - 0.002 r + 0.165 log(M4IGDP)— 0.79 DU86	 (3.8)
(-1.34) (8.37)	 (-1.17)	 (0.73)	 (-7.73)
R 2 = 0.95 DW = 1.95 F(5,,A) = 109.4 n =30
The financial variable M4IGDP is not statisticafly significant in explaining the level
of total domestic real savings. To eliminate the possibility of correlation between
IogGDP and log (M4/GDP) we dropped IogGDP from the equation, and let the real level
of domestic savings be explained by changes in the real interest rate and the intermedia-
tion ratio alone. The result obtained is the following:
logDS = —1.51 - 0.001 r + 1.41 log(M4IGDP)— 0.84 DU86	 (3.9)
(9.04) (-0.61) (1.68) 	 (-9.04)
R 2 =0.94 DW = 2.08 F(4) = 105.6 n =30
Although the i-value of the financial intermediation ratio's coefficient rose, it is still
not statistically significant at the 5 percent significance level but it is statistically different
from zero at the 10 percent level of significance. This result allows us to argue that
although a positive relation exists between the financial intermediation ratio and the level
The estimation was done using the Cochzane-Orcun technique to correct the first order auto-
correlation of the errors.
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of domestic savings, the relation is weak. It cannot be concluded that financial deepening
has an independent effect on the level of real savings.
1114. Determinants of Investment.
In accordance with the financial liberalisation models, where investment is deter-
mined solely by conditions of supply, i.e. by the level of saving, the correlation between
the real interest rate and investment is expected to be positive. There are two different
effects that explain the positive relation between the real interest rate and investment
The first one is the effect that the real rate of interest has on the total quantity of credit
supplied to the private sector and through this on investment. The second one is the effect
that the real interest rate has on the real level of savings and thus on the real rate charged
on loans by the banking sector, i.e. the price of credit. It is argued that 'the lower the real
deposit rate, the smaller the volume of saving and hence the higher the market clearing
loan rate of interest. In such a case, the real deposit rate could act as an inverse proxy for
the real loan raze and should have a positive impact on the investment rate' (Fry, 1988,
p.144).
As far as the first effect is concerned, it has been found that changes in the real
interest raze do have a positive impact on financial savings and thus on the real stock of
financial assets held in the banking sector. Since domestic credit is the main asset back-
ing the banking system's liabilities (i.e. financial assets deposited in the banking system),
we expect a high and positive correlation between the real stock of credit and the real
stock of total financial assets held by the private sector (M4) in the banking system. To
test this relation we regress the total stock of credit given by the banking sector on the
stock of financial assets deposited in the banking system:15
IS The regiession was estimated using the Cocbrane-Ozcutt technique to conect flistorder au-
tocorrelanon of the errors.
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10gCPS =-4.85 + 1.51 logM4RS	 (3.10)
(-2.8) (7.3)
R 2 = 0.95 DW = 1.82 F(2V) = 285 n =30
where: CPS is the real stock of credit given by the banking sector to the private sector
deflated by the National Consumer Price Index expressed in billion pesos and M4RS is
the real stock of M4 in billion pesos. The results show that the real stock of money has a
positive and significant coefficient in explaining the real stock of credit given to the
private sector.
If we consider that financial savings indicate the extent to which the supply of credit
can be increased we test the change in credit given to the private sector as the dependent
variable and financial savings as the explanatory variable:'6
CPS = 1.83 + 0.5 FS	 (3.11)
(0.13) (6.28)
R 2 =0.687 DW1.89 FQ) =28.6 n=29
where: CPS = (CPS, - CPS (,_l) ) is the change in the real stock of credit to the private
sector and FS is financial savings. On average, a one billion pesos increase in financial
savings increases the amount of credit given to the private sector by 0.5 billion pesos.
It must be mentioned that although strongly determined by the total amount of
financial assets in the banking system, credit given to the private sector was also a func-
tion of the reserve ratio imposed by the Central Bank on commercial banks until 1989. It
is left as a matter for further study in the following chapter how the reserve ratio, as an
instrument of credit allocation, affected public and private investment.
We did not estimate the equation in logaiithms because of negative values in both the depen-
dent and the independent vaziable. The regression was estimated using the Cochrane-Oicuu tech-
nique to correct fist-order autocorrelation of the errors.
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We now analyse the determinants of the level of gross fixed investment for the
1960-1990 period. Two hypotheses will be tested. The first one is to test the effect that
changes in the real interest rate have on investment considering both the effect that the
real interest rate has on the amount of credit and the effect that the real deposit interest
rate, as a proxy of the price of credit, has on the level of investment. According to the
financial liberalisation models a positive coefficient of the real interest rate in explaining
the level of investment would be expected for two reasons. Firstly, the higher the real
deposit interest rate is, the larger the amount of savings and thus the larger the supply of
credit. As the supply of credit increases, the market clearing interest rate decreases,
lowering the price of credit. Hence, investment should increase. Secondly (and more
important), classical theory argues that the relation between investment and the real
interest rate depends on the level of the real interest rate relative to its equilibrium leveL
If the real interest rate is below equilibrium, investment is assumed to be constrained by
saving, and investment and the rate of interest should be positively correlated. On the
other hand, the interest rate above the equilibrium level may discourage investment by
making the yield on financial assets more attractive than the rate of return on investment.
To distinguish between below and above equilibrium real interest rates, the model
includes a 'switching' variable (see Rinenberg, 1991) of the type (r - r e )D, where re is
the equilibrium interest rate (or switching point) and D is a dummy variable which takes
the value 1 where r > r' and zero where r ^ r e The equilibrium real interest rate was
searched for by a trial and error process, experimenting for real interest values ranging
from -5ioS percent and reporting the result which minimised the sum of squared residu-
als of the regression. The value which niinimises the SSR is rC =0.
The second hypothesis to be tested is that the real level of investment is demand
determined. To do so, we indude in the regression the lagged change in output
(AGDP...1). Assuming investment is sensitive to changes in demand, the lagged
accelerator is expected to be positive and significant. Including the lagged accelerator as
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an explanatory variable assumes that entrepreneurs take time to adjust the capital stock to
the new level of demand for output.
The investment function then looks like:
1=ao+alr+a2(r_r e)D+a3EGDp,_ l +a 4 CpS	 (3.12)
witha 1 >0,a 2 <0,a 3 >Oanda 4 >0.
LI r ^re, then:
!=ao+air+a31,GDP,_i+a4CpS	 (3.13)
and if r > r', then:
I = (ao-a2r')+(ai+a2)r+a3LGDp,_ l +a 4 CpS	 (3.14)
with the expectation that (a 1 +a2) <0.
Two dummy variables are included in the regression: one for 1981 when there was
unusually high investment due to the 'oil-boom', and one for 1983 when the effects of
the external debt crisis were felt on the level of investment (see Table 1 in the Data
Appendix). Equation (3.12) was estimated in logarithms since the tests statistics sug-
gested this as a superior specification. The estimated equation17 is:
logGFI = 5.70- 0.00165 r - 0.0023 (r - r)D + 0.0004 (EGDP (,_ 1))	 (3.15)
(10.74) (-0.75)	 (-0.66)	 (2.29)
+ 0.192 IogCPS + 0.22 DU81 - 0.20 DU83
(3.54)	 (3.57)	 (-3.37)
R 2 =0.98 DW1.84 F ,7.o) =124.9 n=29 =0.91
(22.8)
where: GFI is real gross fixed investment in billion pesos; r is the real interest rate;
flie equation was estimated using the Cochrane-Orcutt technique to correc first order auto-
correlation of the errors.
113
(r - r e)D is the switching variable; CPS is real credit to the private sector,
IGDP(,...l) =GDP,_ 1 -GDP,_2 is the lagged accelerator; and DU81&DU83 are the
dummy variables for 1981 and 1983. The estimation results show that the sign on the
real interest rate is not positive but negative, but statistically insignificant. The
coefficient on (r - r e )D has the expected negative sign but is also insignificant. Experi-
menting over the range of real interest rates failed to produce a positive sign on r, which
suggests either that the true equilibrium value of r has been below the minimum experi-
enced, or that savings is not related to the real interest rate, as found in the domestic sav-
ing equation. Therefore, the investment equation is reestimaied without the switching
variable, obtaining the following results:
logGF! -5.63 - 0.003 r + 0.0004 (&GDP, - I)) + 0.20 1ogCPS + 0.23 DU81 -0.18 DU83 (3.16)
(11.04) (-2.15) (3.69) 	 (2.47)	 (3.96)	 (-3.36)
R 2 - 0.98 DW = 1.85 F(&2l) = 149.7 n =29
It is shown that real investment is negatively affected by the real interest rate hold-
ing constant the supply of credit, and that both supply side detenninants (credit) and
demand side determinants (the lagged accelerator) are significant. The lagged accelerator
is the most significant of the explanato!y variables, and supports the hypothesis that
investment responds to changes in demand. As far as the two supply side effects
described above are concerned, we find that there is a positive effect from the real interest
rate to investment through the level of credit given to the private sector, but there is a
negative effect from the real deposit interest rate on real investment if, as stated above,
this is considered as a 'proxy' for the real rate charged on loans. This result is not con-
sistent with Mckinnon's Complementarity Hypothesis between money and capital, but
shows support for the assumption that money and capital are substitutes, which implies
that a rise in the real deposit interest rate discourages productive investment
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According to the results obtained from this equation, it seems that investment is
affected by both demand and supply factors. Concerning the effect of the real interest rate
on investment, it is found that the interest rate might affect investment in two opposite
directions. To work out the net effect of the interest rate on investment, we first need to
calculate the magnitude of the two separate effects which are being dealt with. The first
effect is the impact of an increase in the real interest rate on investment if the former is
considered as a proxy of the price of credit. From equation (3.16), we find the partial




According to our results, a one point increase in the real rate of interest causes
investment to decrease, on average, by 1.95 billion pesos.
The second effect is the impact the real rate of interest has on investment through
changes in the supply of credit. To calculate this effect, it must be taken into considera-
tion the effects that the real interest rate has on financial savings, which in turn affects the
supply of credit. To do so, the chain rule will be used, as follows:
aGFI - GF1 *	 * aFS( a. )c) -	 aFS	 ar	
(3.18)
The impact coefficient of credit on investment is derived from equation (3.16):
=(0)*(G1)=06l	 (3.19)
where GFI and C are the mean values of gross fixed investment and of the real stock of
credit respectively over the 1960-1990 period. Then, the impact coefficient of a change
in financial savings on the stock of real credit is calculated by regressing the stock of
The derivation of impact coefficients and elasticities from a semi-log model as the one
presented here is explained in Appendix UIA.2. We understand by a semi-log model one in whidi
the dependent variable is expressed in loganthzns and the independent variables are expressed in






credit on financial savings:
C = 277.2 + 0.14FS	 (3.20)
(5.18) (1.80)
R 2 = 0.81 DW = 1.78 F(3) = 33.89 n =30





Lastly, from the equation that explains the behaviour of financial savings (in section
111.2), we get the impact coefficient of a change in the real interest rate on financial sa y-
ings:
Thus, the effect of the real interest rate on investment through the supply of credit is
given by:
GF1
ar )(c) = (0.61) * (0.14) * (3.97) = 0.34	 (3.23)
Adding the two effects then gives the net effect of the real interest rate on invest-
ment as:
aGFI	 GF!
+ a NC) 
= —1.95 +0.34= —1.61	 (3.24)
Although there is a positive effect from the supply side of the real interest rate on
investment via credit, it seems that this effect is offset by the negative impact that the rate
of interest has on investment when the supply of credit is held constant. The net effect of
interest rates on investment appears to be negative. Thus the evidence for Mexico does
not seem to support the financial liberalisation model hypothesis of a positive relation
between the real interest rate and investment. The results of a positive and significant
lagged accelerator, together with a negative net effect of real interest rates on investment
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is more consistent with the post-Keynesian models discussed in chapter II, which allow
/
for a negative effect of the real interest rate on investment.
111.5. Determinants of Economic Growth
This section analyses the determinants of economic growth using an endogenous
saving model based on Mckinnon's (1973) virtuous circle model on savings and growth.
Mckinnon develops a model to explain the virtuous circle developed between say-
ings and the rate of economic growth, in which the effects of financial variables are
highlighted. Based on the Harrod-Domar model of growth, the following functions are
established.




where a is the output/capital ratio, and is assumed to be constant




where s is the propensity to save out of income.
- The equilibrium percentage rate of growth of output is obtained by differentiating (3.25)
with respect to time and substituting (3.26):





The rate of growth of the economy is determined by the product of the output/capital
ratio a and the marginal propensity to save s.
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- The propensity to save s is itself assumed to be partly determined by the rate of growth











The dependence of savings on growth is what Mckinnon calls the portfolio effect




A higher growth rate requires a higher savings ratio in order for the ratio of money
balances to income to remain at a constant level. In other words, the public's wish to
maintain their ratio of financial assets to income intact when income rises, leads them to
increase their savings, '...that is, they are induced not to consume all of their incremental
income because they want their assets position to rise commesurately. Their propensity to
save out of income is thereby increased' (Mckinnon, 1973, p.124). The effect of growth
on the propensity to save (portfolio effect) depends in turn on the financial conditions of
the economy. The more developed the financial system the higher the financial
assets/income ratio is likely to be and the higher the value of the propensity to save s. For
the portfolio effect to influence the rate of economic growth, a developed and healthy
financial system is needed, including a positive real interest rate offered on deposits, so
that the public is attracted to hold their savings in the form of financial assets.
The economy reaches an equilibrium rate of growth when the actual rate of growth
of output g generates desired savings sufficient to support the investment necessary to
maintain that rate of growth. For the model to have a stable equilibrium solution the
portfolio effect of growth on savings - must be less than the capital/output ratio19:




Introducing additional explanatory variables into the savings propensity function as
part of the 'other variables' in p. we include export performance and foreign capital
inflows:
S = s (g, r, x, S1)
	
(3.33)
where x is the rate of growth of exports and S1 is the foreign savings ratio to income.
Both, the rate of growth of exports and foreign savings relieve the foreign exchange con-
straint on investment and growth that affects developing countries, therefore influencing
the savings behaviour. Mckinnon (1973) argues that trade liberalisation and an equili-
brium exchange rate will increase exports on the one hand and will lessen financial
repression on the other hand. Trade liberalisation implies the elimination of subsidised
credits to importers or exporters and an equilibrium exchange rate implies that neither
exports nor imports are punished.
Papanek (1973) argues that the rate of growth of exports also affects positively the
propensity to save through the income distribution. He argues that exports often produce
highly concentrated incomes with a high propensity to save. Moreover, he argues,
exports are administratively easier to tax than wages or profits thus increasing public sav-
ings as weU.
Foreign savings S1 relieves both the foreign exchange and the savings constraints on
investment and growth. Hence foreign savings affect both the propensity to save and the
rate of growth of output. It has been argued that capital inflows from abroad may reduce
the domestic saving effort. Papanek (1973) finds that the relation between foreign savings
of output. It implies that the slope of the actual rate of growth of output function is lower than uni-
ty and assures its intersection with the 45 degree line from the origin that depicts the product of the
'intended' or ex-ante propensity to save and the output/capital ratio a (See Mckinnon, 1973,
Qapier 9).
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and domestic savings is negative only when foreign savings includes net transfers
received by the government plus official long term borrowing. However, he argues, if
private direct investment and net private transfers are included, the relationship between
foreign savings and domestic savings becomes uncertain.
Let private savings, PS, be a function of real income Y:
PS=sY
Substituting the propensity to save s from equation (3.33), gives:
PS =(ag +a2x+o 3r +aS1)Y





where Y is aggregate income, C is aggregate consumption, I is investment, X is exports
and M is imports.








where PS is private savings and PuS is public savings (total public income T minus total







The sources of finance of investment are: private savings (PS), public savings
(T - G), and foreign savings (M —X). Substituting (3.34) in (3.40) gives:
I=sY+(T—G)+(M—X)	 (3.41)
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Substituting (3.41) in (3.42):
(3.42)
—=a[sY+(T-G)+(M-X)]	 (3.43)at
which in turn gives:
g = as + aS0 + aS1 	(3.44)
where g is the percentage rate of growth of output, SG is the public savings ratio,
and S1 is the foreign savings ratio.
Lf S = (X + a2x + a3r + cs4S1, then the rate of growth of output is determined by:














Equation (3.45) shows the reduced form from which we can solve for the structural
parameters a1 , a2 , cz3 , and ct given the value of a, the productivity of investment.
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IILS.1. Estimation Results
The result of estimating equation (3.45) for the 1961-1990 period with annual obser-
vations is the following:
g = 5.23 + 0.058x - 0.0035 r + 0.33 SG + 0.67 S1	(3.50)
(5.51) (2.18) (-0.08) (3.73) (3.13)
R 2 =0.66 DW=2.04 F(4) =12.48 n=30
Serial Correlation : X1) = 0.153
Functional Form : X1) = 2.00
Normality: Xa)= 0.92
Heteroscedasricity: X1) = 0.15
where:g isthcrealrateofgrowthofoutput(%);xisthe realraxeofgrowthofexports
(%); r is the real interest rate offered on deposits (%); SG is the public savings ratio
(defined as the public's sector financial deficit over GDP) (%); and S is the foreign sav-
ings ratio (calculated as the negative of the current account balance of the Balance of
Payments over GDPX%).
We find that only the real interest rate is not statistically significant in explpining
real output growth, while the other variables are. Hence we do not find empirical support
for a positive and significant effect of real interest rates on economic growth. This result
is consistent with the earlier results of a negative and/or non-statistically significant
coefficient of the real interest rate on the total savings and investment equations. More-
over, when undertaking the Granger causality tests between the growth of output and the
real interest rate we found no support for causality in any direction that is, there seems to
be no Granger causality either from the real interest rate to the growth of output or from
the rate of growth of output to the real interest rate as shown by the following equations:
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and:
= 2.26 + 0.47r(, —1) + 0.52g (, — 1)
(2.22) (0.89)	 (3.29)
R 2 = 0.3 DW = 1.86 durbin -h = 0.75 1(2.27) 5.89
= 5.11 -0.74g(,_i) +0.46r(1_i)
(1.60) (-1.48)	 (2.80)
R 2 = 0.3 DW = 2.24 durbin-h =-1.62 F(ZTh = 4.92
(3.51)
(3.52)
The lagged independent variables are not statistically significant in any of the equa-
tions, thus implying no Granger causality between the two variab1es.
The rate of growth of exports, as expected, has a positive and statistically significant
coefficient. The increase in exports earns foreign currency needed to finance imports of
capital and intermediate goods necessary in the production process in most less
developed countries. As well, a virtuous circle is developed between exports and growth
in the sense that investment in the export sector can lead to a rise in productivity and to
product diversification so that the income elasticity of demand for exports rises (see
Thirlwall, 1982 and Thiriwall and Hussain. 1982).
The results obtained concerning the effects of public savings and of foreign savings
on the rate of growth of output show that foreign saving (S1) has a stronger impact on
growth than public savings (SG ). The foreign savings coefficient is double that of the
public savings coefficient. This means that, other things remaining equal, the produc-




	 = c = 0.33). According to Papanek (1973) this is a reasonable result sinceas50
It should be mentioned that we did not expect a statistically significant coefficient of the
lagged rate of growth of output g , in detennining the real interest rate r, since real Interest
rates were exogenously set by the monetary authorities until April 1989.




foreign savings can fill the foreign exchange constraint as well as the savings constraint.
Also, according to Mckinnon (1973) foreign savings are expected to have a greater
impact on output growth than domestic savings. He argues that financial repression res-
trains domestic savings within less developed economies and generates pressure for reli-
ance on foreign capital to supplement domestic saving and to provide a more efficient
allocation of resources capable of identifying high return investment projects that other-
wise would not take place.
Using equations (3.46) to (3.49) we now proceed to calculate the coefficients
;; I = 1,...,4 that determine the propensity to save in equation (3.35). Since the system
of equations is under-identified (because a is unknown as well), the value of a, the pro-
ductivity of capital, was estimated independently. An incremental capital/output ratio
(ICOR) was calculated equal to 2.95 by finding the coefficient of the incremental output
(AY) in a regression where investment (AK) is the dependent variable. The calculated
ICOR gives an estimated productivity of capital & = 0.34. It was also found, by calculat-
ing the average of the recursive coefficient of .K on iY, an average ICOR for the
1960-1990 period in Mexico of 3.01, which, in turn gives an average = 0.33. This result
enables us to consider the value of & = 0.34 as quite stable over the period analysed.
Knowing that: = 0.058, (32 = —0.0035, = 0.33, f3 ( = 0.67 and & = 0.34, we find








which gives the propensity to save equation as:
s = —Q.062g + O.176x - O.OlOr + 1.014S1	 (3.57)
We find no empirical support for the portfolio effect of growth on the propensity to
save since its coefficient is negative and close to zero. Consistent with the previous
results obtained, we also find that r does not affect positively the propensity to save since
its coefficient is, again, negative and close to zero. However, the rare of growth of
exports and foreign savings do have a positive impact on the propensity to save. Exports
seem to affect savings positively, either through the income distribution effect and/or the
foreign exchange constraint relaxation. As well, foreign savings appear to have a positive
(and virtually cqui-proportional) impact on the propensity to save, not supporting the
hypothesis that foreign savings reduce the domestic savings effort. The values of the
estimated coefficients of the propensity to save (&j, i = 1, 2, 3, 4) satisfy the stability
condition of the Mckinnon model of being less than the capital/output ratio.
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111.6 Conclusions
This chapter has examined the detenninants of financial savings, the level of total
and private domestic savings, investment and output growth in Mexico. The analysis
was undertaken with special emphasis on the effects of the real interest rate on these vari-
ables, since it plays a central role as the key to the relief of financial repression. ft is
believed that the rise in the real interest rate will increase not only financial savings but
also total saving, and thus the non-inflationary sources of finance will be enhanced.
The results obtained are clear as far as the effect of the real interest rate on financial
savings and on total savings is concerned. We found that financial savings are positively
and highly correlated to the real interest rate. We also found that financial savings are
sensitive to the level of real output. This explains the fact that financial savings were
growing while there were long periods of negative real interest rates. During this period
(1977-1981), the Mexican economy experienced a high rate of growth of output. Finan-
cial liberalisation, through the rise in real interest rates, does have a positive impact on
financial savings, and thus, on the total sources of non-inflationaiy domestic finance.
The effect of real interest rates on the total level of domestic savings is statistically
insignificant. That is, the real interest raze appears to have no effect on the total level of
domestic savings. Total domestic saving primarily is a function of the level of real
income. This result implies that a rise in financial savings does not necessarily mean a
rise in the total level of domestic savings of the economy. Financial savings can rise
because the public substitutes other forms of savings (real assets or financial assets depo-
sited abroad) into domestic financial assets, when the real yield of the latter is higher.
Thus, there is no reason to expect that a rise in the real interest rate, caused by financial
liberalisation, will increase the level of total savings. It can even cause total savings to
decline as a consequence of the effect it has on the public sector's borrowing require-
ment.
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The results shown here, together with the weak results of other research on the rela-
tion between interest rates and savings, leads us to think that it is a shortcoming of the
theory behind financial liberalisation to believe that total savings will increase, when it
seems to be that financial savings is the relevant variable.
An interesting question to raise is what are the consequences of a rise in financial
savings even though total savings do not increase. We might think that it does represent a
more efficient use of idle resources if these resources find productive investment outlets,
but on the other hand, financial savings can remain in the financial sector for speculation
purposes and not lead to any productive investment. It cannot be assumed that financial
savings will automatically find investment outlets.
We also found a positive correlation between credit given by the banking sector to
the private sector and the financial asset stock held in the financial system, even though
credit given to the private sector depends on the reserve requirement that the Central
Bank imposes on commercial banks. As well, we have seen that this credit does affect in
a positive way the total level of investment.
This might lead to the conclusion that financial liberalisation can have a positive
effect on the level of investment af savings channelled through the financial system can
find productive outlets easier and faster than any other form of wealth holding.
Nevertheless, if the only way to raise credit is by raising the real interest rate, the higher
levels of the real interest rate might have a negative impact on the level of investment.
Concerning the raze of growth of output, we found no empirical support for the port-
folio effect of growth on savings. Consistent with the previous results, it seems that
changes in the real interest rate do not have any effect on economic growth working
through savings. However, it appears to be that output growth is positively affected by
the rate of growth of exports, which, as well, increases the propensity to save. An
interesting result obtained concerns the productivity of public savings compared to the
productivity of foreign savings. We found that the productivity of foreign savings is
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double that of public savings, which is an important result for a countzy like Mexico that
has relied so much in the past on foreign capital. According to our results, public savings
would have to be twice as much as foreign savings to give the same impact on economic
growth.
As a final conclusion we can say that even though financial liberaiisation will
increase the flow of resources into the financial sector, it is not clear that this process will
increase total saving and investment and thus economic growth. The productivity of




* All variables are expressed in real terms; The GDP, savings and investment values were deflated with the
relevant implicit price index. They are all measured in Billion Mexican Pesos.
(1). We consider the Net Total Value of Domestic Savings (Net Total Domestic Savings= Gross Total Sav-
ings - Depreciation - External Savings).
(2). External Savings = (-)Balance of the Cunent Account of the Balance of Payments.
Source of Data: Banco de Mexico and [NEGI.
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Nxes:
(1). The public savings ratio is calculated as the ratio of the public sector's nominal financial deficit over
nominal GDP. A negative value mflects a public sector deficit.
(2). The fomign savings ratio is calculated as the ratio of external savings ((-) the Balance of the Current
Account of the Balance of Payments) over nominal GDP.
Source of Data: The public sector's deficit data for the 1960-1970 peñod was obtained from Gomez Oliver
(1981). The teat of the data was obtained from Banco de Mexico, Economia Aplicada AC., and INEOL
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Notes:
(1). The Annual Nominal Interest Rate considered is the end of period value of the weighted average
interest raze offered by the banking system on the different bank deposits.
(2).The Annual Real Interest Rate is the 12 month accumulated real rate of interest (December value).
(3). FInancial Savings - (M4RS-M IRS) where: M4RS is the Real Stock of M4; and M iRS is the Real
Stock of Ml.
(4). The Real Stock M4 is the Nominal M4 Stock deflated with the National Consumer Price Index
(1978-100).
(5).The Real Stock of bank credit given to the private sector is deflated with the NCPI (1978=100).
Source of Data: Banco de Mexico.




Calculation of the Accumulated Real Interest Rate.
The twelve month accumulated real interest rate is calculated as follows:
jr.[((l+jr,)* (1+j ,.1 )* •..* (1+fr,,))1]* 100
where:
i,: accumulated real interest rate in twelve months
I,: real interest rate in month t








1,, : real interest raze in month t
i annual nominal interest rate
CPI,: Consumer Price Index in month t
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APPENDIX 11L4.2
Calculation of Impact Coefficients and Elasticities.
From a multiplicative model like the following:
Y=Axe
which is expressed in logarithmic form as:
logY=logA +1logx+r
The impact coefficient of r on Y is:
where Yis the average value of Y, and the elasticity of Ywith respect to ris:
aYr	 -
ar Y
where is the average value of r. The impact coefficient of x on Y is:
ax
and the elasticity of Y with respecito x is
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CHAPTER IV
CREDIT ALLOCATION AND THE PRODUCTIVITY OF INVESTMENT
IV.! Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the efficiency of the allocation of financial
resources in Mexico over the period 1970 to 1990. The chapter is divided into six sec-
tions, but four main areas of analysis can be identified. First, the role of the public sector
in financial policy. Secondly, the allocation of credit given by banks (commercial and
development banks) between the public and the private sector. Thirdly, the relationship
between public and private investment and the productivity of the two types of invest-
ment, and fourth, the effect of financial variables (the real interest rate and the financial
deepening ratio) on the productivity of investment.
The first section analyses the different roles played by the public sector in financial
policy, under a direct intervention in credit allocation scheme and under a financial
liberalisarion environment. It is argued by the financial liberalisation model that one of
the conditions for a liberalised financial system to work efficiently is the reduction of the
public sector's deficit. A low public sector deficit stands now at the core of Mexican
economic policy. One of the objectives of a low public sector borrowing requirement is
not to distort financial maitets. It is argued that a high public sector deficit needs massive
financing which distorts financial markets. If the public sector's financing needs are high,
the government makes use of policies and instruments, such as credit ceilings and reserve
requirements, that divert financial resources to the public sector. This set of instruments
and policies conform to what is understood as financial repression. But this leaves open
the question of how public resources are used and whether public investment is more or
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less productive than private investment.
The reduction in public spending in Mexico during the last decade has affected pub-
lic investment overall. The evolution of credit given to the public sector and to the
private sector is described in section IV.3. One of the puiposes of this section is to
highlight what happened in Mexico during the 1970-1990 period. credit given to the pub-
lic sector increased its percentage share in total credit after 1982, coinciding with the
period when the participation of public investment in total public expenditure fell shar-
ply. Credit given to the public sector after 1982 was mainly devoted to finance interest
payments on the domestic public debt.
After analysing the allocation of credit between the public and private sectors, sec-
lion P1.4 analyses the productivity of investment in both the public and the private sec-
tors with the aim of testing the hypothesis that financial resources diverted by non-market
forces are inefficiently allocated, which implies that public investment is less productive
than private investment. Section IV.4 includes a discussion of theoretical issues concern-
ing the concept of productivity and previous empirical work done on the productivity of
public and private investment in developing countries. It then presents the methodology
and the estimation results obtained for Mexico during the 1970-1990 period.
After considering the efficiency of the allocation of resources, the analysis proceeds
to another controversial issue surrounding public and private investment. Section IV.5
analyses the effect that a change in public investment has on private investment. This is a
controversial issue because the effect of public investment on private investment is sub-
ject to both a complementarity effect and a substitution or crowding-out effect Following
the presentation of a discussion and previous empirical work done on this topic, two
recursive models are developed to find estimates of the net effect of a change in public
investment on private investment: the contributory effect less the crowding-out effect.
Section P1.6 presents an empirical analysis of the financial liberalisation modd
hypothesis of positive real interest rates and high financial deepening ratios as the means
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to increase the productivity of investment. This hypothesis has to be a strong argument
behind the financial liberalisation models, given the weak theoretical and empirical evi-
dence found of a positive relationship between real interest rates and financial deepening
on the one hand and the level of aggregate savings (and the quantity of investment) on
the other. That is, the hypothesis stating that financial variables affect positively the pro-
ductivity or quality of investment stands stronger, at least at a theoretical level, than the
hypothesis of real interest razes affecting positively economic growth through a rise in the
quantity of savings and investment. To test this hypothesis, we examine the effect that
these financial variables have had on the incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR). Addi-
tionally, this analysis includes the effect of the real rate of growth of output on the ICOR,
and tests the hypothesis stating that the ICOR does not remain constant in the short run,
but is determined by output growth and the degree of capacity utilisation of the economy.
Finally, the conclusions derived from the empirical evidence found in this analysis are
presented.
IV.2 The Role ot the Public Sector in Financial Policy
Deregularisation of the financial system implies significant modifications of the role
of public policy in the mobiisation of financial resources. Not more than a decade ago,
the main objective of financial and monetary policy in many developing economies was
to achieve a high rate of economic growth by providing a stable financial environment
and by inducing desired changes in the amount and allocation of the country's credit
resources.
Direct instruments of monetary control were the main means by which credit was
allocated. These instruments of intervention in monetary and credit markets often
included some or all of the following: direct controls on interest rates, bank credit ceil-
ings, selective credit controls, preferential central bank refinance, facilities to direct credIt
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to priority sectors, and reserve and liquid asset requirements.
In the case of Mexico, the use of instruments and policies of direct intervention in
the market was widespread. Direct intervention in financial markets played a determinant
role in the allocation of credit, as analysed in the first chapter of the thesis. The financial
sector provided long-term finance to the public and the private sector at low cost with the
aim of promoting investment and industrialisaxion.
Direct government intervention in financial markets enables the public sector not to
be constrained by its own savings and to mobilise financial resources by borrowing from
the private sector and from the banking sector to finance the budget deficit. The public
sector can, in this way, mobilise a large share of the economy's financial resources in
excess of its own revenue. In Mexico, commercial banks channelled part of their financial
resources at subsidised rates to activities to which the government gave priority. The
reserve requirement ratio was generally high and acted as an instrument both for mone-
taiy control and for financing the deficit of the public sector. Development banks and
trust funds were created and enlarged in order to make the support to preferential sectors
more effective, and the government had sole access to the Central Bank as a source of
financial resources.
Direct credit allocation in priority sectors - priority being determined by a set of
economic and political goals - was considered as the means to finance projects that would
not attract financial resources guided through market forces: 'because of the divergence
between social and private returns', interventionist credit policy is necessary to remove
market distortions and to impel financial intermediaries to better allocate their resources'
(Khatkhate and Villanueva, 1978). Direct intervention was considered essential when
distortions prevailed in an imperfect credit market market imperfections being under-
Social returns differ from the rate of return expected by a private investor since all the benefits
and costs of the investrner* project aie computed, even those that do not acaue to the owner of the
project (see Leite and Sundararajan, 1991).
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stood as a wide term implying lack of information among production and consumption
units in the economy, indivisibiities and fragmentation of the economy. It is argued
that, if properly designed and executed, direct intervention policies can strengthen the
process of financial intermediation by improving the allocation of financial resources. As
Khatkhate and Villanueva (1978) suggest, in less developed economies direct interven-
tion policies 'appear to be necessazy to remove the one weakness of the financial inter-
mediation process: sub . optimal allocation of resources. Financial institutions receive
incorrect market signals in imperfect markets, and their perspectives are narrow, which
impede the flow of their resources to socially productive sectors' (p.987).
The view of economic policy on the role of the public sector in the allocation of
credit has gradually changed in Mexico during the 1980-1990 decade. It is now widely
considered that direct government intervention in financial markets damages the
efficiency of the economy, by reducing financial intermediation and distorting the alloca-
tion of resources. In its 1990 Annual Report, the Central Bank states that the actual
economic strategy followed in Mexico has as a central issue the re-definition of the role
of the state in the economy. It is argued that by increasing the role that market forces play
in the allocation of resources, the overall efficiency of the economy will increase (Banco
de M6xico, 1990).
if the government is to be helpful in bringing about a faster rate of economic
growth, 'it must always be on guard not to be itself a major source of misallocation of
resources' (Tanzi, 1976). Within the financial liberalisation framework of economic pol-
icy, this means that the government should not make use of financial restriction measures
to transfer a high proportion of funds from the financial system to the public sector. Leite
and Sundararajan (1991) argue that misallocation of financial resources by the public sec-
tor would not happen if the funds to finance the government budget deficit are raised in
the financial market on equal terms with the private sector, and, if the social return of the
government's investment projects financed by these funds exceeds the market interest
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rate.
It is argued that direct instruments of monetary control are difficult and costly to
design and implement efficiently, besides causing distortions in the allocation of
resources, since these resources may not be directed into those activities expected to yield
the highest returns 'and less productive activities may be supported to the detriment of
economic growth' (see Johnston and Brekk, 1991). It is further argued that direct controls
in credit allocation inhibit the development of money and capital markets which are
necessary for an efficient allocation of resources.2
If direct government intervention in the financial market is considered to cause a
decline in financial intermediation and an inefficient allocation of resources into low pro-
ductivity activities, the role of the public sector in allocating financial resources needs to
be redefined. Economic policy under a market oriented framework states that, 'the
government has to provide an appropriate environment for the well-functioning of the
financial market and for a competitive financial structure' (Johnston and Bitkk, 1991, p.
99). Polizarto (1991) points out that the role of financial policy in a market economy is:
to control the supply of money, to prevent systemic financial instability and to meliorate
concerns about the efficiency and equity of financial intermediation. The World Bank
states that the role of the government is to ensure that financial institutions are acting
honestly by providing 'a system of laws and regulations needed to promote the use of
contracts that are clear about the rights and obligations of contracting parties' in order to
'foster responsible and prudent behaviour on both sides of the financial transaction'
(World Bank, 1989, p.84). 'It is the role of financial authorities (the Central Bank) to pro-
mote a safe, stable and efficient financial system' (World Bank, 1989, p. 92).
2 Johnston and Biekk (1991) argue that the lack of an effective investment dinr1 outside the
banking system means that only those investment projects that satisfy the cnteña set by bankei
may be able to obtain finance at reasonable interest rates.
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Ohigliazza (1990) distinguishes three categories of action through which the Cen-
tral Bank can promote an efficient financial system. First, the Central Bank participates
by defining directly or indirectly the regulatory framework within which financial inter-
mediaries operate. It sets guidance to induce competition among market participants, to
avoid undue risk-taking by institutions and to provide guarantees to avoid bank runs.
Secondly, the Central Bank can play a critical role in expanding the financial market by
establishing trading patterns and promoting new instruments of monetary control. For the
case of Mexico in particular, the development of a public debt market (mainly Treasury
Bills) has facilitated the use of open market operations as a means of monetary control.
And thirdly, the category comprising policy actions promoting price stability.
It can be argued that under a market oriented economic framework, financial policy
deals solely with prudential regulation. in contrast to economic regulations, such as
reserve requirements and directed credit, which concern policies and instruments
designed to achieve economic goals, prudential regulation concerns the set of laws, rules
and regulations designed to minimise risk and to ensure the safety and soundness of the
financial system (see Polizatto, 1991).
Two types of regulation are required to ensure the establishment of an effective
financial system: preventive and protective regulation (Sheng, 1991). Preventive regula-
tion covers measures such as a minimum capital requirement sufficient to absorb unusual
losses and to reduce the banks' potential for failure. Asset diversification which enables
banks to achieve a better combination of risk and returns. Furthermore, the establishment
of limits to loans offered to 'insiders' (the bank's shareholders) and detailing permissible
activities for banks (stating as non-permissible activities: commercial activities, owner-
ship of equities in firms and enterprises, and participation in non-banking financial activi-
ties) are considered preventive regulations. Finally, the establishment of minimum stan-
dards for the scope, frequency and content of external audits on commercial banks (see
Polizatto, 1991 and Sheng, 1991).
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Protective regulation includes deposit insurance measures, the primary objectives of
which are to prevent bank runs and to protect the stability of the banking system. How-
ever, deposit insurance can cause moral hazard (see section 11.3.2 in chapter 11), which
might affect the banking sector by providing a 'false sense of security [to bank owners
and to the consequent undertaking] of imprudent and unacceptable risks' (Polizatto,
1991, p.183).
Interestingly, among the set of policies recommended by Bhaxt and Meerman (1978)
to ensure a sound development of financial institutions, are: bank supervision, deposit
insurance and 'the imposition of ceilings on deposit rates' (p.53).
The importance of bank supervision is emphasised in a market oriented financial
system, since inappropriate bank supervision can lead to banking distress and banking
crisis (see section 11.3.2).
Effective bank supervision needs a well trained administrative infrastructure that
can end up being as difficult and as costly to implement as organising selective credit
regulations. In order to assess risk adequately, the supervising agency has to periodically
revise the financial situation of every bank, identifying the main changes in financial
ratios, foreign exchange risks and interest rate risks. Also, major credit files must be stu-
died in order to assess lending procedures and the quality of loans (see World Bank,
1989). Additionally, it is stated that the effectiveness of a bank supervisory body
'depends ultimatdy on its leadership and independence from political influence' (Pol-
izatto, 1991, p. 189), which, although a matter that goes beyond the scope of this thesis,
seems somehow difficult to achieve.
The main instrument of monetary control in a deregulated financial system is open
market operations. The existence of a developed government bond market is a pre-
condition to financial liberalisation, so that the public sector can finance the budget
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deficit directly from the private sector without having to turn to direct financing from the
Central Bank or to compulsoiy lending from commercial banks. The strengthening of the
money market3 is encouraged by the government so that monetaiy and credit control can
be achieved through open market operations.
In turn, it is argued that a low level of the public sector borrowing requirement is a
condition for the effective functioning of open market operations as a monetaiy control
instrument. If the budget deficit is large, requiring massive financing, sales of govern-
ment bills tend to be the dominant influence in financial markets, seriously limiting the
use of open market operations as a monetaiy control instrument. Market oriented models
argue that an efficient financial market can be brought about only if the government
reduces its budget deficit to a level that would permit it to borrow directly from the finan-
cial market without recourse to special regulations (see Johnston and Brekk, 1991). Since
the government has an important role in promoting competition and in ensuring that its
financing operations do not distort market rates, the financial position of the government
must be improved, that is, the public sector borrowing requirement has to be lowered.
A direct implication of the above argument is a reduction in public expenditure. In
the case of Mexico, the contraction of public expenditure has affected public investment
above all. The public sector deficit was reduced from 16.7 percent of GD? in 1986 to 6.2
and 3.5 percent in 1989 and 1990 respectively (see Table 2 in chapter III). Investment
expenditure as a share of total public expenditure has been reduced from 32.4 percent in
1981 (its peak level) to 8.6 and 13.6 percent in 1989 and 1990 respectively (Banco de
M6xico, 1991).
The money market is defined by the World Bank as the market in which short-term seathties
such as Tzeasuiy Bills, certificates of deposits and comrneroal bills are traded (World Bank,
1989).
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IV.3 The Allocation of Credit
This section analyses the evolution of credit given by the banking sector over the
1970-1990 period, with the aim of distinguishing the distribution of credit among the
public sector and the private sector. Table IV.1 shows the levels of credit given by com-
mercial banks in real terms, as well as its percentage composition. On average, 8! per-
cent of credit was given to the private sector4, while 19 percent was given to the public
sector during the 1970-1990 period. There is a clear shift in the distribution of credit
before 1980 and after 1984. Before 1980, the average percentage share of credit given to
the public sector was 8.9, and after 1984 it rose to 33.2 percent. The average percentage
share of credit given by commercial banks to the private sector decreased from 91.1 per-
cent for the 1970-1980 period, to 69 percent in the 1984-1990 period.
Table IV.2 shows the distribution of credit given by development banks to the pub-
lic and the private sector. 5 After 1987, the proportion of credit channelled through
development banks decreased compared to that of commercial banks. Although the
major part of credit was given to the public sector, its average share in total credit
increased after 1984: before 1977 credit given to the public sector represented, on aver-
age, 69 percent; after 1984 it rose to 84 percent.
Considering credit given by both commercial and development banks, it can be
observed from Table IV.3 that while total credit given to the public sector shows an
increasing trend during the whole period (only beginning to decline after 1988), there is a
clear shift of its share in total credit from the 1970- 1978 period to the 1984-1990 period.
The average share of credit given to the public sector by both commercial and develop-
' Unfortunately, data on credit per sector are not available for 1981, 1982 and 1983 in the case
of commercial banks.
In the case of development banks, information of credit per sector is not available from 1978
until 1983.
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ment banks increased from 35 percent in the first period to 57 percent in the second
period. In the case of credit given to the private sector, its average share in total credit
decreases more than 20 percent over the periods considered. It is only during 1989 and
1990 that its real level and percentage participation increased.
Having considered the distribution of credit between the public and the private sec-
tor, we now turn to analyse the use of funds effected by the public sector by examining
the destination of public expenditure 6. Table W.4 shows the real levels of the different
uses of public expenditure. First, current expenditure is divided between interest pay-
ments (including both interest paid on the domestic debt and on the external debt),
separated from government consumption, current transfers and other current expenditure
(included in the 'others' column). Then, investment expenditure is divided between pub-
lic works and other investment expenditure, the latter including capital transfers to public
enterprises plus other expenditures.7
It can be observed from Table IV.4 that public investment increased in real terms
from 1977 until 1981, when it reached its peak level. After 1981, public investment kept
falling until 1989, slightly rising again in 1990. In 1989, public investment was one sixth
of its 1981 value, showing a larger fall in public works than in investment in public enter-
prises.
Investment in public works (which include roads, water, sewage, etc.) was more
than ten times lower in 1990 than in 1981, its percentage share in total expenditure
decreasing from 23.78 percent in 1980 to a minimum of 2.24 percent in 1989 (see Table
IV.5).
6 Data on the uses of public expenditure are not available foi the 1970-1976 period.
The addition of the cunent expenditure sub-total and the public investment sub-total does not
coincide with total public expenditure because an 'other expenditure' item ('ajenas netas') is not
included in the table.
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On the other hand, public expenditure devoted to interest payments was the only
item to rise after 1981, both in real terms and as a share of total expenditure. During the
1977-198 1 period, the average share of public expenditure devoted to interest payments
was 10.7 percent. During the 1982-1990 period, it increased to an average of 36 percent.
Thus, while public current expenditure (other than interest payments) and public invest-
ment decreased, interest payments increased.
The issue that deserves to be highlighted is the coincidence of: the upward shift in
the real level and share of credit given by commercial and development banks to the pub-
lic sector, the rise in public expenditure devoted to interest payments; and the decline of
public investment from 1982 onwards. In turn, the percentage composition of interest
paid by the public sector on the domestic debt and on the external debt also changed, the
former increasing from 58.7 percent in 1981 to 79.8 percent of total interest payments in
1990 (see Table IV.6). Thus, after 1981, the public sector's use of financial resources was
mainly devoted to interest payments on its domestic debt, mainly due to the rise in the
real interest rare over this period (see Table 3, Chapter UI).
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Table W.1
Cztdst Given by Commercial Banks
	
Year To the	 Public Sector	 To the Psivaze Sector 	 Total
	
BilL Pesos % Past. BilL Pesos % Pan. 	 BIlL Pesos
	
6.3	 7.70	 752	 92.30	 815
i• i	 7.9	 8.49	 85.0	 91.51	 92.9
1972	 9.9	 10.02	 89.1	 89.98	 99.0
1973	 9.0	 938	 84.9	 9042	 93.9
1974	 7.9	 8.76	 81.8	 91.24	 89.6
	
7.7	 8.33	 85.2	 91.67	 92.9
	
9.2	 9.56	 87.0	 90.44	 96.2
1977	 9.2	 10.44	 78.8	 89.56	 88.0
1978	 8.6	 8.22	 95.9	 91.78	 104.5
	
11.0	 8.93	 112.2	 91.07	 123.2
1980	 11.6	 8.39	 126.6	 91.61	 138.2
iii- 	 	 -	 -	 -	 174.4
-	 -	 -	 -	 178.7
-liii-	 	 -	 132.4
1984	 49.1	 33.58	 97.0	 66.42	 146.1
1985	 68.6	 41.31	 97.4	 58.69	 166.0
1986	 97.4	 51.44	 91.9	 4836	 189.3
1987	 89.7	 46.98	 101.2	 53.02	 190.8
1988	 36.7	 29.79	 86.4	 70.21	 123.0
1989	 30.9	 17.72	 143.5	 82.28	 174.4
1990	 26.5	 11.35	 207.4	 88.65	 233.9
=
Source of Data: Banco de M6xico
Notes: Stocks deflated by the Implicit Price Index for Gross Capital Foimation. Base 1970=100.
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Table IV.2
Credil Givc by Development Bank..
Year To the Public Sector To the Private Sector 	 Total
Bill. Peso. * Pan. BilL Pesos * Pan. BIlL Pesos
1970	 30.3	 62.31	 18.3	 37.69	 48.7
1971	 35.5	 61.18	 22.5	 38.82	 58.0
1972	 43.8	 68.14	 20.5	 31.86	 64.2
1973	 47.7	 70.71	 19.8	 29.29	 67.4
1974	 44.7	 68.55	 20.5	 3145	 65.2
1975	 48.7	 71.71	 19.2	 28.29	 67.9
1976	 71.8	 77.92	 20.4	 22.08	 92.2
1977	 65.1	 72.20	 25.1	 27.80	 90.2
1151.	-	 -	 -	 -	 101.3
•i• 5_	 -	 -	 -	 105.8
ii -	 	 -	 -	 -	 109.4
.ii-	 -	 -	 -	 -	 147.0
-	 -	 -	 -	 2253
1983	 -	 -	 -	 -	 1453
1984	 117.0	 82.91	 24.1	 17.09	 141.1
1985	 145.6	 84.03	 27.7	 15.97	 173.2
1986	 199.0	 87.21	 29.2	 12.79	 228.1
1987	 209.9	 87.76	 29.3	 12.24	 239.2
1988	 117.2	 82.83	 24.3	 17.17	 1413
1989	 108.8	 8138	 24.6	 18.42	 133.3
•i	 83.3	 77.73	 23.9	 22.27	 107.2
Source of DatE Banco de Mxioo
Notes: Stocks deflated by the Implicit Price Index for Gross Capital Fomtation. Base 1970=100.
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Table W.3
Credit Given by Commemial and Development Banks
Year	 To Public Sector	 To Private Sector 	 Total
- BilL Pesos % Put. BilL Pesos % Part. BilL Pesos
1970	 36.6	 28.13	 93.5	 71.87	 130.1
43.4	 28.74	 107.5	 71.26	 150.8
1972	 53.7	 32.89	 109.6	 67.11	 163.3
1973	 56.7	 35.13	 104.7	 64.87	 161.4
52.5	 33.93	 102.3	 66.07	 154.8
56.4	 35.09	 104.4	 64.91	 160.8
1976	 81.0	 43.02	 107.4	 56.98	 188.4
1977	 74.3	 4L71	 103.8	 58.29	 178.1
-	 -	 -	 -	 205.8
•	 -	 •	 -	 228.9
1980	 -	 -	 -	 -	 247.6
1981	 -	 •	 -	 -	 3213
-	 -	 -	 -	 404.2
•	 •	 -	 -	 277.9
1984	 166.0	 57.81	 121.2	 42.19	 287.2
1985	 214.1	 63.13	 125.1	 36.87	 339.2
1986	 296.4	 70.99	 121.1	 29.01	 4173
1987	 299.6	 69.67	 130.4	 30.33	 430.0
1988	 153.9	 58.17	 110.7	 41.83	 264.6
1989	 139.7	 45.39	 168.1	 54.61	 307.8
1990	 109.9	 32.20	 231.2	 67.80	 341.1
Source of DalE Bunco de Mexico
Notes: Stocks deflated by the Implicit Price Index for Gross Capital Formazico. Base 1970=100.
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Table IV.4
Destination of Public Expenditure
Billion Pesos Stocks. 1970 Constant Prices.
Year	 Cuneni Expenditure	 Investment Expenditure 	 Total
Interest	 Others Sub- Public	 Other	 Sub-
Payments	 Total Works Investment Total
1977	 21.4	 135.7	 157.1	 40.4	 12.8	 53.2	 210.5
1978	 23.8	 147.3	 171.1	 52.4	 13.2	 65.6 237.4
1979	 28.4	 163.6	 192.0	 63.0	 18.9	 81.9 276.3
1980	 34.1	 191.4	 225.4	 77.0	 15.9	 92.9 323.6
1981	 51.5	 221.5	 273.0	 95.1	 38.3	 133.4 411.1
1982	 85.6	 262.1	 347.8	 81.0	 24.9	 106.0 463.8
1983	 116.6	 194.7	 3113	 50.2	 203	 703 386.7
1984	 111.8	 1893	 301.1	 473	 15.9	 63.2 369.2
1985	 109.8	 201.8	 311.7	 443	 13.4	 57.9 3753
1986	 142.0	 185.0	 327.0	 39.8	 12.0	 51.8 385.4
1987	 178.6	 175.9	 3543	 38.9	 11.3	 50.2 406.4
1988	 144.4	 155.6	 300.0	 32.6	 5.2	 37.8 338.3
1989	 104.4	 91.2	 195.6	 4.7	 133	 18.0 210.7
1990	 82.5	 88.0	 170.5	 83	 17.9	 26.2 192.6
Source: Banco de M6xico
Notes:
Plows deflated by the National Consumer Price Index. Base 1970=100.
Current Expenditure Sub-Total plus Investment Expenditure Sub-Total does not coincide with Total Public
Expenditure because an 'other expenditure' item ('Ajenas Netas') is not included in the Table.
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Table IV.5
Desiination of Public Expenditure
Percentage Composition (%)
Year	 Current Expenditure	 Invesnent Experxliture
Interest	 Otirra Sub- Public	 Other	 Sub-
Payments	 Total Works Investment Total
1977	 10.17	 64.45	 74.62	 19.18	 6.09	 25.27
1978	 10.03	 62.06	 72.09	 22.08	 5.55	 27.63
1979	 10.28	 59.21	 69.49	 22.82	 6.82	 29.64
1980	 10.52	 59.14	 69.66	 2.3.78	 4.91	 28.69
1981	 12.54	 53.87	 66.41	 23.13	 9.32	 32.45
1982	 18.46	 56.52	 74.98	 17.47	 5.37	 22.85
1983	 30.14	 50.35	 80.49	 12.98	 5.26	 18.24
1984	 30.28	 51.28	 81.56	 12.82	 431	 17.13
1985	 29.27	 53.74	 83.01	 11.85	 3.57	 15.42
1986	 36.84	 47.99	 84.84	 1031	 3.11	 13.42
1987	 43.96	 43.27	 87.23	 936	 2.79	 1235
1988	 42.70	 46.00	 88.70	 9.63	 134	 11.17
1989	 49.55	 43.26	 92.81	 2.24	 634	 8.58
1990	 42.83	 45.69 88.52	 431	 932	 13.63
Source: Banco de Mexico
Notes:
Qmnt Expenditure Sub-Total plus Investment Expenditure Sub-Total does not add 100 percent because
$n a	 j	 ('Ajenas Netas') is not included in the table.
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Table IV.6
Source: Banco de Mexico
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P1.4. The Productivity of Public and Private Investment
Chapter I has given a broad description of the evolution of public and private invest-
ment in Mexico during the last three decades. It was argued that public investment
played a leading role in promoting economic growth (during the seventies), based on the
observation that the raze of growth of public investment was higher, on average, than that
of private investment (Table IV.7).
In this section, the productivity of public and private investment will be analysed.
The pulpose of the analysis is to test the hypothesis underlying financial liberalisation
models which states that resources allocated through direct policy intervention in finan-
cial markets are inefficiently used, and hamper, rather than help, the process of economic
growth. This hypothesis implies that public investment, which is allocated mainly on
economic planning/non-market based criteria, and using direct instruments of credit con-
trol, is less productive than private investment.
Even though the concepts of efficiency and productivity are not precisely the same,
they are closely related (Shone, 1981). Efficiency is concerned with how best to utilise
resources in the production process. Efficiency of production is also referred to as the
minimisazion of unit costs of all factors of production by applying better techniques
(Nadiri, 1970). Productivity is concerned with the output to input relation. Shone (1981)
refers to efficiency as a more all-embracing concept than productivity; he argues that it is
possible to define them in such a way that they are synonymous, but 'this would not be
useful because we would soon find that we would require a concept to go beyond produc-
tivity as conventionally understood' (p.125). Nevertheless, he adds, efficiency is not a
simple concept, it is far from clear, and it is difficult to measure. Since the interest of this





Billion Pesos at Constant 1970 Prices
Y	 Total	 Private	 Public
Investment Investment Investment
1970	 88.7	 59.4	 29.2
1971	 87.1	 64.7	 22.5
1972	 97.8	 66.3	 31.5
1973	 112.2	 68.3	 43.9
1974	 121.1	 76.1	 45.0
1975	 132.3	 77.6	 54.7
1976	 132.9	 82.3	 50.6
1977	 124.0	 76.8	 472
1978	 143.1	 80.3	 62.8
1979	 171.7	 99.0	 72.7
1980	 197.4	 112.5	 84.9
1981	 230.0	 125.9	 104.1
1982	 1893	 105.7	 83.8
1983	 134.8	 81.4	 53.4
1984	 143.7	 88.1	 55.6
1985 -	 155.9	 100.5	 55.3
1986	 136.8	 88.6	 48.1
1987	 136.1	 94.2	 41.9
1988	 144.6	 104.6	 40.0
1989	 154.3	 113.7	 40.6
1990	 175.6	 130.2	 45.4
Source: National Institute of Satisrics, INEGI
Despite the importance of the relationship between public and private investment on
the one hand and economic growth on the other, there are few empirical studies on this
topic. Khan and Reinhart (1990) point out that 'there is virtually no empirical evidence
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that can be called on to support or disprove the notion that private investment is in some
sense 'better' than public investment insofar as long-run growth is concerned' (p.20).
Perhaps one of the reasons for the scarcity of this kind of study is the difficulty of
the interpretation of the resulting productivity estimates, since public investment, which
has an autonomous behaviour, can have positive and/or negative effects on private
investment, thus affecting the latter's productivity.
Bearing in mind that the estimation results can be weak and that care should be
taken in their interpretation, this section proceeds to analyse the methodology and results
of calculating the productivity of investment. The following section (IV.5) will analyse
the complementarity and substitution (crowding-in and crowding-out) effects of public
and private investment.
Different argwnerns exist surrounding the issue of public and private investment
productivity. Newlyn (1977) argues that there is no a priori reason to consider public
investment less productive than private investment. The World Bank (1989) states that
public or private enterprise ownership can cause significant differences in the enterprise's
performance. In practice, they argue, public enterprises have a limited independence
since they are subject to orders from different government institutions, which can cause
inefficiency and lack of innovation. Tanzi (1976) argues that public investment can be
considered as a kind of input for private investment and that the productivity of private
investment is closely related to both the level and the quality of investment in the public
sector. In general, he argues, 'with the exception of investment in public enterprises, the
direct contribution of most public investment to potential output is not high. It is gen-
erally its effect on the productivity of private investment that makes public investment
worthwhile' (p.911).
In their assessment of the financial liberalisation theory, Coffier and Mayer (1989)
state that the economy would gain by liberalising its financial sector since 'in the pres-
ence of financial repression, the government expands its control over resources which
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would otherwise be allocated by the market [...] The government allocates resources to
investment but its selection of projects is poor' (p.7).
Ize (1989) points out that privatisation of industries is one of the measures recom-
mended by the World Bank and the IMF to countries wanting to raise the overall
efficiency of investment, adding for the case of Mexico that the country has made a
'remarkable' progress in the last years as far as privatisation is concerned.
Khan and Reinhart (1990) test the relationship between public and private invest-
ment and economic growth in developing countries, to determine, based on empirical cvi-
dence, if policies designed to encourage private investment at the expense of pul)lic
investment will help the growth rate.
The authors formulate a growth model that separates the effects of public and
private investment. The model is based on an aggregate production function where output
y depends on the stock of capital K, the labour force L, 'other variables' affecting growth
Z and total factor productivity A:
y =Af(K, L, Z)
	
(4.1)
Expressed in growth terms





Writing it for estimation purposes as:
____	
I	 AL	 ______	 __ __ AZ- =cr0 +cz1 	 +a2	 +a3	 (4.3)
Y:-i	 Y:-i	 Z-i
where:
k	 vZ= - a1 = A	 a2 - A	 a3 = A — - and I K (4.4)
arc	 aLy	 aZy
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The constant term a0 is assumed to capture the growth in productivity, a1 is the
marginal productivity of capital (assumed constant over countries), a2 is the elasticity of
output with respect to labour and a3 is the elasticity of output with respect to other vaii-
ables affecting growth.
Considering the productivity of capital calculation, the authors specify that the
incremental capital-output ratio, ICOR, can be estimated from the equation expressed
above if a0 = a2 = a3 =0. In this case,	 would be the estimated actual ICOR 'In the
a1
empirical analysis of growth in developing countries, a simpler form of the equation is
sometimes used in which a0 = = a3 =0. The resuli is the familiar incremental
capital-output relationship, ICOR. The ICOR is also the key relationship employed in
the basic model utilized by the World Bank to calculate external financing needs for
developing countries' (p. 20). However when Cr 0 ^ 0, a2 ^ 0 and a3 ^ 0, the coefficient
_L. would be the estimated net ICOR, which considers the partial effect of investment
a1
on output when the other variables (L and Z) are held constant.8
To lest the differential effects of public and private investment on the growth rate,
total investment is then divided into public (f,,,) and private (1,,,.,,) investment:





Y:-i	 Y:-i	 Y:-i	 L,_1
The relative values of and would indicate either that the respective marginal
productiviucs are equal, = , or that the marginal productivity of public investment is
higher than that of private investment, > J, or that the marginal productivity of
private investment is higher than that of public investment, i <tz.
$ In the next section (IV.4.1) the different types of ICOR are defined (See Leibenstein, 1957,
I966
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The authors stress that caution should be taken in interpreting the marginal produc-
tivity estimates, since public investment can have indirect effects on private investment,
and there is uncertainty about whether these indirect effects are positive or negative.
In specifying 'other variables (Z)', Khan and Reinhart include the rate of growth of
exports (X) and of imports (M) as explanatory variables in two separate equations:




Y:-i	 Y:-i	 Yt-i	 L,_1
and
	
4v	 Jpbl 21prv	 AL	 ___
= +	 +	 + 3	 + 4	 (4.7)
	
Y:-i	 Y:-i	 Y:-i	 L,...1	 M,_1
The results of estimating these equations for a cross-section of 24 developing coun-
tries, among them Mexico, over the 1970-1979 period, show that the estimated marginal
productivity of private investment has consistently higher statistical significance than that
of public investment. Moreover, the estimated marginal productivity of public invest-
ment, although not statistically significant, has a negative sign in the two specified equa-
tions. The estimated marginal productivity of private investment is between 0.158 and
0.209 with t-statistics higher than in each case; while the estimated marginal produc-
tivity of public investment is either equal to -0.108 (with a t-statistic equal to 1.02) when
growth of exports is included as an explanatory variable, and equal to -0.182 (t-staxistic
equal to 1.55) when the rate of growth of imports is included as an explanatory variable.
Public investment is then excluded from the explanatory variables due to its lack of
statistical significance, resulting in a rise in the coefficient and the statistical significance
of the private investment ratio. The authors do not report any result where the public
investment ratio is included instead of the private investment ratio.
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Concerning their results, Khan and Reinhart argue that 'public sector investment in
developing countries has no direct effect on growth, which in itself is, of course, an
important result. On the basis of these estimates there is little doubt that the direct effects
of private investment on growth outweigh the direct effects of public sector investment'
(p.23).
Sarmad (1990) tests the Khan and Reinhart model for two different periods of time.
Firstly, he does so for the 1970-1979 period in order to compare his results with those of
Khan and Reinhart, who estimate the model for the same period. Secondly, the model is
tested for the 1980-1987 period. He finds that for a sample of 15 developing countries
(instead of 24 countries used in the original work)9 during the 1970- 1979 period the
results obtained by Khan and Reinhait are confirmed as far as the marginal productivity
of public and private investment is concerned. That is, the effect of public investment on
the rate of growth of output is not statistically significant, while the effect of private
investment on output growth is positive and statistically significant The estimated
coefficient of private investment is 0.214 (t-statistic = 2.12) and the estimated coefficient
of public investment is 0.019 (t-statistic = 0.15) when the rate of growth of labour and of
exports are included as cxplanazozy variables in the equation. When the rate of growth of
imports replaces export growth as an explanatory variable, the coefficient of public
investment becomes negative (-0.021) and remains statistically insignificant (t-statistic =
0.17). However, the results obtained by Sarrnad for a sample of 24 developing countries
during the 1980-1987 period show a different pattern. Public investment shows a positive
and statistically significant estimated coefficient equal to 0.263 (t-statistic = 3.05) when
the rate of growth of labour and of exports are included as explanatory variables, and
equal to 0.245 (t-statistic = 2.65) when import growth is included instead of export
growth. The estimated marginal productivity of private investment is lower than public
Saunad limits the sample to 15 countries because of lack of data (see Sarmad, 1990, p.5)
158
investment in both cases, but remains positive and statistically significant, equal to 0.161
(t-statistic = 2.62) in the case where export growth is included and equal to 0.164 (t-
statistic = 2.51) when import growth is included.
Sarmad concludes that 'the role of public investment in the growth process in
developing countries appears to be no less important than that of private investment,
though the pattern of public investment contribution to growth has changed significantly
during the past two decades' (p.10). A possible explanation for the change in the impact
of public investment on economic growth during the last two decades, he argues, is that
public investment was used in projects with a long gestation and in many cases unpro-
ductive which might have negatively affected the contribution of the public sector to
aggregate growth.
IV.4.1. Methodology and Estimation Results
Following the Khan and Reinhart's (1990) model, the productivity of public and
private investment in Mexico is estimated by including them as separate variables of the
output function.









Expressing it for estimation purposes as:
(4.10)




If we consider, in turn, that the stock of capital K consists of a public and a private
component:
K=KbI+K,,,.	 (4.11)
output can be expressed as a function of:
Y = a (K,,,,, + K,,,,,)	 (4.12)
where K,,,,, is public capital stock and Kr,. is private capital stock.







Since we are interested in testing the hypothesis of different values of a for private
and public capital, then:
aK,,,,,	 ____
= a1 at + a2	(4.14)
Expressing it for estimation purposes as:
= a1 Ix,,, + a2 'P":	 (4.15)
where	 is public investment and I,,,.,, is private investment
Taking the basic equation of Haxrod's growth model: g = s a, where gis the rate of
growth of output, s the propensity to save and a the productivity of capital; and consider-
ing that in equilibriwn savings are equal to investment:












Equations (4.10), (4.15), (4.17) and (4.19) are estimated in order to compare the
estimated coefficients between total, public and private investment productivity. To cal-
culate the different sectors' investment productivity, two different methods of measure-
ment are used, with the aim of comparing their results. Firstly, econometric methods are
used (Ordinaiy Least Squares) to estimate the marginal productivity value as the
coefficient of investment when using the change in output as a dependent variable (in
equations (4.10) and (4.15)), or, as the coefficient of the investment to output ratio when
using the rate of growth of output as the dependent variable (in equations (4.17) and
(4.19)). Secondly, the incremental capital-output ratio ICOR was calculated on an annual
basis, obtaining then the average ICOR for the period, and calculating the average pro-
ductivity of investment as the reciprocal of the average ICOR, which is sometimes
referred to as the incremental output-capital ratio or 10CR.
Three types of ICORs are distinguished (see Leibenstein, 1957, 1966). Firstly, the
actual ICOR, which is the one considered in this analysis, accounts for the ex-post rela-
tion between investment and changes in output. Secondly, the net ICOR, which considers
the change in output due to a change in the capital stock net of changes in other factors of
production. Thirdly, the adjusted ICOR,, which considers the effect of investment on out-
put growth given specific changes in other factors of production. The net and the adjusted
ICORs would allow us to isolate the effect of increases in investment on increases in out-
put. When using the actual ICOR, all changes in output are attributed to changes in the
stock of capital, since changes in other factors of production are not being considered.
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Hence, our results will be underestimating the ICORs and overestimating the produc-
tivity of investment (see Thirlwall, 1989).
All the equations include an intercept term in their estimation, thus allowing the
average and the marginal productivity to differ. The average productivity of capital is





The marginal productivity of capital is the addition to total product attributable to




if Y(K)=a+aK and a^O, then the marginal productivity differs from the aver-
age. The resulting coefficients are thus estimates of the marginal productivity of
investment, which is independent of the level of input (K). The independence of the
estimated productivity from the level of investment is important in this case since the
level of public investment is lower than the level of private investment during the period
analysed (Table P1.7). If a =0, the result a > might partly reflect a lower average
level of public investment compared to the average level of private investment.
Tables P1.8 and P1.9 show the estimated coefficients. Table P1.8 shows the results
of estimating equations (4.10) and (4.15) using Ordinary Least Squares and correcting
with the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure in the presence of autocorrelation of the errors.
Table P1.9 shows the results of estimating equations (4.17) and (4.19) using the same
methods. In addition to the R 2 , the Durbin-Watson (DW), and the F statistics, the
Lagrange Multiplier test of auto-correlation of the errors (SC1 ) are reported in the
Tables.1°
10 The Qi-square value of this statistic must be lower than the cntical value X)2 = 3.84 to ac-
162
Regressions are done using annual data for the 1970-1990 period. The estimated
results of equations (4.10), (4.15), (4.17) and (4.19) show high residuals for the years
when the growth of output is negative (1982, 1983 and 1986, see Data Appendix Chapter
III). For this reason, we include three dummy variables in the regressions for the years
when output growth is negative.
Tables IV.8 and IV.9 include the results obtained (including and excluding the
dummy variables) with the puxpose of showing the sensitivity of the estimated
coefficients to the inclusion or exclusion of variables.
Table IV.8
Noies i-statistics in bracketz.
cepi the null hypothesis of no auto-conelation of the ermrs.
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Table IV.9
Noes: t-sianstics in brckecs.
A common feature that can be observed from the tables considered is that including
the dummy variables for 1982, 1983 and 1986 improves the estimation results as shown
by the statistical tests. The t-staxistic, the R 2, and the F statistic increase when the
dummy variables are included. The estimated productivity coefficients can be thus con-
sidered to be more reliable in the case where the dummy variables are included.
The estimated coefficients of public, private and total investment in Table IV.8,
*
when a = -i--, show the productivity of total mvestment as a weighted average of the
productivity of public and private investment; a positive estimated productivity of public
investment (a1 = 0.78) and statistically significant (t-staxistic= 3.16); while the estimated
productivity of private investment is negative (a2 = —0.07) and not statistically
sgnificant (t-statistic= -0.28). This result is perhaps due to the presence of muhicollinear-
iry in the regression. Mulricolhnearity of the variables can be expected since the expla-
natory variables are interrelated. In these cases, it becomes very difficult to obtain precise
estimates of the separate effects of the variables involved. Coefficients may not appear
significantly different from zero, not because they have no effect on the dependent vari-
able but because the sample and specification may be inadequate. Estimates of
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coefficients may be very sensitive to additions or deletions of variables (see for example
Judge, Griffith, Carter and Lee, 1980). However, taking these results at their face value,
they are opposite to those obtained by Khan and Reinhart (1990) in the sense that a nega-
tive productivity would be conferred, not to public investment as in their case, but to
private investment.
Table IV.9 shows the estimated & values when & = (J/gfl . In this case, the constant
term is statistically significant in all the estimations reported. The results obtained when
the dummy variables are included are interesting since both the coefficients of the public
and the private investment ratio have positive and statistically significant values. The
estimated productivity of public investment is 0.77 (t-statistic= 3.87) and the estimated
productivity of private investment is 0.68 (t-statistic= 1.90). The estimated productivity
of total investment is a weighted average of public and private investment equal to
0.74.11
Since the object of this section of the analysis is not to investigate the determinants
of output growth, but to find estimates of the productivity of investment in the public
and private sectors of the economy, no other variables were introduced in the equation to
try to improve the estimation. Further empirical evidence is given by estimating
separately the relationship between public investment and output growth on the one hand,
and private investment and output growth on the other hand.
The estimated values of total productivity differ from those estimated in (lapter ilL This
can be due to differences in the sample period, since Qapter III considers the 1960-1990 period.
Another reason affecting this result is the difference in the base of the data used. Clapter ifi uses
data base 1980.100 and in this chapter we use data base 1970=100 for convenience reasons. The
real values of GDP and investment were modified in the original source (see for example Banco de
Mexico's Annual Reporl for 1985 which includes the data with base 1970=100. and the 1990 An-
nual Repon which includes data with base 1980=100).
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iY = a 1 'pbl and iY = a2	 (4.20)(4.21)
or,
g = a1 f- and g = a2 	(4.22X4.23)
The results of estimating equations (4.20) to (4.23) are shown in Tables 1V.l0 and
IV.11. A constant term is included in all equations so that the marginal productivity of
investment can be estimated. As in the previous estimations, we include dummy vari-
ables for the years when output growth is negative (1982, 1983 and 1986). Including the
dummy variables improves the test statistic values for all equations, except in the case of
equation (4.23), where the F statistic does not improve.
Considering the estimated coefficients of public and private investment, it can be
seen from Tables IV.10 and IV.1 1 that the coefficient of public investment is positive and
statistically significant in both tables when the dummy variables are included. The
estimated coefficient of private investment, although positive, lacks statistical
significance except in the case of equation (4.23) in Table IV.l0 when the dummy vari-
ables are excluded from the equation.
Table IV.10
Notes: i-statistics in brackets.
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Table IV.11
Notes: t-statistic in brackets.
Table IV.12 shows the calculated annual ICOR coefficients for total, public and
private investment, their period averages and the calculated average productivities. It is
interesting to notice the decrease in the estimated productivity values from the 1970-1981
period to the debt crisis period 1982-1990.
According to our results, the estimated productivity of public investment does not
seem either negative or lower than the productivity of private investment. The estimation
results show higher productivity values for public investment than for private investment.
The estimated productivity of public investment lies within the 0.75 <a 1 <0.95 range
for the 19704990 period, and the estimated productivity values of private investment are
within the range —0.07 < a <0.68.12
Hence, the empirical evidence does not support the hypothesis that the productivity
of public investment is lower than private investment, or that public investment is unpro-
ductive.
2 Coidering only the equations where the dummy variables (1982, 1983 and 1986) are in-




The calcutazed productivity values of pnvare and public investment aie higher than for total investment be-
cause the output measure used is the same. Hence their values reflect the average levels of public, private
and total lnves*menL
Excludes 1982. 1983 and 1986. during which the rate of growth of output was negative.
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IV.5 The Effect of Public Investment on Private Investment
The effect of public investment on private investment is ambiguous at a theoretical
level since two opposing effects can occur simultaneously: a complementary or contribu-
tory effect and a substitution or crowding-out effect. Public investment is complemen-
tary to private investment if an initial increase in public investment leads to an increase
in private investment. Public investment crowds-out private investment if the latter
decreases as a result of an increase in the former.
There are several reasons why there might be a complementary relation between
public and private investment. If there are unemployed resources, an increase in public
investment raises the level of aggregate demand and widens the size of the market for
private production of goods and services. Furthermore, a high percentage of public
investment is devoted to public works in infrastructure (see Table IV.5), creating
economies of scale and Increasing the productivity and profitability of private invest-
ment. Private investment is thus stimulated by the rise in the expected rare of return.
However, the contributory effect of public investment on private investment may be
offset by the crowding-out effect. It is argued that public investment can crowd-out
private investment in both physical and financial terms. In physical terms if public invest-
ment produces marketable output that competes with private output, then private invest-
ment may be 'physically' crowded-out (see Khan and Reinhart,, 1990). Also at full
employment public investment will crowd Out private investment. In financial terms we
distinguish two ways in which financial crowding-out can rake place. The first one refers
to the case where a higher real interest rate crowds-out a certain amount of private invest-
ment that would otherwise have taken place. If the higher real interest rare is a function
of the level of public investment, then, a rise in public investment can cause private
investment to decline. The real interest rate may be expected to rise as a result of the
higher demand for credit by the public sector needed to finance additional public invest-
ment. The second way considers the case where the financing of public investment
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lowers the availability of financial resources to the private sector, thus hampering private
investment. If public investment is financed, say, by diverting funds from commercial
and development banks through reserve requirement increases, then credit to the private
sector may be limited.
U Tun Wal and Wong (1982) develop a recursive model to estimate the net effect of
public investment on private investment, that is, the contributory effect less the
crowding-out effect. Private investment is specified in their model as a function of public
investment (1(3,), the change in the stock of credit given to the private sector (domestic
and net foreign capital inflows) (FP,), and the lagged stock of capital of the private sector
(KP(,..1)):
IP,=c0+c1lG,+c2FP,+c3KP(,_1)	 (4.24)
The contributory effect of public investment on private investment is measured by
the public investment coefficient, c 1 . To take into account the financial crowding out
effect, credit given to the private sector is then specified as a residual of total credit F,,
less credit given to the public sector FG,:
FP=F,FG,	 (4.25)
while credit to the public sector is specified as a function of public investment IG,:
FG, = g o + g 1 IC,
	 (4.26)
Substituting equation (4.26) in equation (4.25), and in turn, substituting FP, in
equation (4.24) leads to a reduced form equation which considers credit to the private
sector as an endogenous variable in the model:
IP,=k0 +k 1 IG,+k2 F,-f- k 3 KP (, _ 1)	 (4.27)
The resulting coefficient of public investment, k 1 = c 1 - c 2 g 1 , indicates the
(4.29)
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existence or non-existence of a crowding-out effect. The estimations obtained by U Tun
Wai and Wong suggest, in the case of Mexico, the existence of a crowding-out effect that
completely offsets the contributory effect of public investment for the sample period
1965-1975, since the estimated coefficient of public investment in the reduced equation is
negative, k 1 <0, i.e. C 2 g 1 > c 1 . They find a positive net effect of public investment on
private investment for the case of Greece, Korea and Malaysia.
The analysis undertaken by FitzGerald, Jansen and Vos (1992) links the crowding-
in and crowding-out effects of public investment on private investment with the impact
of the external debt variables. To do so, the authors develop an externally constrained
accelerator model in which private investment is specified as a function of the change in
GDP, (Y, - -i) lagged public investment (I	 ), the domestically financed budget
deficit (Z,), the net inflow of external capital to the private sector (Fp), and the lagged
dependent variable:
I,, 1 =k 1 (Y,—Y,_1)+k2J,_1 +k 3 Z+k4 F,+k5 I,,, _ 1 	 (4.28)
where the expected signs of the coefficients are: k 1 > 0, k2 >0, k3 <0, k4 > 0 and
k5 >0. The public investment coefficient k2 measures the stimulus to private invest-
ment provided by public investment,, and k 3 measures the impact of priority budgetary
claims on domestic resources and thus any credit rationing.
Further, the link between foreign exchange constraints and the fiscal balance with
foreign trade and foreign financial flows is specified in the following equations:
where M,, the import capacity, is equal to the sum of exports X, net capital inflows to the
public sector F:, and net capital inflows to the private sector F,,, less the interest pay-
ments on the external debt (I DF, _):
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M1 —X,+F81 +F,—iDF,_ 1	(4.30)
Public investment is specified as a function of net foreign borrowing:
Ist fo+f i Fg	 (4.31)
And the public sector's domestic borrowing requirement Z is the sum of public
investment J, foreign debt service i DF, ... and net foreign borrowing of the public sec-
tor
Z=J,+iDF,_1 —(F+fY)	 (4.32)
By substituting the last set of equations into the private investment function (4.28),
the authors arrive at the following reduced form equation in which private investment is
only determined by external sector variables:
1,bo+b 1 X,+b 2 X,... 1 +b 3 F,+b 4 F,_ 1 +bsF,	 (433)
+b6 F,_ 1 +b7 iDF_ i +b 8 i (1 _ 2) DF1 _ 2 +b9I1_1
The net effect of a rise in public investment on private investment is given by the
constant term bo=(k 2 +k3 )jo+k3 fA. The results of estimating this equation for a
sample of 22 developing countries shows that b 0 is positive in 26 out of 29 estimated
equations. This result leads FitzGerald, Jansen and Vos to conclude that although the
foreign financing of the public sector's expenditure can have a negative effect on private
investment by increasing the external debt burden and undermining the private sector's
confidence, it is offset by the positive effect that foreign financing has in reducing the
claim of the public sector on the domestic financial markets, thus releasing the domestic
credit constraint on private investment.
Galbis (1978) tests the relationship between public and private investment for a
sample of sixteen Latin-American countries from 1961 to 1973. The ratio of private
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investment to income is specified as a function of: the deposit interest rate, inflation, the
rate of return on capital and the ratio of public investment to income. Although the depo-
sit interest rate and the rate of return on capital are omitted in the estimations because of
unavailability of data, the results of the time-series regressions indicate both a comple-
mentaiy and a substitution relation between public and private investment in Latin-
American economies. For the specific case of Mexico he finds a complementary relation.
Galbis concludes that the lack of a general pattern of behaviour suggests that 'the institu-
tional affangements specific to each counfly are more important than general principles'
(p. 430).
Pradhan, Ratha and Sarma (1990) develop a general equilibrium model for the case
of India, with the purpose of analysing the complementary and crowding-out effects of
public investment on private investment, making reference to the modes of financing and
the manner of allocating public investment. They find that in spite of the way in which
public investment is financed and allocated, private investment falls when public invest-
ment increases. However, they argue, total investment and economic growth increase
despite the fall in private investment. In this sense, they conclude, crowding-out need not
be undesirable.
Greene and Villanueva (1991) analyse a private investment function for a sample of
23 developing countries (including Mexico) from 1975 until 1987. To test the relation
between public and private investment they divide the set of countries into two groups
according to their private investment ratio: the first one includes the countries where the
private investment ratio to gross domestic product is over 12 percent, while the second
group includes the countries where the ratio is below 12 percent. By analysing the public
and private investment ratio to GD? in both sets of countries, they find that a comple-
mentary relation seems to exist between public and private investment, since, on average,
the public investment ratio is higher in the first group of countries, than in the second set
of countries, which have a lower private investment to GD? ratio. Then, Greene and Vii-
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lanueva specify a private investment function to test econometrically the determinants of
private investment and the effect that public investment has on it. The ratio of private
investment to GDP is specified as a function of the following variables: the real deposit
interest rate, the lagged percentage change in real GDP per capita, the ratio of public
investment to GDP, inflation, the lagged level of per capita GDP, the lagged ratio of debt
service payments to exports and the lagged ratio of the counny's stock of external debt to
its nominal GDP. Estimating the equation for the 23 countries in the sample, they find
that the estimated coefficient of the public sector investment ratio is positive and
significant in explaining private investment, suggesting complementarity between public
and private investment. According to Greene and Villanueva's results, private invest-
ment is determined positively by the lagged rate of growth real per capita GDP and pub-
lic investment, while the real interest rate, inflation, the lagged ratio of debt service pay-
ments to exports and the lagged ratio of the stock of debt to GDP have a negative effect
on private investment.
IV.S.1 Methodology and Estimation Results
In this section we develop two models to test the net effect of public investment on
private investment considering the two ways in which public investment can financially
crowd-out private investment, which are then estimated for the case of Mexico during the
1970-1990 period.
The first model considers the case when private investment is crowded-out through
an increase in the real interest rate derived from the increased demand for credit by the
public sector. Taking the total investment function specification from Chapter ifi to
explain private investment, and adding public investment as an explanatory variable
gives the equation
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I =a +a 1 4i,z +a 2 r +a 3 CPrS +a 4AGDP,_ 1	 (4.34)
where: I is the level of real private investment, !pb: is the level of real public invest-
ment, r is the real interest rate, CPrS is the stock of real credit given by the banking sec-
tor (commercial and development banks) to the private sector and EGDP .... is the
lagged change in real gross domestic product.
The coefficient of public investment a 1 measures the contributozy effect of a rise in
public investment on private investment. This coefficient can overestimate the total
effect since the financial crowding-out effect is not being explicitly considered (see U
Tun Wai and Wong, 1982). With the purpose of measuring the crowding-out effect and
then being able to estimate the net effect of public investment on private investment, the
following recursive model is proposed:
Stating the real interest rate as a positive function of public investment
and substituting (435) into (4.34) gives:
(4.35)
!=ao+a i J+a 2 (bo+b i I,b,)+a 3 CPrS+a 4 GDP_ i	(436)
=> I,, = (ao+a2bo)+(a1 +a 2 b 1 )4+a 3 CPrS+a 4AGDP1 _ i (4.37)
obtaining the reduced form equaxion
+c 1 1,+c2 CPrS+c 3 EGDP,_ 1	 (4.38)
where:
c0=a0 +a2bo




The coefficient c 1 measures the net effect of public investment on private invest-
ment. If c 1 is lower than a 1 , then there is crowding-out working through the real interest
rate. However, if c 1 > 0 the net effect is positive. If c 1 <0, crowding-out offsets the
contributoiy effect and the net effect of public investment on private investment is nega-
live.
The second model also considers equation (4.34) as the private investment function,
taking into account that private investment can be crowded-out by public investment if
the public sector increases its demand for credit and reduces the availability of credit to
the private sector. If credit to the public sector (CPuS) is stated as a positive function of
public investment:
CPuS=rio+1I,,,,	 (439)
and credit to the private sector is determined as the residual of total credit given by the
banking sector (it') (commercial and development banks) less credit given to the public
sector
CPrS = TC - CPuS	 (4.40)
Substituting (439) and (4.40) into (4.34) gives:
I,,.,,=a 0 +aI j +a 2 r +a 3 TC— fo — i I,,) +a4AGDP1_i 	 (4.41)
> I=(a0 —a 30)+(a 1 —a 31)!o+a 2 r+a 3 TC+a 4AGDP,_ 1 (4.42)
Leading to the reduced form equation:
1=8,+6i !,+6r+&3t'C+64 LGDP,_ 1	 (4.43)
where:
8=a0 -a3





If 6 <a 1 there is financial crowding out working through a reduction in the availa-
biity of credit to the private sector. If 6 <0, the crowding out effect offsets the coniri-
butory effect.
Equation (4.34) is estimated in logarithms, since the statistical tests suggested this
as a superior specification. Estimation is done by Ordinary Least Squares over the period
1970-1990. Dummy variables for 1986 and 1988 are included in the regression because it
seems to be that private investment in paiticular was significantly affected by the
intensification of the austerity measures imposed by the government after the drastic fail
in the price of oil in 1986, and in 1988 private investment seems to have been affected by
the establishment of a 'deal' between the public and the private sector fixing key prices
of the economy such as the minimum wage and the exchange rate in December 1987.13
The main purpose of this and the following equations is to test the effect of a change
in public investment on private investment considering the indirect effects that the former
has on the latter through the real interest rate and through the availability of credit to the
private sector in the financial market. Therefore, the real interest rate and the real stock of
credit given to the private sector are included as explanatory variables. To be consistent
with the total investment function used in the previous chapter, and to test the sensitivity
of private investment to changes in aggregate demand, the lagged change in the real level
of GDP is also included as an explanatory variable.
It must be mentioned that when the two dummy vaziables for 1981 and 1983 were included
in the equation (as done in section 111.4 for the case of total investment), their estimated
coefficiei*s were noi statistically significant.
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The estimated results of equation (4.34) are:
log!,,,, = 0.17 + 0.001 r + 0.23 log!,,b, - 0.0002GDP,_ 1 	 (4.44)
(0.39) (0.54)	 (3.21)	 (-0.34)
+ 0.71 logCPrS + 0.05 DU86 + 0.29 DU88
(6.31)	 (0.59)	 (2.91)
R 2 = 0.91 DW = 2.08 F(6,14) = 24.12 n =21
Serial Correlation : Xl) = 0.11
Functional Form : Xl) = 2.94
Normality : X2) = 0.39
Hezeroscedasticity : X1) = 0.02
vbeie:
I,,,: Real Private Investment. Billion Pesos. 1970 Prices.
r Real Interest Rate (%)
Real Public Invesunent. Billion Pesos. 1970 Prices.
tGDP, - : Lagged change in GDP. Billion Pesos. 1970 Prices.
CPrS: Real Sto of Qedit given to the Private Sector. Billion Pesos. 1970 Prices.
According to the estimated coefficients, private investment is positively affected by
a change in public investment. The estimated impact coefficient 14 of a change in public
investment on private investment is a i=0.39, while the estimated elasticity of private
investment with respect to public investment is = 0.23. A 10 percent increase in pub-
lic investment is associated with a rise in private investment of 23 percent on average.
Credit given to the private sector does seem to have a considerable positive effect on
private investment, while the estimated coefficients of the real interest rate and of the
lagged change in GDP are not statistically significant. Probably, the demand side effect is
being captured by public investment, reducing the statistical significance of the lagged
accelerator.
14 See Appendix IILA2 in Chapter Ill for the calculation of impact coeffiaents and elasticities
out of a semi-log model.
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Financial crowding-out of private investment woiking through rises in the real
interest rate is measured by the estimated results of equation (4.38):
log!prv = 0.07 + 0.21 lOg!b1 - 0.0003 LtGDP, - 1	 (4.45)
(0.19) (3.52)	 (-0.48)
+ 0.74 logCPrS + 0.06 DU 86+0.33 DU 88
(8.50)	 (0.75)	 (4.11)
R 2 = 0.91 DW = 1.99 F(5,15) = 30.31 n = 21
Serial Correlation : X1) = 0.005
Functional Form :	 = 3.08
Normality : X) = 0.15
Hezeroscedasticity : X1) = 0.002
The equation is well determined and shows the expected signs. The impact
coefficient of a change in public investment on private investment derived from this last
I — -
equation is c 1 = 0.21 (-) = 0.36, where I,,,.,, and 'pbl are the average values of private
'pbt
and public investment respectively. Comparing the coefficient c 1 derived from the
reduced form equation, with the coefficient of public investment a 1 in equation (4.34),
we find that C1 is positive and lower than a 1 ; i.e. 0 <c 1 =0.36 <a 1 =0.39. However,
considering the estimated elasticities of private investment with respect to public invest-
ment,	 = 0.23 in equation (4.34), and	 = 0.21 in equation (4.38), a test was under-
taken to see if	 and	 are statistically different. Knowing that the standard error of
is	 = 0.058, and the critical t-value t(,,k...1) at a 5 percent significance level is
t(15)0.95 = 1.746, we find that the statistic Z =	 = 033 lies in the range where
-C'
the hypothesis of , ^	 is rejected. According to these results, Ci and a 1 are not sta-
tistically different which does not support the hypothesis that there is crowding-out of
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private investment working through a rise in the real interest rate, caused, in turn, by
increased public investment.
The result of estimating equation (4.43) is as follows:
log!,,,, =1.37+ 0.006 r + 0.18 log!,,,, + O.00213GDP, ... 	 (4.46)
(4.57) (3.31)	 (2.28)	 (2.78)
+ 0.43 logTC - 0.27 DU86 + 0.01 DU88
(5.76)	 (-2.84)	 (0.12)
R 2 =0.89 DW=1.49 F (.5,14) =20.9 n=21
Serial Correlation : X1) = 0.17
Functional Form : X1) = 0.76
Nornalfty : X2) = 2.58
Heteroscedasricizy : X1) = 0.26
The comparison of the coefficient of public investment 6 = 0.18 (--) = 031 with
'pbl
a 1 = 0.39 would seem to indicate that there is crowding-out of private investment work-
ing through the availability of credit to the private sector. Nevertheless, testing the
hypothesis of the estimated elasticity of private investment with respect to public invest-
ment in equation (4.34) being statistically different from that in equation (4.43), we find
that the statistic Z =	
01 
= 0.62 (where the standard error of tj is	 = 0.0805),
Si"
remains within the range where the null hypothesis,	 =	 is accepted since
Z <t(14);O.95 = 1.761. Hence, according to the empirical results obtained, it cannot be
concluded that a rise in public investment crowds out private investment by reducing the
availability of credit to the private sector.
The empirical evidence obtained in this section of the analysis suggests that there is
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no financial crowding-out of private investment caused by a rise in public investment
either working through a rise in interest rates or through the availability of credit to the
private sector. In both cases, the net effect of a change in public investment on private
investment is not statistically different from the total effect, which leads us to conclude
that the dominant relation between public and private investment is one of complemen-
tarity.
IV.6 The Relation Between Financial Variables and the Productivity of Investment
This section analyses the effect of financial variables (the real interest rate and the
financial deepening ratio) on the productivity of investment.
The hypothesis stating that positive real interest rates increase the average produc-
tivity of investment is probably the strongest theoretical argument supporting the liberali-
sation of the financial system, given the theoretical and empirical weakness of the posi-
tive relationship between real interest rates and financial deepening on the one hand, and
aggregate savings on the other, as discussed in Qapter IlL The effect of interest rates on
the efficiency of investment is considered to be more effective than its effect on the
amount of savings (and investment), since the latter depends on the final result of the
substitution and income effects. The tnie effect of real interest rates, Fry (1982) argues, is
'on the average efficiency of investment, not its volume' (j).737). Mckinnon (1989)
points out that 'apparently the quality, if not the quantity of investment improves
significantly when interest rates are positive and financial intermediation is robust'
(p.34). Quoting Collier and Mayer (1989): 'As both Fry and Mckinnon note, if the gains
from savings are modest, the substantial gains hypothesized for domestic financial
liberalisation stand or fall by improvements in investment allocation' (p.1).
In Chapter II, we analysed the theory behind the relation between financial variables
and the productivity of investment This section is thus limited to the empirical analysis
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of the effectiveness of the real interest rate and the financial deepening ratio as deter-
minants of the productivity of investment. The quality of investment is determined by
many economic and non-economic variables. Our main interest lies in the role of finan-
cial variables.
Fry (1979 and 1989) tests the effect of the real interest rate on the incremental
capital-output ratio ICOR for the case of Turkey over the period 1950-1977. He does so
by regressing the ICOR on the real interest rate measured as the difference between the
deposit interest rate and expected inflation. He argues that 'if average investment
efficiency is monotonically related to the incremental output-capital ratio (10CR) a, a
positive association between the 10CR and dis-equilibriuni real deposit rates would sup-
port the efficiency analysis [where the real interest rate affects investment efficiency by
discouraging those investment projects whose real rate of return is lower than the real
interest rate offered on deposits] (Fry, 1989, p.l47). The estimation results obtained by
Fry (1979) a&5:
= v = 2.53 - 24.87 (d - i)	 (4.47)
(5.84) (-3.10)
R 2 =0.253 DW= 1.93
where v is the incremental capital-output ratio, d is the nominal deposit rate and I is
inflation. Based on these results, Fry concludes for the case of Turkey over the years
1950-1977 that a change in the real deposit rate positively affects the productivity of
investment: a one percentage point increase in the real interest rate raises the incremental
output-capital ratio (10CR) by 0.249.
Polak (1989) devotes a chapter of his book "Financial Policies and Development" to
sness the importance of market determined equilibrium real interest rates on the deterini-
15 i-statistics in brackets.
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nation of the level and quality of investment. No government intervention in financial
markets is the only way, he argues, in which a country can devote the resources at its
disposal to the best investment projects, where best means the investment with the
highest marginal contribution to output. By these means, he continues, the country can
block off projects with low or negative marginal productivity, because projects that could
not pay the market cost of capital (the real loan interest rate), would be screened out of
the market. 'Self-investment projects that promised less than the prevailing market yield
would not be undertaken, since the saver would have the alternative opportunity of earn-
ing the market yield by using any one of the available channels for intermediation'
(PolaIc, 1989, p.56). Polak argues that in less developed countries, artificially set low real
interest rates lead to the fragmentation of the capital market and to the inefficient alloca-
tion of savings into low yield investment projects. Setting real interest rates at an
artificially low level makes 'room in the queue of savings for projects that would
automatically be disqualified on the basis of an equilibrium real interest rate, controls on
real interest razes cause the use of part of the available scarce savings for the execution of
sub-optimal investment projects and the concomitant exclusion of a larger amount of
more deserving projects' (Polak, 1989, p.6O). The level of real interest rates, he argues, is
an indicator of the fragmentation of the capital market, and at the same time, one of the
causes of it. The greater the distance between an equilibrium market clearing rate and the
actual level at which controlled interest rates are set, the stronger the forces toward a dis-
toned capital market
To support empirically the argument that artificially set real interest rates and dis-
torted capital markets hamper the rate of growth of output, Polak reports the result of
work done by the World Bank, where, for a sample of 40 developing countries, from
1960 to 1980, an increase in the real interest rate (RRI) is associated with a higher growth
rate (y):16
16 i-statistics in brackets.
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y = 5.21 + 0.27 RRI	 (4.48)
(15.3) (4.5)
= 0.32
P1.6.1 Methodology and Estimation Results
Financial liberalisation theory predicts a negative relationship between the real
interest raze and the ICOR the higher the real interest rate, the higher the expected rate of
return of investment projects, which assumes a higher level of productivity. Concerning
self-financed investment, entrepreneurs will not invest if the expected yield of the project
is lower than the real deposit interest raze offered in financial markets, thus forcing the
investment projects to be realised to have a high expected rate of return, and hence, it is
assumed, a high level of productivity. Concerning investment projects financed by the
banking system, lenders will not be willing to finance projects the expected yield of
which is not enough to cover payments. This process forces those investment projects to
be financed by banks, to have a high expected raze of return and productivity.
It is also argued that financial depth contributes to growth by improving the produc-.
tivity of investment. Provided that intermediaries are good at selecting viable projects,
greater intermediation will ensure that the better investments are financed and will there-
fore increase average productivity (see World Bank, 1989). The larger the amount of
resources channelled to the financial system, the larger the amount of investable funds
that can be efficiently allocated.
In addition to the financial variables, we include the rate of growth of output g as an
explanatory variable to test the hypothesis of g having a negative effect on the ICOR (a
positive effect on the productivity of investment). According to Leibenstein (1966) the
ICOR cannot be assumed to remain constant over time. On the contrary, he argues, the
value of the ICOR in the short run is determined by the rate of growth of output and the
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degree of capacity utilisation (see Thiriwall, 1989). If the economy is coming out of a
recession, a rise in g, (which implies iY, > Y, —1) will take place with low investment
(EK) since there is spare capacity, and the ICOR ,-, will have a relatively low value.
On the other hand, when the rate of growth of output is decreasing, Y1 <LY and
investment remains stable, the ICOR increases. Hence, a negative relationship is
expected between the rate of growth of output and the ICOR. It is assumed that invest-
ment K varies less than output z.Y, that is, investment is considered to have a more
stable behaviour than output. According to Lcibenstein, the investment rate is more
stable than growth for the following reasons: firstly, government investment is likely to
change slowly. Public investment has an autonomous behaviour independent of the rate
of growth of output, 'a zero growth rate will not reduce government investment to zero'
(Leibenstein, 1966, p.2!). Secondly, private investment may take place for defensive pur-
poses as well as for expansion. Finns invest to defend their relative position with other
firms even if the absolute position of the industry as a whole does not improve.
To test these h)potheses, we specify the ICOR as a function of the real interest rate,
the financial deepening ratio (calculated as the ratio of nominal M4 over nominal GDP),
and the rate of growth of output g:
ICOR =f(r, M4/GDP, g)	 (4.49)
Dummy variables for the years with a negative rate of growth of output (1982, 1983
and 1986) are included in the equation. 17 If growth g is negative and 1).' <0, then
ICOR <0. But a negative rate of growth of output does not imply necessarily that invest-
ment has had a negative productivity. A negative rate of growth of output can be due to
factors other than the productivity of investment. Thus, including the ICOR values when
output growth is negative, might bias the estimated results.
The regression without the dummy vaiiables shows high residuals for these yea's.
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The result obtained for the case of Mexico over the 1970-1990 period is as follows:
ICOR = 9.6 + 0.03 r —0.03 (M4/GDP)— 0.74g	 (4.50)
(3.87) (0.91) (-0.41)	 (-6.09)
—47.1DU82— 15.3DU83 — 15.5DU86
(-27.5)	 (-8.53)	 (-9.78)
R 2 =0.99 DW= 1.53 F (614) =241.0 n=21
Serial Correlation : X1) = 1.34
Functional Form X1) = 14.5
Normality : X2) = 6.61
Heteroscedasriciy : X1) = 0.12
where ICOR is the incremental capital-output ratio of total investment, calculated amiu-
ally (see Table IV.12), r is the real interest rare (%), (M4IGDP) is the financial deepen-
ing ratio, where M4 is the broadest monetaiy aggregate in nominal terms and GDP is the
gross domestic product in nominal terms, and g is the real rate of growth of output (%).
According to the above results, we find that neither the coefficients of the real
interest rare or of the financial deepening ratio are statistically significant. The rate of
growth of output g has the expected sign and is statistically significant, supporting
Leibenstein's hypothesis that the ICOR varies inversely with the rate of growth of output
On the other hand, the evidence does not support the hypothesis which predicts a
significant effect of financial variables, such as the real interest rate and the financial
deepening ratio, on the productivity of investment.
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From the empirical results obtained, it cannot be concluded that financial variables
determine the productivity of investment.18
When the rate of growth of output is excluded from the ICOR equation, the estimated
coeffictents of the real interest rate r and of the financial deepening ratio (M4/GDP) show that the
latter has some significant effect on the detennination of the productivity of investmnenv
ICOR - 14.15-0.009, - 0.23 (M4/GDP)-42.1 DU82 - 7.3DU83 -11.01 DU86
(2.13) (-0.20)	 (-1.75)	 (-21.4)	 (-4.5)	 (-7.3)




The theoretical role of the public sector in financial policy under a liberalised finan-
cial system is one limited to the surveillance of the money and capital markets. It can be
argued that under a liberalised financial system, the developmental role of the Central
Bank is reduced, if not abandoned. Its main objective ceases to be the allocation of credit
to preferential sectors of the economy with the aim of promoting economic growth.
Instead, financial policy is oriented towards the maintenance of price and exchange rate
stability, to the development of a money market and to the supervision of the financial
system.
Market oriented economic policies imply a reduction in public expenditure. This
reduction has affected mainly public investment for the case of Mexico. In this chapter
we have analysed how public investment was reduced in real terms and as a percentage
share of total public expenditure after 1982, despite the fact that total credit given to the
public sector by commercial and development banks was increased. We have emphasised
that it was only after 1982 that credit given to the public sector was higher than that given
to the private sector. It was also after 1982 that public investment was reduced sharply,
and credit to the public sector was mainly used to finance interest payments on the
domestic public debt. Moreover, it is precisely during the years when public investment
is veiy low, that the public sector increases its share in total credit given by commercial
and development banks.
According to the empirical evidence obtained in this chapter concerning the produc-
tivity of public and private investment, there is no statistical evidence that public invest-
ment is less productive than private investment. The data also suggest a decline in the
levels of the productivity of investment, both public and private, after the debt crisis in
1982. This decline in productivity coincides with the fall in the levels of investment after
1982, especially of public investment, as analysed in Chapter I.
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The results obtained as far as the net effect of public investment on private invest-
ment is concerned, suggest that public investment is not at the expense of private invest-
ment: no evidence of financial crowding-out of private investment by public investment
was found. The two categories of investment are complementary.
As an overall conclusion to this chapter, we can say that there is no reason to
believe that a rise in public expenditure will crowd-out private investment. It seems that a
rise in public investment can encourage private investment and raise the levels of produc-
tivity of investment. At least, a rise in public investment seems to be a better source of
improving both the quantity and the quality of investment, if compared to the effects that
financial variables, such as the real interest rate and the financial deepening ratio, have on
the aggregate level of investment, either its quality or its quantity.
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CHAPTER V
FOREIGN CAPITAL INFLOWS, DOMESTIC SAVINGS,
INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
V.1 Introduction
The dependence of an open developing economy on foreign capital iziflows as a
source of finance sets to a large extent the pace at which the recipient country's economy
can grow. Especially after the rise in the price of oil during the early 1970's, when the
supply of international credit expanded, developing economies increased their reliance on
foreign funds. This trend can be seen in Mexico, whose main export is oil, when the avai-
lability of foreign exchange expanded during the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's
as a consequence of both the rise in the price of oil and the increased supply of foreign
loans. During the 70's, the Mexican economy relied heavily on foreign loans as reflected
in the rise of the foreign debt stock from US$6000 million in 1970 to US$91200 million
in 1982 (World Bank, 1985). After 1982, the deterioration in the terms of trade - the fall
in the price of oil - and the fall in the supply of foreign loans led Mexico to become a net
exporter of capital in order to service' the external debt. The stock of external debt kept
increasing after 1982 reaching US$107600 million in 1987. The debt burden became an
obstacle to economic growth. The reduction of external net transfers became one of the
main objectives of the government's economic policy: 'In each of the past few years
[1983 to 1989] Mexico has transferred abroad resources equivalent to 6 percent of the
country's output. Decreasing these transfers to 2 percent of GDP will free resources
necessary to finance the productive investment essential for economic growth' (Aspe,
I The service oc the external debt includes amomsation plus inteiest payments.
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1990, p.128). In 1990, after the debt-renegotiation process, the Mexican external debt
was reduced by US$7000 million and financial flows to Mexico were partially resumed.
This chapter consists first of an analysis of the theory and empirical findings con-
cerning the effect of foreign capital inflows on domestic savings, investment and
economic growth. It then examines the case of Mexico. The effect of capital inflows on
domestic savings and investment is analysed considering foreign savings both as a homo-
geneous flow and disaggregated into its different components (debt creating flows and
foreign private investment). Concerning economic growth, a model is developed consid-
ering not only foreign capital inflows but also taking into account the loss of domestic
savings caused by capital outflows i.e. interest payments on the external debt, remitted
earnings and capital flight. It is shown that provided net foreign capital inflows exceed
the loss of domestic savings, the effect of foreign capital inflows on growth is positive.
Finally, the chapter explores the relationship between net transfers of resources and
growth performance taking into consideration the estimated values of capital flight as a
transfer from the country to abroad.
The source of the data used in this chapter is the Banco de Mexico's Balance of
Payments Statistics and the Statistical Abstract of Latin America. Regression analysis is
done using Ordinary Least Squares applying the Cochrane-Orcutt technique in the case of
auto-correlation of the errors. Besides reporting the R 2 , DW and F statistics the work
shows the results of the serial correlation, functional form, normality and heteroscedasti-
city tests.2 When the Cochrane-Orcutt technique is used the auto-correlation coefficient is
reported.
2 The Qi-square value of the serial correlation, functional form, normality and heteroscedasti-
city tests should be lower than the critical values of 1 at acceptable levels of significance. At a 5
percent significance level, the critical values are = 3.84 and x = 5.99 with one and two de-
grees of freedom respectively.
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V.2 The Impact of Foreign Capital Inflows on Domestic Savings
Macroeconomic theories of foreign capital inflows can be divided into two main
frameworks. First, the traditional view, in which foreign savings are regarded as a supple-
ment to domestic resources. This view has been incorporated into the dual-gap analysis,
which has been put forward mainly by H. Cheneiy and co-authors (Chenery and Strout,
1966, Chenery and Bruno, 1966, Chenery and Adelinan, 1966 for example). One of the
main assumptions of this model, sometimes referred to as the "Orthodox Model", is that
all foreign capital inflows are devoted to investment. The second framework considers
that foreign savings substitute domestic savings by encouraging domestic consumption.
This view considers that foreign savings can be used either for consumption or for invest-
ment purposes. The second framework, known in the literature as the "Savings Debate",
was first put forward by Griffin (1970, 1978) and Weisskopf (1972).
The literature devoted to the study of the effect of foreign capital inflows on the
recipient country's domestic savings is now very large, and it can be said that until now
no definite conclusion has been reached. Some authors have even argued that the study of
the relation between foreign and domestic savings has received more attention than it
deserves (Polak, 1990). Ultimately, as Thiilwall (1989) contends, if the interest lies in the
effect that foreign capital inflows have on economic growth, the important issue is the
effect it has on investment and not on domestic savings.
The following section will discuss firstly the dual-gap analysis, followed by the sav-
ings debate and an updated review of new evidence found on this topic.
V.2.1 The Dual-Gap Theory
The dual-gap model considers that foreign assistance can make possible a fuller use
of domestic resources and accelerate economic growth by relieving the savings constraint
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and/or the foreign exchange constraint. Based on a Harrod-Domar model of growth, the
dual-gap model considers output growth as a function of the level of investment, which
in turn is financed by savings, either domestic or foreign. At the same time, investment
requires a proportion of inputs (capital and intermediate goods) which are not produced
domestically and have to be imported. If savings fall short of the required investment to
achieve a target growth rate, growth is said to be constrained by savings (this situation is
also known as investment limited growth). If the level of exports of the country is lower
than the level of required imports needed for investment, then growth is constrained by
foreign exchange (trade limited growth).
One of the basic assumptions of the dual-gap model is the lack of substitutability
between domestic and foreign resources. A developing country is unable to transform its
suiplus in domestic resources into foreign currency, so that the only way in which a
country can finance its deficit on current account in the short run is through foreign bor-
rowing since domestic savings cannot be used to finance the external deficit. hi the long
run, however, one of the objectives of economic policy is to change the structure of the
economy to reduce or eliminate its dependence on foreign resources. This is done by
increasing the propensity to export or by reducing the propensity to import Out of income
(through import substitution).
The relation between the foreign savings ratio and economic growth is defined using
the Harrod-Domar growth model g = as, where g is the growth rate, s is the domestic
savings ratio and a is the incremental output-capital ratio. If a is the foreign saving ratio,
then growth can increase tog =(s+a)a, provided a >0, ands andado not fall. Simi-
larly, growth can be expressed as a product of the ratio of imports to income z = -j-, and
the incremental output-import ratio m' = 4, as g = I m'. With a net foreign capital
inflow equal to a, growth increases to g = (1+ a) m'. If the country sets a target rate of
growth equal to r, the required savings ratio to support this rate of growth is equal to
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=	 and the required import ratio is equal to 1* = 	 If the actual domestic saving
a	 m
ratio s falls short of the required savings ratio s* the savings gap appears equal to
- s = a. If imports required to achieve the growth rate are more than the level of
imports that can be financed with export earnings, the countiy's foreign exchange gap
MX	 .
appears equal to 
-j- - 
- =1* -: = a. To achieve the target growth rate r, foreign capital
inflows a must fill the dominant (binding) gap. While ex-post the savings gap (I - S) is
equal to the foreign exchange gap (X - M) by definition from the national accounts, cx-
ante they do not have to be the same (see Thirlwall, 1989, chapter 13). Since the two
gaps are not additive, when the binding constraint is covered by foreign capital inflows,
the other constraint is automatically covered.
V.2.2 The Savings Debate
From the equation g = (s + a )a, it can be seen that foreign capital inflows can have
a positive effect on growth as long as the domestic savings ratio s and the productivity of
capital a do not decrease. The assumptions that s and a remain constant were challenged
by Griffin (1970) and Weisskopf (1972). Griffin argued that the inflow of foreign capital
does have a negative impact on the domestic saving rate s and on the productivity of cap-
ital a. Firstly, he points out, there is no a priori reason to believe that all foreign savings
will be devoted to investment. It is likely that a share of foreign savings is consumed. If
a is the proportion of foreign savings devoted to consumption, then, output growth does
not increase by a a' but by '(1 - a) a a', which is lower than a a provided that
0 <a < 1 as normally assumed. This result still allows for a positive effect of foreign
savings on growth since (1 - a)a a is positive. It is further argued by Griffin that foreign
savings can reduce the saving effort of a countiy (reduce s), both in the public sector and
in the private sector. In the presence of a large supply of foreign capital, the public sector
might reduce its saving effort by relaxing taxation and increasing its consumption expen-
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diture. Private savings may be reduced because 'easy-finance' (low interest loans) may
reduce the incentive to save of local investors: 'foreign capital may pre-empt the most
profitable investment opportunities, and the strong, direct competition faced by local
investors may tend to reduce the supply of indigenous entrepreneurship and savings'
(Griffin, 1978, p.66). Furthermore, foreign savings may reduce domestic savings by
stimulating imports, since the availability of foreign exchange may induce the govern-
ment to keep an overvalued exchange rate, encouraging imports and discouraging
exports.
Griffin does not consider the possibility of growth being constrained by the availa-
biity of foreign exchange. In the long run, he contends, a country's economy must be
flexible enough to earn foreign exchange. He argues that if the foreign exchange gap is
binding, it is because of the incapacity of the country's government to implement import
reduction or export expansive economic policies. The source of the problem, he argues,
is the unwillingness of the government to introduce policies to reduce consumption (in
order to increase savings, reduce imports and increase exports). Hence, there can ulti-
mately be only one constraint on investment in the long run, which is the amount of sav-
ings. Therefore, if foreign capital inflows reduce domestic savings, the rate of growth of
the economy is curtailed.
Concerning the effect of foreign capital inflows on the productivity of capital a,
Griffin argues that the ICOR (the inverse of the productivity of capital a) may increase
for the following reasons. Foreign capital tends to be invested in economic infrastructure
projects like transport facilities and electric energy, which are projects with high ICORs.
According to Griffin, the investment of foreign capital inflows is biased against directly
productive activities which will tend to lower the aggregate output-capital ratio. More-
over, it is also argued that foreign capital is sometimes used to finance projects with a
political rather than an economic purpose. In this way, the positive effect that foreign
savings can have on the rate of growth of the recipient country can be more than offset by
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the reduction in the propensity to save s and the decrease in the average productivity of
capital caused by foreign capital inflows. Kennedy and Thiriwall (1971) suinmarise this




where gj is the rate of growth due to foreign capital inflows, s is the original domestic
savings ratio, a is the capital inflows ratio, a is the proportion of capital imports con-
sumed, c is the ICOR and q is the amount by which the ICOR changes due to capital
inilows. 8 can be very low, or become negative, if a is high and q is sufficiently high to
offset the addition to savings.
Kennedy and Thirlwall (1971) criticise Griffin's modeL The main Criticism they
make is that the model does not recognise the possibility of growth being constrained by
foreign exchange and the difficulty of relaxing the foreign exchange constraint in the
short run without reducing the rate of growth of output. if no foreign capital is available,
then the only way to earn foreign exchange and relax the foreign exchange gap is by
depressing the domestic levels of consumption, in both the public and private sectors.3
Kennedy and Thiriwall also argue that the productivity of investment not only does not
fall, as argued by Griffin, but it can rise as a consequence of foreign exchange enhancing
the possibility of a more productive use to be made of capital resources as a whole, by
allowing necessaiy imports of capital and intermediate goods. Moreover, they argue that
infrastructure investment projects, which do have high ICOR values, increase the produc-
tivity of other sectors of the economy by the effect of externalities, and the overall ICOR
of the economy, which is the relevant one to consider in this case, may be reduced.
Weisskopf (1972) develops a model in which a goodness of fit criterion allows him
to assign countries as either being savings constrained,, foreign exchange constrained, or
This was clearly the case in many Latin-Amencan countnes after the debt a-isis in 1982.
When the supply of foreign capital fell, countries like Mexico bad to reduce their level of domestic
cousumpbon in order to reduce the deficit in the current account of the Balance of Payments.
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both. For those countries being constrained by savings, he argues that foreign capital
inflows can exert a negative impact on domestic savings and therefore on growth. The
reason he gives why a negative relation between domestic savings and foreign savings
can be expected is that to the extent foreign capital inflows are used to increase consump-
tion there will be a decline in intended domestic savings, for domestic income remains
unchanged. The extent to which foreign capital inflows substitute for domestic savings is
given by the regression estimated for the 17 developing countries be found to be savings
constrained over the 1953-1966 period4:
S =a +0.183Y-0.227F+0.176E
(6.59)	 (-5.3)	 (4.6)
where S is domestic savings, Y is Gross Domestic Product, F is foreign savings (calcu-
lated as imports less exports) and E is exports. The estimated coefficient of F (equal to
0.227) measures, according to Weisskopf, the marginal propensity to consume out of
additional external resources. This coefficient must be non-positive. If all external
resources are used for investment, this coefficient would be equal to 0, and domestic sav-
ings would remain unaffected by foreign savings, if the coefficient is negative, it means
that a share of foreign capital, equal on average to the coefficient of F, is being con-
sumed. in this case, 23 percent of foreign capital inflows substitute for domestic savings.
For those countries in which the trade gap was found to be binding, Weisskopf argues
that foreign savings can have a positive effect on domestic savings since external
resources help to relieve the limitations imposed by a shortage of imports.
Much of the debate surrounding the impact of foreign savings on domestic savings
is based on the econometric results of equations of the type of:
DS=f(...,SF,...)
Figures in parentheses are I-statistics.
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where DS, domestic savings, is the dependent variable and SF, foreign savings, is an
explanatory variable. The major part of the studies done on the relationship between
domestic and foreign savings find a negative association between these two variables. As
ThirIwall (1989) points out, 'care must be taken in interpreting this relationship because
owing to the way saving is defined a negative relationship is bound to be found as long as
a portion of capital imports is consumed' (p.304).
Domestic savings DS is defined as the difference between gross capital formation




If all foreign capital inflows are invested, then investment increases by the same
amount as foreign savings (J = ESF) and domestic savings remain constant. If a pro-
portion of foreign capital is consumed, then ESF > M which would cause savings to fall
to maintain the identity. An existing negative statistical cozrelation does not imply a
reduction of the savings effort of a country.




the correct interpretation of the coefficient of foreign savings c should be the marginal
propensity to consume out of foreign savings, while (1- c) measures the propensity to
save out of foreign savings.





From national accounts: Y C + I + X - M. Assuming that foreign savings is equal to the
negative of th deficit in current account:X-M=-Fthen, Y-C+!-F. SinceS =Y-C, their
Y-C-S-I-F,whcreYisincome,Iis investment,Xisthelevelofexports,Misthelevelof
imports, F is foreign savings, and S is domestic savings.
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depends on the assumptions taken with respect to the role SF plays in the definition of
aggregate consumption and savings. Assuming that consumption C is a function of total




where b is the marginal propensity to consume out of income. Two possible cases are
considered. in the first case domestic savings DS is calculated as the difference between
















where d is the marginal propensity to save out of foreign savings (d =1— b).
However, if domestic savings DS are calculated as the difference between income Y
and consumption C, without considering SF as additional resources to domestic income,










Suppressing the intercept term and dividing by Y:
€/-=d—b(45-)	 0^b^1	 (5.10)
In this case the coefficient b (or f in equation (5.3)) is the marginal propensity to
consume out of foreign savings. Hence, according to the way domestic savings are calcu-
lated, either as a function of (Y + SF) or as a function of (Y), the coefficient in equation
(5.3) measures either the propensity to save out of income or the propensity to consume
out of foreign savings, respectively.
Let us now consider the way domestic savings are defined and calculated from








From equation (5.13), domestic saving can be defined as the difference between
gross investment and foreign savings:
DS=Y—C=I—SF	 (5.14)
According to the definition of domestic savings and its calculation, it seems that the
correct interpretation of the ( coefficient in equation (53) is that is the marginal pro-
pensity to consume out of foreign savings, as in case two, and not the marginal propen-
sity to save, as in case 1. Considering equation (5.10), where b is the propensity to con-
sume out of foreign savings, it can be seen that if b =1, all SF are consumed, if b =0 all
SF are invested. The empirical results of estimating an equation like (5.3), must then
show a coefficient within the range value —1 ^ ^ 0 because = —b and 0 ^ b ^ 1.
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Chandavarkar (1990) goes further by arguing that 'the national account linkage of
domestic savings, investment and foreign savings invalidates the conventional statistical
correlation between SF and DS because these two variables cannot be treated as indepen-
dent variables' (p.28). Polak (1987) says that the negative statistical correlation between
foreign savings and domestic savings is 'essentially worthless' (p.1 13) for both statistical
and economic reasons. The statistical reason is the one given above: the linkage in
national accounts of SF and DS. There are economic reasons that establish a negative
association between SF and DS, without implying any causality relation from SF to DS.
According to Polak (1987), these reasons are: first, if a country invests its foreign
resources productively, domestic savings would rise over time and less foreign capital
would be needed. Second, if foreign resources (mainly aid) are allocated on a basis of
need, and if that need is measured by the domestic savings ratio, a negative correlation
betweenDS andSFwould appearand the causality would run fromDSto SFinthis case.
Kennedy and Thirlwall (1971) make this point too, suggesting that countries receive
foreign savings (aid) 'because they save a low proportion of their national income'
(p.136).
Papanek (1972) has argued that it could be misleading to treat foreign savings as an
homogeneous flow when it is made up of different components: aid (loans or grants),
foreign private investment, commercial borrowing and changes in foreign exchange
reserves. Each of these components can have a different impact on domestic savings and
growth. As aid constitutes a large share of foreign savings, it is possible, he argues, that
domestic savings and foreign capital are simultaneously determined by exogenous factors
related to the general economic situation of the country. As an example, he mentions the
possibility of a fall in the terms of trade of a country, which might lower domestic sav-
ings at the same tune that more foreign resources are needed to sustain growth, without
implying a causality from foreign savings to domestic savings.
The results obtained by Papanek (1973) concerning the effect of the components of
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foreign capital inflows (aid, foreign private investment and other inflows) on domestic
savings show that all foreign resource inflows have negative and statistically significant
coefficients:
DS = 11.4— 1.00AID —0.65 FPI—O.38F1+0.20 PX+ 1.50X
(12.1) (-7.1)	 (-3.5)	 (-1.6)	 (5.4)	 (7.0)
	
R 2 =0.62	 F=28.4
where FF1 is foreign private investment, F! is other foreign capital inflows, PX is primary
exports, and X is other exports. He contends that the negative correlation between aid and
savings is likely to be the result of exogenous factors affecting both variables rather than
a causal relationship. However, the significant negative correlation between savings and
FF1, is more difficult to explain. He suggests that it might be for statistical reasons: since
FPI may be overestimated (in order to justify greater repatriation of profits or capital), it
might cause the estimated domestic savings to be lower, given the level of income.
Many studies have tested the hypothesis of foreign and domestic savings being
determined simultaneously by exogenous variables. If this hypothesis is correct, foreign
savings cannot be treated as an exogenous variable in the determination of domestic sav-
ings. Some of these studies are analysed below.
Morisset (1989) tests the effect of foreign savings on domestic savings using time
series data for Argentina. He first tests the hypothesis relaxing domestic savings and
foreign savings without including any other explanatory variable:
DS	 SF
If ( <0, some foreign saving is devoted to consumption. If all foreign saving is
invested, then =0. He finds that I is negative and statistically significant for the case of
Argentina during the 1960-1981 period. Morisset then proceeds to estimate a savings
function, arguing that the exclusion of important explanatory variables (such as the level
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of income and the rate of growth of exports) might bias the estimated coefficient of
foreign saving on domestic saving. We present two of his estimated equations of the sav-
ings function for Argentina during the above sample period. The first equation is:
DS = —1.92 + 0.244 Y - 0.241 SF + 0.0034r + 0.013 ir
(-1.81) (8.74) (-1.23)	 (0.29)	 (5.56)
DW = 1.98 R 2 = 0.951
where DS is real domestic saving, SF is real foreign saving, r is the real interest rate, and
it is the rate of inflation, and the second equation is:
DS = 1.523 + 0.1751 - 0.982A1D + 0.098 FF1— 0.0168 r + 0.856X + 0.0076 iv
(1.16) (3.55) (-0.91)	 (0.11)	 (2.63)	 (-0.84) (2.54)
DW=1.77 R2=0.952
when aid and foreign private investment (FF1) substitute SF as explanatory variables,
and the rate of growth of exports is also included as an explanatory variable. 6 The results
show that SF loses its statistical significance and in neither of the two equations does SF,
AID or F!'! appear to have an effect on DS. He thus finds support for the hypothesis that
excluding explanatory significant variables from the equation might bias (overestimate)
the calculated effect of SF on DS.
To test the hypothesis that DS and SF are being simultaneously affected by other
variables (i.e. SF is not exogenous), Morisset regresses DS and SF independently on the
rate of growth of the money supply, the public deficit, external interest rates and the
terms of trade, which are internal and external factors that can affect both domestic and
foreign savings (see Morisset, 1989). He finds that the budget deficit and the rate of
growth of the money supply significantly affect both foreign and domestic savings. He
concludes that as long as exogenous factors such as monetary and fiscal policies can
6 Morisset does n* include the rate of growth of exports when SF is included as an mndepen-
dent vanable to avoid mulucdllinearity between exports and SF which is defined as (X —M).
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affect SF and DS simultaneously, one is not able to interpret the traditional empirical
results properly (i.e. domestic savings as a function of foreign savings).
Snyder (1990) tests the hypothesis of both domestic savings and foreign aid inflows
being determined by the level of income per capita of a country. By regressing the sav-
ings ratio () on income per capita () and the ratio of aid to output () on the one
hand, and then regressing the ratio of aid to output on income per capita and the savings
ratio on the other han±
S	 Y	 A
() + a2 (j)
and
Snyder finds that for a sample of 50 developing countries from 1960 to the early 1980's,
the coefficient of income per capita is positive and statistically significant in explaining
both the savings ratio and the aid ratio. The coefficients & and are positive and sta-
tistically significant, while &2 and f2 are not statistically significant. Snyder thus con-
cludes that since both aid and savings seem to be determined by the level of income per
capita, the negative relation between foreign saving (aid) and domestic saving conforms
more to a simultaneous process determined by the level of income per capita than to a
negative effect of foreign aid on domestic savings.
Further evidence on the causality from SF to DS is given by Bowles (1987).
According to Griffin the causality runs from SF to DS, and SF is considered an exo-
genous variable. Bowles argues that this causality is not 'universally accepted': causality
running from SF to DS has been challenged by many studies which consider the possi-
bility of foreign savings being determined by the economic situation of the country of
which the domestic saving rate is one indicator. Using time series data from 1961 to 1981
for 20 less developed countries, Bowles tests the causality between SF and DS using
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Granger causality tests:
S	 S=c +a( )(: - 1) +(j)(f_1)
and
A	 S
(j')	 C +Y(j)(t...1) +X()(,_1)
where (j) is the domestic savings ratio and 4) is the aid ratio. The results show that in
10 out of the 20 countries analysed, a significant correlation between DS and SF does not
exist, lending no support to the view that a causal relationship between SF and DS exists.
In 3 countries j was found positive and statistically significant implying that causality
runs from domestic savings to foreign savings. In 5 countries & was found negative and
statistically significant, implying that SF has a negative effect on DS, and finally, in 2
countries, Bowles finds that causality runs in both directions (both & and j are statisti-
cally significant). These results show the inconclusiveness of the relationship between
foreign savings and domestic savings, and indicate that the effect of foreign savings on
domestic savings varies from countiy to country.
V.3 Foreign Capital Inflows and Investment
The relationship between foreign capital inflows and investment seems to be less
controversial than the one with domestic savings or with economic growth. The more
general acceptance of a positive effect of capital imports on investment is probably the
reason why studies on this topic are scarcer compared to those analysing the effect of
foreign assistance on savings and growth.
The effect that foreign capital has on investment is probably the most relevant when
it comes to assessing the impact of foreign capital inflows on economic growth. A posi-
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tive association between capital imports and investment means that foreign capital must
finance additional growth. Various studies reveal a positive effect of foreign capital
inflows on investment. Some of them will be reviewed in this section.
Massell, et. al. (1972) consider that inasmuch as foreign assistance provides the
means to relieve the foreign exchange constraint present in many developing countries
and allows the expansion of the level of imports, it is an important determinant of capital
formation. To test this hypothesis they regress the change of investment (iSJ) on the
change of: exports (AK), net public capital inflows (AG) and net private capital inflows
(AP). They do so in order to test if different sources of foreign capital may differ in their
impacts on investment, in line with Papanek's hypothesis. Additionally, the one year
lagged values of the regressors are included as explanatory variables. They obtain the
following result for a sample of 11 Latin-American countries from 1955 to 1966:
Al, 0.23 + 0.093 AX, + 0.36 AG, + 0.38 AG (,_ 1) + 0.545AP, + 0.422AP (,_ 1)
(1.38) (1.43)	 (127)	 (1.39)	 (6.88)	 (3.03)
R 2 =0.382
Only cuxrent and lagged net private capital inflows have statistically significant
coefficients. Private inflows seem to be designated for investment projects. Massell et. aL
argue that because public capital inflows are mainly devoted to long maturity investment
projects, they appear non-statistically significant in the short run. According to these
results, private capital inflows seem to affect investment in the short run while public
inflows seem to affect investment in the long run. The latter effect could probably be
captured by introducing lagged public foreign capital inflows for which a long time-series
sample is needed.
Similar results are obtained by Ahmed (1987) for the case of Pakistan. He specifies
investment as a function of changes in gross national product, bank credit to the private
sector, the lagged level of investment, and private and public foreign capital inflows. The
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estimated coefficients of the regression, for the period from 1963 to 1985 in Pakistan,
show that private capital inflows exert a positive and significant effect on investment
while public capital inflows, although the coefficient is positive, is not statistically
significant.
Levy (1987) examines the effect of concessionary aid flows on the investment rate
of low-income developing countries. To assess the relation between aid inflows, savings
razes and investment rates, he estimates the following equation for a sample of 46 coun-
tries from 1968 to 1980:
where A is official development assistance (ODA) 7, i is investment, S is domestic savings
and Y is Gross Domestic Product. He finds an estimated coefficient F= 0.86 (t-staxistic
equal to 4.1), which implies that on average, 86 percent of concessionaxy aid in low-
income countries is invested. By adding the log of income per capita Z in the equation as
a measure of development:
$=a++(ro+r1zY.
Levy finds that the links between aid and investment vary among countries in relation to
their level of development, which gives support to the hypothesis that a higher share of
aid is invested the higher the level of income per capita of a country, since low income
per capita countries might have a greater tendency to use aid to maintain a subsistence
level of consumption.
ODA is defined as those officIal flows from one counuy to anot&r aimed at economic
development or welfare improvements that have at least a 25 peicent grant element (Norton, Oniz
and Pardey, 1992).
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However, there is no consensus in the literature on the impact of foreign capital
inflows on the productivity of investment. As argued earlier, the assumption that the
incremental output-capital ratio (10CR) remains constant as considered by the dual-gap
models was challenged by authors like Griffin (1970) and others (for instance, Rana and
Dowling, 1988) who argue that foreign capital inflows can reduce the 10CR value and
offset any positive effect on growth caused by the additional available foreign resources.
On the other hand, Thirlwall (1972, 1989) contends that foreign capital inflows can raise
the productivity of capital.
Few empirical studies have been made on the impact of foreign capital inflows on
the productivity of investment. The World Bank (1985) stresses that although foreign
capital allows a country to invest more than it could if it only used national savings, its
effect on growth is strongly determined by the efficiency with which they are used. Pub-
lic sector investment, they argue, 'requires careful appraisal, taking reasonable precau-
tions for domestic risks. Private sector investment projects need a framework of incen-
tives which encourage efficient investment Failures in these two areas can be a primary
cause of slow growth' (p.44). Closely related to the debate surrounding public vs. private
investment, the World Bank's argument is directed against regulation and protection of
industries. They argue that protection of public investment, where a large percentage of
foreign capital goes, leads to economically inefficient investment projects, with a low
contribution to growth. They consider that foreign capital inflows would lead to efficient
investment projects in an unregulated economy, in which market determined interest and
exchange razes would be maintained.
Rana and Dowling (1988) measure the effect of the different components of foreign
capital inflows on the incremental output-capital ratio. Using pooled cross-section and
time-series data for nine Asian developing countries during the period 1965-1982, they
find that only foreign private investment has a positive effect on the incremental output-
capital ratio, while aid has a negative impact. These results, they argue, are because aid
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introduces inappropriate technologies or finances capital intensive projects.
As argued earlier in this chapter, ii is possible that foreign capital inflows invested
in long maturity projects, like infrastructure, have high ICOR values. However, this does
not mean their contribution to growth is negative because none of the externalities effects
on other economic sectors are being considered. Investment projects in infrastructure,
health or education projects, often undertaken by the public sector, might not have an
immediate positive effect on growth. The long-run effect of this kind of project on the
productivity of investment can be difficult to capture econometrically. As Thiriwail
(1989) contends: 'there is no convincing evidence that countries with a high ratio of capi-
tal inflows to national income have a higher capital-output ratio than other countries' (p.
304).
V.4 The Impact of Foreign Capital Inflows on Growth
Although foreign capital inflows make possible additional investment in the reci-
pient country, its effect on growth is not clearly defined in the literature given the uncer-
tain effect of capital inflows on domestic savings and the productivity of investment. In
this section recent literature written on this topic will be analysed. It will be seen that
even though foreign capital inflows may partially substitute domestic savings, the total
effect on growth is positive.
It is argued that single equation models that estimate the rate of growth as a function
of the ratio of foreign capital inflows among other variables overestimate the effect of
capital inflows on growth because they do not take into consideration the possible nega-
tive impact on domestic savings, which would cause growth to decrease. Gupta and Islam
(1983) develop a simultaneous equation model to estimate the direct and indirect (via the
negative impact of foreign capital on domestic savings) effects of foreign capital inflows
on savings and growth. Stating the savings ratio as a function of per capita income (y),
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the rate of growth of income (g), the dependency ratio (DR) and the foreign capital
inflows ratio (-j):
-=ao+b0y+c0g+d0DR+e0,	 (5.15)
and stating growth as a function of foreign and domestic savings:
S	 F	
(5.16)
they arrive at the following reduced form equation for growth by substituting (5.15) in
(5.16):
(l—cb1) [(a
1 +b 1 ao)+b 1 boy+b 1 d0 DR+(b 1 e 0 +c 1)]	 (5.17)
The model assumes that domestic savings and growth are jointly determined.
Domestic savings is a positive function of growth (equation (5.15)) and growth is a posi-
tive function of domestic savings (equation (5.16)). Both domestic savings and growth
are affected directly and indirectly by foreign capital inflows. The direct effect of foreign
capital inflows on savings is expected to be negative (e 0 <0). However, the indirect
effect (via the positive effect of capital inflows on growth) can be positive if growth
exerts a positive impact on the domestic savings rate. 8 The direct effect of foreign capital
inflows on growth is expected to be positive (c 1 >0) while the total effect, given by
(b 1 e0 + c 1 ) can vaiy according to the values of the coefficients whose expected values
are: b 1 > 0, e 0 <0, and c 1 > 0. If c 1 > b 1 e 0 , the total effect on growth is positive, and
if C1 <b e 0 the total effect is negative. According to this model, as long as foreign cap-
ital exercises a negative effect on the domestic savings rate, the total impact on growth is
$ lila worth mentioning that in Chapter III (section 11L5) where Mckinnon's portfolio effect is
tested, there was no evidence of the rate of growth affecting positively the propensity to save for
the case of Mexico during the 1960-1990 period.
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smaller than the direct effect. The model is estimated using a sample of 52 developing
countries for two time periods, 1950 to 1965 and 1965 to 1973, in order to compare
results between both periods. The sample of 52 countries is divided on the one hand by
income per capita groups to differentiate the stage of development, and on the other hand
by geographical regions. On this basis, they find that domestic savings and foreign capital
make a positive impact on growth but that the former is more important (given the mag-
nitude and the statistical significance of the coefficients in equation (5.16)) than the latter.
The domestic savings coefficient maintains its significance in all the samples considered.
Too long to be presented to detail, the estimation results concerning the impact of foreign
capital inflows on growth show that, in general, the direct effect (from equation (5.16)) is
positive and that although the direction of the total effect (from equation (5.17)) is paral-
lel to the direction of the direct effect, its values are smaller. Based on this conclusion,
Gupta and Islam argue that single equation models tend to overestimate the effect of
foreign capital on growth. In terms of the model's notation, this means that since the
coefficient b 1 e0 tends to be negative, then c 1 > (c 1 + b 1 e 0), the direct effect is higher
than the total effect.
Rana and Dowling (1988) develop a similar simultaneous equation model. Growth
and domestic savings are specified as:
g=a 0 +a 1 AID+a 2 FPI+a 3 DS +a 4 CX+a 5 LF 	 (5.18)
and:
DS=a6+a7AID+a8FPI+a9CX+a1oy+a11g	 (5.19)
where CX is the ratio of change in exports to income, LF is the rate of growth of the
labour force and y is income per capita, from which the reduced form looks like:




They estimate the structural and the reduced forms of the model for a sample of 9 Asian
developing countries during the 1965-1982 period. The empirical results show that
growth is positively and significantly affected by foreign private investment (FF1),
labour force growth (LF) and by income per capita (y), while savings seem to be only
affected by income per capita. When calculating the total effects (direct and indirect
from the structural and reduced forms respectively) they find that the total effect of
foreign capital inflows on growth is lower than the direct effect, reaching similar conclu-
sions to Gupta and Islam.
V.4.1 Capital Imports, External Debt Service and Economic Growth.
Although external borrowing can make possible a higher rate of economic growth in
the recipient country, the terms of external borrowing may have offsetting effects on
growth, as has been demonstrated in many developing countries during the debt crisis of
the last decade. To examine this offsetting effect the concept of net transfers of
resources becomes important, since it considers not only the net foreign capital inflows
into a country but also the interest payments or service on the accumulated external debt
(see Bacha, 1992). Net transfers (N) are defined from the Balance of Payments as the
difference between net capital inflows (F)9 and net factor payments abroad (3):
N=F—J, which is equivalent to the trade balance (M—X+J)whereMis imports of
goods and services and X is exports of goods and services. Net  factor payments abroad
are equal to the difference between total factor payments and the income received from
factor services abroad. Factor payments abroad indude: remitted and reinvested earnings
F includes the change in international reserves held at the Central Bank, enteiing the
definition ofF with a cgaiive sign.
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and interest payments on the external debt of the the banking, public and private sectors.
Bacha (1992) argues that both net capital inflows and net factor payments abroad
are largely determined by factors beyond the control of the indebted country's govern-
ment, so that net factor payments abroad is 'given' from the developing country's per-
spective. To consider the net addition of foreign savings to domestic resources, Bacha
suggests that 'as net factor payments to abroad are beyond local policy control, they
should be subtracted from net capital inflows to obtain an appropriate measure of the lini-
itations that financial transactions with the rest of the world are imposing on the invest-









where S is domestic savings. Investment is financed by domestic savings and net
transfers. If domestic savings remain constant, variations in foreign transfers will be
reflected in investment and economic growth.
The model of foreign capital inflows and growth derived from the debate between
Ball (1962) and Massell (1964) (see Thirlwall, 1989) is based on the concept of net
transfers since investment and growth are affected not only by capital inflows but also by
interest payments abroad. One of the basic characteristics of this model is the distinction
between domestic output and national income. From the definition of domestic output
(GDP) and national income (GNP) to the model develops as follows. National Income is
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) equals the total value of output accruing thin a country.
Thus, it Includes factor income generated by foreign investors or suppliers in the country but ex-
cludes factor income invested or supplied abroad by normal residents of ibe countr. Gross Na-
tional Product (GNP) equals the total value of output accruing to a country. Thus, it excludes fac-
tor income earned by foreign investors or suppliers in the country but includes factor income
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defined in this model as:
Y=C+I+X—M—rD	 (5.25)
where C is consumption, I is investment, X is export earnings, M is import expenditure, r
is the external interest rate and D is the stock of foreign debt. The model assumes that the
countzy does not hold any foreign assets so that income from factor services abroad are
not considered, leaving only interest payments abroad as the only component of net fac-
tor payments (see Ball, 1962). Domestic output Q is defined as:
Q=C+I+X—M	 (5.26)
so that Q = Y + rD; the difference between domestic product and national income is net




where s is the marginal propensity to save out of income. Based on a Hanod-Domar




where a is the productivity of investment. And finally, the long-run 11 Balance of Pay-




where D is the increment of foreign debt.





earned in other countries by normal residents of the country.
Il Movements in foreign exchange reserves are not considered in the model because they are
shoit-nin capital movements.
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Substituting in equation (5.28):
tQ =a(sQ —srD +iD)	 (5.31)












This condition states that the effect of net capital inflows on economic growth will
be positive as long as capital inflows are higher than the interest payments abroad that
would otherwise have been invested domestically.
To examine the effects of foreign capital inflows and interest payments abroad on
the rate of growth of income (Y), the relation Q = Y + rD is substituted in the investment
equation (5.30):
I=s(Y+rD)+ED—srD	 (5.35)
Substituting in equation (5.28) gives:
AY+rLtD=a[(sY+srD)+1D—srD]	 (5.36)




The rate of growth of income will be higher with net capital inflows than with a bal-
anced current account if the productivity of foreign capital inflows is higher than the rate
of interest on foreign loans (a > r). That is, investment is profitable only if the rate of
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return on investment exceeds the interest rate.
V.5 The Empirical Evidence for Mexico
Foreign borrowing is one of the factors that has allowed Mexico to achieve high
rates of economic growth, especially between the early 1970's and 1981. By 1982, cir-
cumstances changed when the international price of oil fell and international interest
rates went up, harming the economy (see Chapter I). It was first thought by the Mexican
government and the international financial community that the price of oil would the
again and that the debt problem of Mexico was a temporary one. By mid-1982 it became
clear that the debt crisis was not transitory, and the availability of easy foreign finance
ceased in 1982. Domestic economic policy rapidly changed to enhance the economy's
ability to generate foreign exchange to meet the service of the external debt. Economic
policy was aimed at reducing the levels of domestic consumption in order to increase
savings, increase exports, reduce imports and generate a trade surplus. If a country gen-
erates a trade surplus it becomes a net exporter of resources (negative net transfers). The
cost of doing so, as pointed out by Bacha (1992), is that 'investment rates have to con-
tract, thus lowering output growth rates' (p. 1185). In Mexico, net transfers of resources
became negative after 1982. The fall in foreign capital inflows and the effect of contrac-
tionary policies were soon felt on the level of investment and on the rate of economic
growth.
V.5.1 The Effect of Capital Imports on Domestic Savings and Investment
This section analyses the effect of foreign capital inflows on domestic savings and
investment in Mexico during the 1960-1990 period. In order to do so, it is necessary to
specify savings and investment functions.
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Real domestic savings are specified as a function of the real level of output (real




Output has already been shown to be a determinant variable of the level of domestic
savings (see Chapter lIt). The coefficient of foreign savings is expected to be either nega-
tive (or not statistically significant), since it measures the propensity to consume out of
foreign savings according to the explanation given above. The equations are estimated
using Ordinary Least Squares applying the Cochrane-Orcutt technique to correct for
auto-correlation of the errors where appropriate. A dummy variable for 1986 is included
in the savings equations, a year in which contractionary economic policies became more
sningent after further drops in the international price of oil. The estimation result is as
follows1 :
DS =-13.0 + 0.12GDP —0.13SF— 307.9DU86	 (539)
(-0.29) (10.7)	 (-0.96) (-6.6)
R 2 =0.93 DW=1.84 F(4,) =83.5 n=31 =0.42
(2.25)
Estimated in logarithmic form to test for a better specification of the equation14:
12 Foreign savings sie calculated as the negative of the current account deficit.
In the case of using the Cochrane-Orcutt technique to correct for auto-correlation of the er-
rors, asin this case, we zepon the value of the auto-correlation coefficient . The i-statistic is re-
ported below. in parenthesis.
Foreign savings carot be expressed in logarithms because of several negative values in the
series.
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logDS = —2.22 + 1.01 1ogGDP - 0.0003 SF - 0.78DU86	 (5.40)
(-3.64) (13.4)	 (-0.91)	 (-7.7)
R 2 = 0.96 DW = 1.87 F(4) = 135.4 n =31 = 0.41
(2.25)
The results of estimating the equation in a logarithmic form improve the overall
significance of the equation since the F statistic value is higher. According to the results
obtained, domestic savings are strongly determined by real income, as expected from the
Keynesian savings function. Concerning the effect of foreign savings on domestic sav-
ings, we find that although the sign of the coefficient is negative, it is not statistically
significant, indicating that the effect of foreign savings on domestic savings is negligible.
Estimated in a ratio form, the results show that the foreign savings ratio to GDP is
not statistically significant in explaining the domestic savings ratio:
L. 11.7 +0.O3--6i4DU86	 (5.41)
(19.8) (0.30) (-7.44)
R 2 = 0.77 DW = 1.93 F(4) = 28.22 n =31 = 0.68
(5.04)
In the light of the literature reviewed, the results obtained show that foreign savings
are mainly saved rather than consumed, since we find no statistical significance for the
foreign savings coefficient. This means that the propensity to consume out of foreign sa y-
ings is negligible and that, presumably, foreign savings has been devoted to investment.
An analysis of the composition of foreign capital inflows in Mexico reveals that the
main component has been long term capital inflows to the public sector. Table VA.1 in
the Appendix shows the values of Mexican capital imports from 1960 until 1990,
classified as foreign private investment 15, gross long term capital inflows to the public
5 Foreign private investment is composed of diiect foreign investment. Only in 1989 and 1990
1oig Private Investment
(16.9 %)





sector (without subtracting debt amortisaxion payments) and short term capital inflows
(see Table V.A.1 in the Appendix). The following figure (V.1) shows the percentage




Source: Banco de Medco and Statiatcal Ab	 for Latin-Amenca
Although during the last four years (from 1987), the participation of foreign private
investment has been increasing16, the major source of foreign financing has been long
term credits given to the public sector. The next equation analyses the impact of foreign
capital inflows on domestic savings considering its components. Following Papanek's
sie portfolio investment figures included, years during which portfolio investment increased and
became a significant proporuonof foreign private investment. Before 1989, figures of portfolio
foreign investiner* axe not available Direct foreign investment includes all business enterprises in
which foreign investors have a coatrothng interest or an unpoxtant voice in management (usually a
25 percent minimum of voting stock).
16 During 1989 and 1990, the rise in foreign private investment is partly due to the increase in
portfolio investment, which represented 14 percent of total foreign private investment in 1989 and
43 percent in 1990.
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hypothesis which suggests that the components of capital inflows can have a different
effect on the recipient countzy's economy, domestic savings is first specified as a func-
tion of disaggregated foreign savings 17, i.e. foreign private investment (FF1), and debt
creating flows (DCF) which are composed of net total long term capital inflows (to the
public' 8 and to the private sector) (LTC) 19, and short tenn capital inflows to the public
and private sectors.20 The level of real income and the dummy variable for 1986 are also
included in the regression.
The result of estimating the equation in a logarithmic, which proved a better
specification, is:
logDS = —2.52 + 1.07 IogGDP —0.07 logFPI + 0.0002DCF - 0.74DU86 (5.42)
(-6.15) (17.56)	 (-1.58)	 (1.11)	 (-6.22)
R 2 = 0.96 DW = 1.43 F(4) = 145.7 n = 31
Serial Correlation : )2 = 2.23
Functional Form : ) 2 = 0.73
Normality : X(2)2 = 7.53
Hereroscedasricuy : 1)2 = 1.46
Real income remains as the main explanatory variable, while the components of
foreign savings show no statistical significance at this level of disaggregation. However,
if debt creating flows DCF is in turn divided into its components: total net long term
All foreign saving components are measured for estimation purposes in billion Mexican
pesos at constant 1980 prices. The series have bn converted from dollars into pesos using the
average exchange rate (which in turn is based on monthly averages of the exchange rate). The
series in cunen! prices were deflated with the implicit price index of capital formation (Base 1980
- 100) to obtain the series at coostant 1980 prices. The source of the Balance of Payments data is
Banco de Mdxico: 'Indicadores Economicos', except foreign private investment (FPI) during the
1960-1979 period, which was taken from the 'Statistical Abstract for Latin-America', whose
methodology coincides with the one followed by Banco de Mexico from 1980 onwards.
Capital inflows to the public sector include capital imports of the banking sector (commer-
cial and development banks and the Central Bank).
19 To estimate the effect of long term financing on domestic savings, the net figures will be
used (amortisation payments on the external debt are subtracted from total inflows).
Net short-term capital inflows include the public, banking and private sectors.
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(LTC) and short term capital (STC) inflows, we find that long term capital inflows show a
weak but statistically significant positive coefficient as shown below:
logDS = —2.22 + 1.03 IogGDP - 0.05 logFPI + 0.0005LTC	 (5.43)
(-4.78) (14.78)	 (-1.23)	 (1.75)
+0.0002SW —0.71 DU86
(-0.48)	 (-5.99)
R 2 =0.96 DW=1.36 F(5,5) =120.5 n=31
Serial Correlation : 	 = 2.74
Functional Form :	 = 0.94
Normality :	 = 4.03
lIe:erosce4asricizy : X(1) = 1.02
The equation is well determined and shows the predominance of GDP as an explanatory
variable of savings. The estimated coefficient of net long term capital inflows is statisti-
cally significant ax 5 percent significance level, while foreign private investment and
short term capital inflows do not seem to affect the level of domestic savings. The impact
coefficient of LW on DS, calculated from the estimated coefficient and the mean values
of the dependent (DS) and independent (Lit) variables, is equal to 0.19. This coefficient
indicates that, on average, a 10 billion pesos rise in LW increases domestic savings by
1.9 billion, which is a low value given the average annual flow of domestic savings equal
to 380 billion pesos at constant 1980 prices.
Further enquiring into the effects of long term capital inflows on domestic savings,
the latter are disaggregated into net long term foreign borrowing by the public sector
(LTC1j1) and by the private sector (LTC,WV) in order to separate their effects. In the light
of the literature reviewed, foreign credit to the public and to the private sectors have
separate effects on domestic savings. It is argued that foreign funds borrowed by the pub-
lic sector might reduce the government's savings effort and reduce public savings. Con-
cerning the effect of foreign credit to the private sector, it is argued that availability of
foreign loans may reduce the incentive to save of domestic investors. The following
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equation tests this hypothesis:
logDS = -2.23 +1.02 1OgGDP - 0.04 logFPI + 0.0002 LTCPbI 	(5.44)
(-4.91) (15.01)	 (-0.83)	 (0.55)
+ 0.002LTC,, - O.0006STC -0.69 DU86
(2.08)	 (-1.27)	 (-5.86)
R 2 =0.96 DW1.59 F(6,) =105.5 n=31
Serial Correlation :	 = 0.88
Functional Form : 	 = 0.89
Normality :	 = 5•35
Heteroscedasricity :	 = 0.66
The results show no evidence of substitution of domestic savings by any of the com-
ponents of foreign savings. The major part of capital imports during the 1960-1990
period has been loans given to the public sector, as shown in figure V.! and Table V.A.!
in the Appendix. Considering only long term borrowing by the public and private sectors,
foreign loans to the public sector represent 92.4 percent of total accumulated long term
loans for this period, while foreign credit to the private sector amounts to 7.6 percent.
According to our results, net foreign loans to the public sector do not seem to have any
effect on domestic savings. Interestingly, foreign loans given to the private sector have a
positive and significant effect on domestic savings. The calculated impact of LTCPJ .V on
DS is equal to 0.7521, which, given the average annual flow of net foreign capital to the
private sector of 12.3 billion pesos, represents on average a 9.! billion rise in domestic
savings. The percentage composition of total foreign long term loans between credit
given to the public and to the private sector has varied during the period analysed. During
the 1960's long term credit to the public sector constituted 70.2 percent while 29.8 per-
cent was given to the private sector. From the early 1970's until 1982, the proportion of
21 Calculated from the estimated coefficient and the mean values of DS and LTC,,.
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loans to the public sector increased to 86.3 percent. Analysing the data shown in Table
V.A.1, it can be seen that net long term capital inflows to the private sector became nega-
five from 1985 until 1989. Given the positive association between this variable and
domestic savings, it can be argued that the fall of foreign credit to the private sector is
one of the factors explaining the sharp fall in private savings, and in total savings, after
1985 (See Table 1 in the Appendix of Chapter Ill).
The main conclusion derived from this section of the analysis is that either con-
sidered as an homogeneous flow or as separate components, foreign capital inflows do
not seem to have a negative impact on the level of domestic savings. There is no empiri-
cal evidence of foreign savings substituting domestic savings in the case of Mexico. On
the contrary the empirical evidence indicates that foreign savings do not affect the level
of domestic savings, except for the positive association found between net foreign bor-
rowing by the private sector and domestic savings.
Investment (gross fixed investment GFJ) is specified as a function of the lagged
change in output (LGDP(, -1)), the real rate of interest r and foreign savings SF. By
including the lagged change in GD? we test for the lagged accelerator effect on invest-
ment, and by including the real interest rate as an explanatory variable we test the direct
effect of the real rate of interest on investment, as done in the third chapter of the thesis.
The main objective of this equation is to test the relation between foreign savings and
investment in Mexico for the 1960-1990 period. Three dummy variables are included in
the equation, for the years 1981, 1983 and 1986. 1981 and 1983 were years of unusual
behaviour of the economy just before and after the debt crisis began. During 1981,
investment levels were unusually high because of the 'Oil-Boom', and during 1983, the
investment level dropped once the economy felt the consequences of the debt crisis. The
dummy variable is included for 1986 since investment was affected by the tightening of
monetary and fiscal policies after the second large fall in the price of oil (see Chapters I
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and IV). The resulting equation is22:
GFI = 1033.4 + 0.17 /.GDP (, .') — 2.86r + 0.93 SF	 (5.45)
(2.79) (2.22)	 (-3.25) (4.28)
+ 143 DU81 — 119DU83 — 88DU86
(2.83)	 (-3.17)	 (-2.50)
R 2 = 0.98 DW = 1.60 F (621) = 123.41 n = 29 = 0.95
(24.77)
where:
GFI: Gross Fixed Investment. Billion Pesoi at constant 1980 prices.
tGDP, - : Lagged change in GDP. Billion Pesos at constant 1980 prices.
r Real deposit interest rate (%).
SF: Foreign Savings. Billion Pesos at constant 1980 prices.
Consistent with the results obtained in chapter III, the lagged accelerator is positive
and statistically significant, indicating that investment responds to past changes in
demand. A rise in the real interest rate exerts a negative impact on investment, supporting
the hypothesis that money and capital are substitutes: a rise in the real deposit interest
rate will encourage financial asset accumulation and discourage investment projects.
Foreign savings, considered as an homogeneous flow in this case, shows an estimated
positive and statistically significant coefficient. According to the estimated results, a 100
billion pesos increase in foreign capital inflows is associated with investment increasing,
on average, by 93 billion pesos (at constant 1980 prices), which amounts to 15 percent of
the annual average investment flow during the period analysed.
In the following equation we disaggregate foreign savings into foreign private
investment (FPI) and net long term capital inflows to the public sector (LTC) to
The equation is unt estimated in a logarithmic form because all of the explanatory variables
have several negative values.
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differentiate their impact on investment. We include three year lags of long term capital
inflows in order to measure the long run effects of this variable on current investment. It
has been argued that public sector capital inflows have a long tenn effect on growth
rather than an immediate impact (see Massdll ct.al., 1972). One reason to expect a long
term effect of LTC on investment is that the investment expenditure of a project can be
distributed over several years. As well, public investment projects, in infrastructure or
transport, can encourage further investment (as seen in chapter W, a rise in public invest-
ment has a positive effect on private investment, increasing total investment and growth).
The equation shows interesting results:
GFI = 206.0 + 0.78 AGDP (t ... I) + 1.75 r + 3.95FF! + + 0.98LTC	 (5.46)
(4.87) (5.13)	 (0.60) (3.68)	 (1.73)
+ 0.15LTC (,_ 1) 1.12LTC Q _ 2) + 1.O9LTC(,_3)
(0.41)	 (2.82)	 (3.20)
R 2 = 0.91 DW = 1.24 Few) = 27.54 n 28
Serial Correlation : 	 = 3.67
Functional Form :	 = 0.17
Normality : X)2 = 0.17
Heteroscedasricizy : 	 353
The lagged accelerator remains a significant determinant of investment and the real
interest raze loses its statistical significance when net long term capital inflows to the pub-
lic sector are lagged. Foreign private investment seems to have a large positive impact
on current investment. According to the estimated results, a 10 billion pesos (at constant
prices) increase in foreign private investment is associated with a rise in total gross fixed
investment of almost four times that value. However, the average value of private
foreign investment is much lower than that of long term capital inflows, as shown in Fig-
ure V.1 and in Table V.A.1 in the Appendix. Concerning the effect of net long term capi-
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tal inflows on investment, it can be observed that, according to the estimated results, the
effect of the two and three year lagged variables is higher than the current period impact,
while the one period lag is not statistically significant. These results give empirical sup-
port to the hypothesis that long term capital inflows have a positive effect on investment
not only during the current period but also in the long-run.
V.5.2 Foreign Inflows and Outflows of Capital and Economic Growth
This section analyses the impact of foreign capital inflows on economic growth con-
sidering the offsetting effects of the outflow of financial resources from the recipient
country, Mexico, to abroad. The model we develop for this analysis is based on the
model derived from the debate between Ball (1962) and Massell (1964) presented above
in section V.4.1. The model is expanded in several ways. Capital imports are considered
to be formed not only by debt creating flows (net long term and short term capital
inflows) but also by private foreign investment. It considers not only interest payments
on the external debt, but net factor payments abroad, which include interest on the exter-
nal debt of the public, private and banking sectors plus remitted earnings. Movements in
the international reserves held at the Central Bank are also considered since they play an
important role in short-term fInancing. Finally, the model incozporates 'capital flight' (or
non-registered capital outflows from the private sector) as a leakage of financial resources
from the countiy, which, as such, might have an offsetting effect on the domestic rate of
economic growth. Quoting Cardoso and Dornbusch (1987): 'Capital flight is important
in a developing [country] context because they represent savings not available for domes-
tic capital formation' (p.1422). Or considering Pastor's (1990) point of view, capital
flight hampers growth 'partly because investment has been diverted abroad but also
because necessary imports are limited by the foreign exchange drain from capital flight'
(p.1).
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V.5.2.1 Definition and Measurement of Capital Flight
There are various ways of defining and measuring capital flight. It is agreed that
capital flight is a 'response to a perceived risk of holding domestic assets' (Gibson and
Tsakalotos, 1990, p.4). However, since no unique definition concerning the components
of capital flight is given by economic theory, it is considered that an appropriate
definition will be one that is consistent with the kinds of economic and policy questions
under consideration (Cwnby and Levich, 1987). The analysis undertaken in this chapter
is concerned with the loss of domestic savings resulting from capital flight. The instabil-
ity of the Mexican economy during the last two decades, characterised by inflation and
several devaluations of the Mexican peso with respect to the U.S. dollar (see chapter I),
led to considerable outflows of capital from Mexico. As a portfolio decision taken during
this period, Mexican investors preferred to hold foreign assets abroad seeking markets or
other units of account to preserve purchasing power, rather than looking for quick profits
from short-term speculative movements of capital. The above considerations suggest that
in the case of Mexico a broad definition and measure of capital flight is the appropriate
one.
The broadest definition of capital flight is the one used by the World Bank (1985)
and by Morgan Guaranty (Anthony and Hughes, 1992). These definitions do not distin-
guish between normal capital outflows and 'abnormal' capital outflows or capital flight.
The World Bank (1985) measures capital flight as the difference between the sources and
the uses of foreign capital. The difference between the addition of net capital inflows in
the form of increases in the external debt and foreign direct investment and the addition
of the current account deficit plus the change in international reserves, gives an approxi-
mate measure of capital flight. This definition assumes that foreign capital inflows in
excess of that required to finance the deficit on current account and the change in interna-
tional reserves is an increase in net foreign claims by the private sector and can be con-
sidered as capital flight.
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The Morgan Guaranty definition (Anthony and Hughes, 1992) is a modification of
the World Bank method. In addition to the current account deficit and the changes in the
international reserves they also subtract the increase in short-term foreign assets of the
banking system from total inflows. They do not consider the acquisition of foreign assets
by the commercial banks as capital flight.
The definitions of capital flight used by Dooley (Cumby and Levich, 1987) and
Cuddington (Cumby and Levich, 1987) distinguish between normal capital outflows and
capital flight. Dooley defines capital flight as the stock of foreign claims that do not gen-
erate income reported in the balance of payments accounts. This definition assumes that
the interest earned on legal and normal capital outflows would be reported in the balance
of payments. Capital flight is then estimated by calculating the stock of 'legal' foreign
assets from the stream of reported income and subtracting this from total external
daims. Additionally, Dooley adds the reported errors and omissions as part of capital
flight and the difference between the World Bank's figures on external debt and the
domestic balance of payments data on external liabilities. The rationale underlying these
adjustments is that errors and omissions reflect capital flight and that the World Bank's
debt data are more accurate than the data reported on the domestic balance of payments
accounts.
Cuddington focuses only on short-term capital flows rather than all private sector
acquisitions of foreign assets. He defines capital flight as the acquisition of short-term
external assets by the non-bank private sector, which is calculated by adding errors and
omissions to selected short-term capital items. Cuddington considers errors and omis-
sions as unrecorded short-term capital movements and argues that errors and discrepan-
cies arising from the capital and current accounts data collection are likely to be zero on
average over a long period.
According to Dooley's definition, regardless of the amount of capital outflows, if they were
all reported (by reporting the earnings in the domestic balance of payments accounts) there would
not be any capital fhgJi.
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Table V.1 shows the capital flight values for Mexico using different methods of esti-
marion for the 1972-1988 period. As expected, these estimates vazy considerably (see
Anthony and Hughes (1992) for a discussion on these inconsistencies). For example, if
the figures for the 19764988 period are added and compared, it can be noticed that the
total varies from US$26600 million when Dooley's methodology is used, to US$69160
million when the World Bank's method is used. A US$43 billion difference arises
between the two methodologies, in spite of their desire to measure the same concept.
This discrepancy arises because of the way capital flight is defined and calculated.
This chapter estimates capital flight using a 'residual' approach, as the one used by
the World Bank. Estimates rely on the domestic balance of payments account's data on
net indebtedness. The sources of foreign finance considered are: Net long-term capital
of the public, private and banking sectors (subtracting amortisation payments on the
external debt and long term assets); short-term liabilities of the public, private and bank-
ing sectors; foreign private investment and the change in international reserves (a net
gain is recorded as a debit (-) and a net loss is recorded as a credit (^)). The use of
foreign finance is the financing of the deficit on current account of the balance of pay-
ments. The differences between the sources and the uses of foreign finance are the esti-
mates of capital flight, which are shown in Table V.2 for the 1960-1990 petiod. Capital
Flight estimates show a total of US$41241 million for the 1973-1990 period. These esti-
mates are lower than the total estimated by the World Bank's approach. This difference is
due, firstly, to the different source of the debt-creating flows data. 27 Secondly, to be con-
The sourne of the World Bank's estimates is from the World Debt Tables.
The change in international reserves can be considered as a use of foreign exchange if a net
rise is considered positive and a net loss is considered negative.
Even though before 1973 capital flight was not a problem, the 1960-1972 period is Included
for consistency in the estimated model.
27 See Zedillo (1987) for a discussion on the discrepancies arising from the sources of the data
used concerning the external debt. Zedillo argues that the use of World Debt Tables data overesti-
mates capital flight while the use of the domestic balance of payments data on external Indebted-
ness is more consistent with other items of the balance of payments and more consistent over a
period of time.
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sistent with the Banco de Mexico, which estimates a repatriation of capital during 1989
and 1990 (see Banco de Mexico, Annual Reports, 1989 and 1990), long-term assets of
the public, private and banking sectors are subtracted from total long-term liabilities28.
Table V.1
Notes:
(1) Dooley, taken from Anthony and Hughes (1992). Original source: Dooley, M.P.
'Capital flight: A Response to Differences in Financial Risks', in IMF Staff Papers,
Vol.35, 1988.
(2) World Bank, taken from Anthony and Hughes (1992)
(3) Cuddington, taken from Anthony and Hughes (1992). Original source: Cuddington,
J.T. 'Capital Flight: Estimates, Issues and Explanations', Princeton Studies in Interna-
tional Finance, No.58, 1986.
(4) Zedillo (1986)
While long-term assets aie relatively small during the whole period, reaching US$890 mil-
lion in 1988, ii has an outstanding value in 1990 equal to US$7427 million. The 1990 value of
long-term assets corresponds to the public sector's external assets, not associated with the interna-
tional reserves. This increase is due to the new bonds' guarantees which substituted the external





V.5.2.2 Economic Growth with Foreign Inflows and Outflows of Capital
Stating the Balance of Payments equation as:
(X—M)+(FSAI—FPA)+LTC+STC+FPI+MR=0	 (5.47)
where:
X: Exports of goods and non-factor services
M: Imports of goods and non-factor services
(X - M): Trade Balance
FSAJ: Income from factor services abroad
FPA: Factor payments abroad (including interest payments)
LTC: Net long term capital
STC: Net short term capital
FPI: Foreign private investment
MR: Change in International Reserves (a net loss is recorded as a credit (+) and a net gain
is recorded as a debit (-))
If LTC +STC +FPI +MR Fthen, equation (5.47) is written as:
(X—M)+(FSAI—FPA)+F=0 	 (5.48)
If we consider net factor payments abroad (J) as I = FPA - FSAI, them
(X—M)—J+F=0	 (5.49)
Defining capital flight, or private non-registered capital outflows, as the difference
between capital imports (including the change in international reserves) and the balance
of the current account (see Zedillo, 1986 and Pastor, 1990):
KF=LTC+STC+FPI+MR—(M—X)—(FPA—FSAJ) 	 (5.50)
=> X+F+FSAJ=KF+M+FPA	 (5.51)
The interpretation of equation (5.51) is that capital inflows and the change in interna-
tional reserves (F), exports (X), and income from factor services abroad (FSA!) finance:
imports (M), factor payments abroad ((FPA) which includes interest payments on the
external debt) and capital flight (KF).
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The Balance of Payments equation can then be expressed as:
=> (X—M)—J—KF+F=O	 (5.52)
To the extent that capital flight is a non-registered capital outflow and a leak of
resources which is being invested abroad, we assume national income Y defined as:
Y=C+I+X—M—f	 (5.53)
where f = I + KF: net factor payments abroad plus capital flight.
Domestic Output (Q) is defined as:
Q=C+I+X—M	 (5.54)
where C is aggregate consumption, i is investment, X is exports of goods and non-factor
services, and M is imports of goods and non-factor services.
The aggregate consumption (C) and output change (SQ) functions are given in
equations (5.27) and (5.28) respectively. Dividing both sides of equation (5.28) by Q, the
rate of growth of output is expressed as a function of investment and the productivity of
investment (a), without considering foreign capital movements, as:
--	 (5.55)
sinceS=I ex-post.




=> I=sQ+F — sf	 (5.56)
Substituting (5.56) into (5.28):
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LQ = a(s Q + F - sY)	 (5.57)
From which we get the expression for the rate of growth of output:
(F—sf)	 (5.58)




From equation (5.59) ii can be seen that the rate of growth of output considering net
transfer of resources, gP, is higher than g = as if the following condition is met:
(LTC+STC+FPI+MR)>(sJ+sKF)	 (5.60)
That is, capital imports will have a positive effect on output growth only if net capi-
tal inflows aic higher than the proportion s of net factor payments abroad and capital
flight that would be invested domestically.
Applying the model to Mexican data for the 1960-1990 period, we first calculate the
average rate of growth of output without considering foreign capital movements, as given
by g = as. To do so, we refer to section V.5.1 in this chapter, where the average propen-
sity to save out of income is estimated holding capital inflows constant. The value of s is
calculated for the 1960-1990 period, by regressing net domestic savings on income
(GD?) and foreign capital inflows (SF), finding an estimated value for s equal to = 0.12.
Chapter IV of this thesis gives some estimates of the value of the productivity of
total investment a. However, these calculations are done for the 1970-1990 period.
Hence, here we estimate the average value of a for the 1960-1990 period following the




from one of which the estimated & will be chosen according to the test statistics results of
both equations. Since 1982, 1983 and 1986 were years of negative growth of output, we
include a dummy variable for each of these years in order not to obtain biased estimators
of a (see Section IV.4. 1). The results are:
LQ, = —42.5 + 0.31I —321 DU82 - 356DU83 - 290.9DU86	 (5.63)
(-0.63) (3.85) (-7.34)	 (-7.31)	 (-7.58)




g, =-5.52 + 0.57	 - 7.0DU82— 6.6DU83 - 6.5DU86	 (5.64)
(-1.82) (3.77)	 (-3.90)	 (-3.24)	 (-3.86)
R 2 =O.80 DW=1.85 F(s ) =17.74 n=31 =0.38
(2.08)
whe:
Q Real Gross Domestic Produ. Billion Pesos
I: Real Gross Fixed Invenent. Billion Pesos
g: Real rale of growth of outpll
DU82., DU83 and DU86: dummy variables
The results of the first estimated equation show higher values of the significance
tests than the second one, specifically concerning the F statistic value. Relying thus on
the estimated value of a from equation (5.63), we consider & = 0.31 for the 1960-1990
period
Given the values: = 0.12 and & = 0.31, the value for g (in percent) is g = 3.72,
which gives the average rate of growth of output for the 1960-1990 period considering
domestic savings as the only source of finance. We then calculate the average annual
flow (in million dollars) of the variables included in condition (5.60) for the 1960-1990
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period. We consider the average flow of: net long-term capital inflows of the public,
private and banking sectors; foreign private investment, and the change in international
reserves.29 On the other hand, we calculate the average flows of net factor payments
abroad and of the estimated capital flight. When fitted to condition (5.60) we get
(LTC + STC + FF1 + MR) = 3765.0 > s (J + AT) = 589.9	 (5.65)
On average, the addition of the net inflow of capital and the change in international
reserves has been higher than the loss of savings due to capital outflow. According to the
model, we expect a higher average value of the actual rate of growth of output than
the one given by j = as, " > . For the whole period (1960-1990), the average actual
rate of growth is equal to 5.20 percent Thus, equation (5.59) and the implied condition
(5.60) are satisfied and it can be said that on average, between 1960 and 1990 foreign
capital inflows allowed the Mexican economy to grow at a faster pace than the achievable
growth with only domestic savings as a source of finance. Having both foreign and
domestic savings as sources of finance, the economy has grown, on average, 1.5 percent
more peryear than otherwise (? -j= 1.5).
Analysing equations (5.59) and (5.60) of the model on a yearly basis allows a more
detailed test of the model. To be able to analyse how well the modd adapts to annual data
we had to estimate yearly values of the productivity of investment a. These estimates
(see Table V.3) are given by the inverse of the annual incremental capital-output ratio:
a, = '. Oiapter IV of this thesis has analysed the determinants of the ICOR. It was
found that the ICOR varies inversely with the rate of growth of output, and that the
ICOR's value cannot be considered as a constant. Concerning the propensity to save out
of income s, we have assumed = 0.12 as a constant value for the period analysed, given
International reserves include: use of IMF credit, monetary gold. SDR's,, foreign exchange
and other claims. A net pin in wtemational reserves is reported as a debit (-) and a net loss in
liiernational reserves is considered as a credit (+).
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our findings on its stability (see Chapter 111, section 1.11.3). The resulting values of g = as
arc shown in Table V.3. Except for 1982 and 1983, g is lower than the actual rate of
growth g*. Table V.3 also shows the annual values of the sum of net long-term and
short-term capital inflows, foreign private investment and the change in reserves
(F = LW + SW + FF1 + MR), as well as the estimated loss of domestic savings result-
ing from the regulated and unregulated capital outflows s(J + KF). The last column of
Table V.3 shows the difference between F and the estimated domestic savings loss. The
first point to notice is that this value is positive for the whole period except for 1983,
1984 and 1987. During these three years, the net inflow of capital is negative due to a fall
in foreign loans to the public sector and a negative net flow of foreign loans to the private
sector. Excluding these three years, according to the estimations obtained, foreign capital
inflows have been a net positive addition to domestic savings.
From 1960 until 1981 the model is satisfied: foreign savings represent a net addition
todomticsavings(F>s(f))andtheacmalrateofgrowthg*ishigherthang=as.
However, for 1982, 1984 and 1987, the model's predictions are not satisfied. For 1982,
the modeipredicts ahigher thang,whenactuallyg 2 =-0.60 <g 12 =-0.24. In
1984 and 1987, when capital imports are negative, the model predicts g* <g, and the
data for these years show the opposite. It is possible that the value of a for these years is
underestimated and hence g is also underestimated. On the whole, equation (5.59) is
satisfied in 27 out of 30 cases which gives a 90 percent accuracy.
Table V.4 shows period average values of g*, g, F and s (f). The first row shows
the l961-l970 period, or 'Stabilising Development' period, during which high rates of
growth were achieved with internal and external balance (see Chapter 1.3). The second
row shows the period of expansionary economic policy, 1971 to 1981, during which the
economy grew at a fast pace with a high average level of foreign capital inflows. In the
third row, we show the 'Oil-Boom' sub-period (1978-1981) during which, with capital
° 1960 is excluded because of data unavailability.
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imports at their highest level, the highest average rate of growth was achieved. The fourth
row shows the period from 1982 until 1990 during which the low average growth of out-
put, below 1 percent, coincides with a fall in capital inflows. Several issues deserve to be
highlighted. First, it is noticeable the difference between g* and g, Cf - g), achieved
during the 1960's. The variable Cf - g) measures the amount by which the actual rate of
growth is higher or lower than the calculated domestic savings financed rate of growth.
During the 1960's this amount is quite large given that capital inflows were relatively
low. According to the World Bank (1985) the contribution of capital inflows to growth
during this decade is high because financing was directed to specific investment projects.
Additionally, as exposed in Chapter I, growth during this period was encouraged by an
expansion of domestic credit. Second, Cf - g) has the highest average value during the
'Oil-Boom' period (1978-1981) with the highest level ofF for the period analysed. The
World Bank (1985) argues that during this period, although a high proportion of bor-
rowed resources continued to flow into specific investment projects, the availability of
cheap foreign funds led to the rechanneling of funds into the financing of the fiscal and
foreign deficits; a process that led, according to the World Bank, to a loss of the potential
gains from borrowing. Thirdly, during the 1982-1990 period, the fall in F coincides with
the lowest average growth and the lowest average level of Cf - g). Since 1982, available
financing has been linked with debt-servicing and the balance of payments. For all
periods, the model complies with the data inasmuch that a positive value of (F - s (f)) is
associated with an actual rate of growth g* higher than g = as. To estimate the extent to
which the difference between g* and g is affected by both capital imports F and loss of
domestic savings s (I')), Cf - g) is regressed on both F and s (f). A dummy variable
for 1986 is included as the estimation results show a high residual value for this year. The
resulting equation is:
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(g* g) = 2.78 + 0.25 F - 2.23 s (f) - 5.53DU 86	 (5.66)
(7.89) (4.46) (-4.47)	 (-3.75)
R 2 0.63 DW = 1.34 F(3) = 14.94 n = 30
Serial Correlation : 	 = 2.16
Functional Form :	 = 0.05
Normality : X(2)2 = 1.05
Hereroscedasricity X(1) 2 = 0.58
The equation is well determined, the coefficients show the expected sign and are sta-
tistically significant. A rise in capital imports F has a positive effect on (g* —g).
According to the estimated coefficients, a 1 billion dollar rise in F increases (g* - g) by
0.25 percentage points while the loss in domestic savings due to capital outflows has a
negative impact, larger in absolute terms. The positive effect ofF on (g* - g) is partially
offset by a rise in s f. On average, the impact of a rise in regulated and unregulated capi-
tal outflows on the rate of growth seems to be larger, and in opposite direction, than the
effect of net foreign capital inflows. If the net addition to domestic savings (F —sJ') is
considered as the explanatory vaiiable in order to compare its estimated coefficient with
that ofF in the last equation, the result is:
(g' - g)= 1.80 + 0.14(F - s (J'))-4.96DU86	 (5.67)
(2.26) (3.79)	 (2.53)
R 2 = 0.59 DW = 1.81 F(3,) = 12.24 n =30 = 0.63
(3.68)
The estimated coefficient of (F - si') is positive but lower than that of F in the pre-
vious equation. According to the results obtained, it can be argued that the loss of domes-
tic savings as a consequence of capital outflows does reduce the effect that foreign capital
inflows has on financing additional growth.
Bearing in mind the estimation errors involved in the calculation of the productivity
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of investment a and hence on the calculated rate of growth g = as, the following can be
concluded. It is found for the case of Mexico that the model is accurate in explaining that
provided net foreign capital inflows are higher than the loss of savings caused by capital
outflows, the rate of growth of output is higher than the growth rate obtainable with
domestic savings as the only source of finance. However, the loss of savings due to capi-
tal outflows reduces the positive impact on growth.
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Table V.3
Year	 g=&s Actualg* g*_g LTC+STC+ s(J'+KF)
FPI+MR	 (1)-(2)
	
(%)	 (%)	 (MilLDIIs.)	 (Mill.Dlls.) (MillDlls.)
	
(1)	 (2)
1960	 -	 -	 8.0	 -	 338.2	 -9.14	 347.3
1961	 0.27	 3.24	 4.9	 1.66	 347.2	 14.6	 332.6
1962	 0.25	 3.00	 4.7	 1.70	 277.4	 18.7	 258.7
963	 0.40	 4.80	 8.0	 3.20	 217.4	 16.2	 201.0
0.53	 6.36	 11.7	 5.34	 633.4	 43.7	 589.7
5	 0.31	 3.72	 6.5	 2.78	 337.2	 8.9	 328.3
1966	 0.32_ 3.84	 6.9	 3.06	 573.2	 412	 532.0
967	 0.27	 3.24	 6.3	 3.06	 902.3	 59.7	 842.6
0.34	 4.08	 8.1	 4.02	 811.7	 42.7	 769.0
0.27	 3.24	 6.3	 3.06	 786.4	 52.6	 733.8
970	 0.32	 3.84	 6.9	 3.06	 932.5	 26.8	 905.7
971	 0.21	 2.52	 4.2	 1.68	 789.3	 44.7	 744.6
9Yr	 0.40	 4.80	 8.5	 3.70	 645.8	 21.9	 623.9
973	 0.38	 4.56	 8.4	 3.84	 2665.5	 212.3	 2453.2
974	 0.27	 3.24	 6.1	 2.86	 4697.4	 287.8	 4409.6
9T - 0.25	 3.00	 5.6	 2.60	 5944.0	 351.0	 5593.0
976	 0.19	 2.28	 4.2	 1.92	 7309.3	 661.2	 6648.1
977	 0.18	 - 2.16	 3.4	 1.24	 2807.5	 377.2	 24303
978	 0.38	 4.56	 8.3	 3.74	 3752.9	 410.7	 3342.2
979	 0.38	 4.56	 9.2	 4.64	 6528.4	 598.8	 5929.6
980	 0.33	 3.96	 8.3	 4.34	 11886.2	 931.4	 10954.8
981	 0.29	 3.48	 8.8	 5.32	 29341.9	 2833.6	 26508.3
982	 -0.02	 -0.24	 -0.6	 -0.36	 9086.1	 1854.8	 72313
T	 -0.23	 -2.76	 -4.2	 -1.44	 -3406.8	 1326.8	 -4733.6
0.22	 2.64	 3.6	 0.96	 -1411.9	 15113	 -2923.2
985	 0.16	 1.92	 2.6	 0.68	 1990.6	 1414.2	 576.4
-0.35	 -4.20	 3.8	 0.40	 1430.4	 807.7	 622.7
987	 0.12	 1	 1.7	 0.26	 -428.9	 1202.0	 -1630.9
.988	 0.09	 -	 1.4	 0.32	 8998.3	 1533.5	 7464.8
1989	 0.18	 2:i	 3.2	 1.04	 4200.9	 686.0	 3514.9
1990	 0.21	 2.52	 3.9	 138	 13732.3	 904.0	 128283
Source: Banco de Mexico and Statistical Abstract for Latin-America
Notes:
LW: Net long-term borrowing of the public, private and banking sectors
Sit: Net short-term borrowing of the public, private and bmking sectors
FPJ: Foreign private investment
JR: Change in international reserves (a net increase is recorded as a debit (-) and a net fall is
recorded as a credit (4))
I: Net factor payments abroad - factor payments abroad - income from factor services




Period	 g = & $ Actual g* g* - g LTC + STC + s (I + 1(F)
FPI+bJR	 (1)-(2)
(%)	 (%)	 (Mill.DlIs.)	 (MiILDIIs.) (MIILDIIs.)
(1)	 (2)
	
1960-1990	 3.72	 5.20	 1.48	 3765.0	 589.9	 3175.1
	
1961-1970	 3.94	 7.30	 3.40	 581.9	 32.5	 549.4
	
1971-1981	 3.60	 6.82	 3.22	 6942.6	 611.9	 6330.7
	
1978-1981	 4.10	 8.70	 4.60	 12877.4	 1193.6	 11683.8
	
1982-1990	 0.51	 0.87	 0.36	 3799.0	 1248.9	 2550.1
Source: Banco de Mexico and Statistical Abstract for Latin-America
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V.5.3 Net Transfers, Capital Flight and Economic Growth.
This section explores the relationship between net transfers of resources, capital
flight and economic growth in Mexico for the 1960-1990 period.
Net transfers of resources have been defined as the difference between net capital
inflows F and net factor payments abroad J, which is equivalent to the trade balance.
Capital flight (KF) is an unregistered capital outflow that, as Dombusch points Out,
'imposes a further transfer burden [on the domestic economy]' (Dornbusch, 1990, p.143).
Especially after 1973, when capital flight figures became significant, it is important to
consider this capital outflow as it represents a net resource transfer from the countty.
Hence, both net factor payments and capital flight are considered as negative transfers of
resources(f =1 +KF).
Figure V.2 shows a comparison of the estimated average rate of growth obtainable
with domestic savings alone for the 1960-1990 period, j = 3.72, and the annual actual
rate of growth g,.
In 1977, and from 1982 until 1989, g' is lower than = 3.72. Interestingly, yet not
surprisingly, the relation between g, and j coincides in direction with the value of





















Actual Rate of Growth of Output g*
and g = S
Table V.5 shows the estimated values of (F —f) from 1960 until 1990. It can be
seen that for 1977 and from 1982 until 1989, the value of(F —f) is negative, years when
the actual raze of growth is lower than j. And for the rest of the years, during which
g, > j, (F - f) is positive. The visible relationship between net transfers of resources
(including capital flight as a negative outflow) and economic growth shows that positive
net transfers, by relaxing the foreign exchange constraint, allow for higher rates of
growth. When net transfers are negative, the rate of growth of output does not exceed the





The discussion in the theoretical part of this chapter dealing with the effect that
foreign capital inflows have on the recipient countiy's domestic savings indicates a lack
of consensus on this issue. Disagreement exists on both statistical and theoretical levels
concerning the interpretation of the estimated coefficient and the direction of the causal-
ity effect between capital imports and domestic savings. However, much of the debate
seems to be based more on statistical rather than theoretical reasoning. Because of the
way domestic savings are defined, a negative coefficient of domestic savings on foreign
savings shows that a proportion of foreign savings is consumed without this implying a
reduction of domestic savings. This statistical result does not imply that foreign savings
substitute domestic savings, a result that undermines the argument put forward by the
"Savings Debate" theorists.
For the case of Mexico, the results show that domestic savings are determined by
the level of income, while the estimated foreign savings coefficient shows no statistical
significance. No empirical evidence is found supporting a substitution effect of foreign
savings on domestic savings, either considering the former as a homogeneous flow or at a
disaggregated level.
Concerning the effect of foreign savings on investment, the empirical evidence
found by many studies including this one suggests that foreign capital inflows do finance
additional investment. The conelation between these variables is positive and significant.
The results obtained show an estimated coefficient close to unity indicating that a very
high proportion of foreign savings is invested, a result which is also supported by the
non-statistically significant estimated coefficient of foreign savings in the domestic sav-
ings equation. At the same time, it is found that the level of investment is determined by
demand factors since the lagged accelerator coefficient is statistically significant. Addi-
tionally, support is found for the hypothesis that the effect of foreign credit (long-term
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capital) on investment is larger in the long run than in the short run, due to the long-term
nature of foreign loans destined for investment and to the externality effects that this
investment has on inducing further investment projects.
As far as economic growth is concerned, the analysis shows that foreign capital
inflows finance additional growth provided they exceed the loss of domestic savings pro-
voked by capital outflows. For the Mexican economy, the conditions of the model are
satisfied: on average, net foreign capital inflows exceed the loss of domestic savings at
the same tune that the actual raze of growth of output is higher than the calculated growth
raze financed only by domestic resources. It is found that a net inflow of capital provides
additional growth, but that capital outflows, regulated and unregulated, reduce this effect
by causing a loss of domestic savings.
The evident relationship found between net transfers of resources (considering capi-
tal flight as a negative transfer) and economic growth performance indicates that
economic growth is to a large extent determined by the availability of foreign exchange.
If foreign exchange ceases to be available, the economy cannot grow faster than the
growth rate determined by equilibrium on the current account of the balance of payments





_____ _____________	 Million Dollars	 _____________
Year Foreign Private 	 Gross Long-term	 Long-term	 Short-term
Investment	 (1)	 Capital Inflows	 Capital Inflows	 Capital Inflows
_____ _____________ to the Public Sector (2) to the Private Sector (3)	 Total (4)
1960	 67.9	 352.1	 27.5	 70.7
1961	 94.4	 357.3	 24.3	 33.7
1962	 127.0	 400.9	 33.2	 1.1
1963	 81.4	 424.0	 14.8	 40.4
1964	 112.1	 752.1	 133.5	 60.3
1965	 214.0	 370.6	 35.6	 120.1
1966	 183.0	 598.6	 113.7	 168.1
1967	 130.0	 763.4	 161.9	 323.6
1968	 227.0	 818.3	 99.1	 277.5
1969	 297.0	 1041.3	 101.6	 -62.1
1970	 323.0	 828.2	 119.9	 330.2
1971	 307.0	 793.4	 233.4	 157.2
1972	 301.0	 1017.2	 293.5	 -95.4
1973	 457.0	 2110.6	 486.3	 635.6
1974	 678.0	 2766.4	 471.8	 1509.8
1975	 609.0	 4421.6	 635.2	 1281.6
1976	 628.0	 5417.9	 340.6	 1122.0
1977	 556.0	 6232.3	 103.9	 -1067.7
1978	 824.0	 8343.3	 259.9	 -960.1
1979	 1337.0	 10415.0	 752.7	 1710.9
____	 2155.0	 10323.9	 1668.4	 2243.6
1981	 2835.8	 18587.5	 2249.0	 11710.5
1982	 16573	 13931.9	 1356.6	 -5930.9
1983	 460.5	 8257.2	 545.6	 -5062.8
1984	 391.1	 5488.6	 386.5	 -1972.0
1985	 4903	 3401.7	 -431.1	 -751.9
1986	 1521.9	 3985.2	 -469.5	 -203.7
1987	 3247.6	 8796.0	 -2285.8	 -833.3
1988	 2594.6	 5855.0	 -3065.1	 183.7
1989	 3530.3	 5878.8	 -1119.1	 -47.1
1990	 4627.7	 10597.9	 589.3	 4354.3
Source: Banco de Mexico and Statistical Abstract for Latin-America.
Notes:
(1). Foreign private investment is direct investment, only in 1989 and 1990 figures on portfolio
investment are available and detached from direct investment. Portfolio investment is US $493.3
and US $1994.5 million in 1989 and 1990 respectively.
(2). Gross long-term capital inflows to the public and banking sectors (commercial and develop-
ment banks and Central Bank), amortisatIon payments are not deduced. (3). Gross long-term cap-
ital inflows to the private sector (other than foreign private investment).




THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS CONSTRAINT
ON THE RATE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
VL1 Introduction
Unless a country is a net recipient of capital inflows, it cannot grow faster than the
rate of growth of output consistent with balance of payments equilibrium on current
account. Although long periods of a prevailing deficit in the current account have been
experienced by many countries during the last three decades, the events of the 1980's
exposed the unlikelihood of a country being permanently a net recipient of external capi-
tal, showing that sooner or later a country's economy must adjust to an equilibrium posi-
non in its current account. Starting from this proposition, Thirlwall (1979, 1982, 1989)
has developed a model in which the long run rate of growth of output of an open econ-
omy, assumed to be in balance of payments equilibrium, is determined by its export
capacity, measured by the real rate of growth of exports, and by its dependence on
imports to expand output, measured by the income elasticity of demand for imports.
How weil the balance of payments equilibrium growth rate approximates the actual
growth rate of a country is one test of the model.
The model assumes that output growth is driven by the expansion of the corn-
ponents of demand. In turn, the expansion of demand is determined by the constraint set
by the balance of payments. Demand can expand up to the point where the necessary
imports to expand output can be financed. Therefore, the balance of payments sets the
ultimate constraint on output growth. In this sense, exports are distinguished from the
other components of demand by being the only one that provides foreign exchange at the
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same rime as inducing the expansion of demand. If the limit of demand expansion set by
the balance of payments is exceeded, thus incurring an external deficit, demand has to be
curtailed up to the point where imports can be financed. Thus, it is the level of income
that adjusts to restore equilibrium in the balance of payments.
Thiriwall's model implies and assumes that in the long run the real terms of trade
remain constant (or that terms of trade movements do not act as an efficient balance of
payments adjustment mechanism). Consequently, the effects on output growth of capital
inflows and of movements in the real terms of trade can be derived from the difference
between actual growth performance and the rate predicted assuming balance of payments
equilibrium and no change in the real terms of trade. In this chapter, the model is exam-
ined first theoretically and then tested for the specific case of Mexico.
The second section of this chapter develops the balance of payments constrained
growth model and its modification for the case of developing countries where capital
inflows play an important role. The section analyses the results reached by the model
with and without including capital inflows, and elaborates on what these results imply
concerning the effects that relative price movements have on the balance of payments and
hence on growth. The third section reviews the results of applying the model to data of
developed and developing countries, as well as some statistical tests on the predictive
accuracy of the model. Section four examines theoretical aspects and empirical evidence
regarding the estimation of the price and income elasticities of export and import
demand. It reviews the specification of export and import demand functions as well as
some of the elasticity values found, in order to compare them with the elasticity values
estimated in this work. Section five contains in the first part the income and price elasti-
city estimates for Mexico, and in the second part the results of applying the model to the
analysis of Mexico's growth experience from 1960 to 1990.
The sources of the data used in this chapter are: Banco de Mexico's Economic mdi-
cators, the Statistical Abstract for Latin America, the United Nations Economic Survey
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on Latin America and the IMF's International Financial Statistics. As in the previous
chapters, regressions are done with the Ordinary Least Squares method applying the
Cochrane-Orcutt technique in the case of auto-correlation of the errors. Besides reporting
the R 2 , DW and F statistics the study shows the results of the serial correlation, func-
tional form, nonnality and heteroscedasticiiy tests.1
VL2 The Balance of Payments Constrained Growth Model
The model developed by Thirlwall (1979, 1982, 1989) essentially argues that a
country's rate of growth of output in the long run is determined by its capacity to export
and its dependence on imports, measured by the rate of growth of exports and the income
elasticity of demand for imports, respectively. The model is based on the trade multiplier
developed by Harrod in 1933. The Harrod trade multiplier in its simplest form (see Har-
rod (1933), Kennedy and Thirlwall (1979), Thirlwall (1982)) assumes an economy where
total income is derived from the production of goods for domestic consumption (C) and
exports (X), while total expenditure is divided between home consumption goods (C) and
imports (M). With a constant terms of trade, the equality between total income and
expenditure implies equilibrium in the trade balance: X = M. If m is the proportion of
1	 1	 1income devoted to imports, then: Y = - X or EY = - iSX, where -, the trade multi-
m	 m	 m
plier, represents the amount by which output changes to restore balance between imports
and exports given an autonomous change in exports.
Keeping the assumption of a constant terms of trade, the static multiplier adopts a
dynamic form if, using Harrod's equilibrium condition, we multiply the LHS of 	 = m
by and the RHS by
M'
The Chi-square value of the serial conelation, functional form, normality and beteroscedasli-
city tests should be lower than the critical values of at acceptable levels of significance. At a 5
percent significance level, the critical values are = 3.84 and = 5.99 with one and tw de-














wherey isthe rateofgrowthofreal income,xisthe rate ofgrowthofexports anditis the
income elasticity of demand for imports.
The dynamic 1-larrod trade multiplier can also be reached through the balance of
payments constrained growth rate model. This model is derived in Thiriwall (1979, 1982,
1989), where the balance of payments equilibrium condition measured in domestic
currency is expressed by:
P,X,=PpM,E1	 (6.4)
where Pa is the domestic price level at time t, X is the volume of exports, Pft is the
foreign price level, M, is the volume of imports and E, is the exchange rate.
Exports and imports are specified as multiplicative functions of relative prices and
income with constant elasticities as:
Pa 	 P
X = (	 )1 Z, and M, = (_	 ) 
y1X	 (6.5X6.6)
PftE
where Z, is the level of world income; Y, is domestic income; r is the price elasticity of
demand for exports (r <0); i is the price elasticity of demand for imports ( < 0); c is





demand for imports (ic > 0).
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PftE1'')
=> y(=PJz,pft(E,1
Taking natural logarithms of equation (6.9) and differentiating with respect to time
gives:
(6.10)
where lower case letters represent rates of growth. Grouping terms and solving for y




This last equation expresses that, in the long run, the growth rate consistent with
equilibrium in the balance of payments is positively affected by output growth abroad via
its effect on export growth, inversely affected by the income elasticity of demand for
imports, while the total relative price effect on growth depends on the value of the price
elasticities and (see below).
To obtain the dynamic Harrod trade multiplier result, the assumption of constant
relative prices measured in the same currency must hold in the long run, implying that









Assuming constant real terms of trade in the long run, an open economy's real rare
of growth of output consistent with balance of payments equilibrium is determined by the
rate of growth of exports divided by the income elasticity of demand for imports. This
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ratio -, which is equivalent to the dynamic }larrod trade multiplier, constitutes
Thiriwall's basic result.
VI.2..1 Capital Inflows, Balance of Payments and the Rate of Growth of Income
To apply the Harrod trade multiplier to developing countries, the majority of which
have had persistent deficits in current account over the last two decades, the model has to
account for the effect of foreign capital inflows on growth. Expressing the balance of
payments equation starting from disequilibrium on the current account as:
PX,+C,=PpM,E,	 (6.14)




where and	 are the proportions of exports earnings and capital inflows, respec-
	
2 The zeSUIty,	 L	 is reached using equation (6.5) in rates of growth form where
X (pa - Pp - e,) +e; or, x £ z, if the real terms of trade remain the same i.e.
(Pa —pp - c) 0.
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•	 •	 .	 .	 3 E	 Ctively, in total foreign exchange receipts , (- + 	 = 1.
Taking natural logarithms of equations (6.5) and (6.6), and differentiating with
respect to time gives:
X,=T)(,pd,—pft—e)+Ez,	 (6.16)
and
'V(Pp +e, PdJ)+7tYI	 (6.17)
Substituting equations (6.16) and (6.17) into (6.15) and solving fory:
(6.18)
Since p,,=(1 — 7p,then
(6.19)
Equation (6.19) expresses the balance of payments constrained growth rate starting
from initial disequilibrium in the current account. The equation states that output growth
in the long run is governed by the following determinants: the volume response of
exports and imports to changes in relative prices measured in the domestic currency,
represented by the first term on the right hand side of the equaxion the rate at which the
real terms of trade are changing (,p,, — Pp - e1 ), or pure terms of trade effect; the effect
that the rate of growth of the world economy has on domestic exports, az,; the rate of
growth of real capital inflows measured in domestic currency, (c —pb); and lastly by the
domestic economy's dependence on imports, Jt.
dtConcerning the pure terms of trade, a rise in the relative price ratio ( 	 ), or
PpE
3 These pmponioas are introduced in the equation to account for the apprriate weight of ex-
ports and capital inflows, since the base levels from where the rates of growth depart are not the
un.
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(P — Pp - e,) > 0, has a positive effect on Yt other things remaining equal, and a
deterioration in the terms of trade, (pd, — pp - e,) < 0, worsens the balance of payments
and lowers the constrained growth rate y,. However, the terms of trade effect is not com-
plete without considering the volume response of exports and imports to changes in rela-
tive prices, which is given by the price elasticities r and F respectively. Assuming no
capital inflows so that = 1 and = 0, equation (6.19) reduces to (6.11). Then, it can
be seen more clearly that if the addition of the price elasticities of exports and imports is
higher than unity in absolute terms, I i + I > 1, the deterioration of the terms of trade,
i.e. foreign prices rising faster than domestic prices (pd, — Pp - e,) <0 improves the bal-
ance of payments situation and increases y,. As well, equations (6.11) or (6.19) reflect the
Marshall-Lerner condition which states that depreciation of the domestic currency,
e, >0, will improve the balance of payments and hence y,, while appreciation e <0 will
worsen the balance of payments, provided that Ir +tI > 1. But if 1 and 1 have low
values and ITI + <1, then deterioration of the terms of trade will worsen the balance
of payments and reduce the rate of growth consistent with equilibrium in the balance of
payments.
Output growth abroad exerts a positive effect on domestic export and output growth.
The magnitude of the effect of income growth abroad z, on domestic growth will depend
on the income elasticity of demand for exports £ which captures the non-price factors of
export competitiveness in foreign market A higher value of c implies a stronger response
of domestic exports to changes in foreign market growth rates.
Concerningtheeffectofcapitalinflowsongrowth,it canbeseenthat ifthereal
growth rate is positive (c1 —pd,) >0 and - >0, output growth will be higher than if y,
was constrained to maintain balance of payments equilibrium on current account.
Finally, as the income elasticity of demand for imports measures the dependency of
the economy on imports, the equation reveals that the higher is it, the lower the value of
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the rate of growth of output consistent with equilibrium on the balance of payments.
Constant relative prices measured in a common currency is a strong theoretical
assumption that nevertheless seems to reflect reality. Thiriwall (1979, 1982), Bairam
(1990), Bairam and Dempster (1991) and Soukiazis (1990) accept the hypothesis that
relative prices measured in a common currency tend to remain constant in the long run:
(pj, - pft - e,) 0. International price differences tend to be eliminated in the long run
either because of international competition 4 or because depreciation of the exchange rate
triggers domestic inflation eliminating the difference between p and Pft such that
= pj, - pft• Although the assumption of real terms of trade being constant in the long
run has been debated (McGregor and Swales, 1986), it is widely accepted that price elas-
ticities of imports and exports of developing countries tend to have either a much lower
absolute value than the income elasticities or are not statistically different from zero
(Houthakker and Magee (1969), Bond (1985), Goldstein and Khan (1985), Marquez and
McNeilly (1988)).








or, using equation (6.16):
E
YB: ** =	
x1 + - (c, - p)
(6.21)
it
since x, = £ z, when (p - Pft - e) =0. The balance of payments constrained growth
rate, starting from initial disequilibrium and assuming constant relative prices, is deter-
mined in the long run by the weighted sum of the rate of growth of exports and the
In highly competitive markets, price differences are not sustainable in the long run as ex-
pressed by the Law of One Price.
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growth of real capital inflows, both divided by the income elasticity of demand for
imports. Considering the world's output growth z,, and the rate of growth of capital
inflows, as exogenously determined for a developing country, it is only through improv-
ing export performance and/or reducing the economy's dependence on imports that the
country can increase its rate of growth without falling into balance of payments disequili-
brium. Otherwise, the rate of growth is conditioned by the rate of growth of capital
inflows.
Since equation (6.19) is derived from a balance of payments identity, any deviation
of the extended model YB,* from the actual rate of growth y, must reflect the effects of a
change in the real terms of trade either relaxing or tightening the balance of payments
constraint, according to the direction of movement in the real terms of trade and to the
volume response of exports and imports offsetting or reinforcing the pure terms of trade
effect.











Four cases5 can now be distinguished through which y,* over or undeipredicts y:
Case 1.- A deterioration of the real terms of trade that is reinforced by an adverse
Assuming the price elasticities r and q have normal values, Le <0 and <0.
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volume response of exports and imports to changes in relative prices: (p —pp - e) < 0
and (1 +	 + si)> 0, (which in turn implies that I 1+ y I <1), tightens the balance
of payments constraint on growth. Hence, YBI* overpredicts y,.
Case 2.- An improvement of the real terms of trade is reinforced by a low volume
responseofexports andimports: (,pd:—pp — e1)> 0and(1+-ri+V)> 0,thusrelaxing
the balance of payments constraint. Therefore, YB:* UfldJdiCtS Yt
Case 3.- The deterioration in the real terms of trade is more than offset by the
volume response of exports and imports: (pa Pp - e,) <0 and (1+ r i- v) <0,
implying that the price elasticities have the 'right' values I-Tl+yI >1 (in the sense
that they fulfill the Marshall-Lemer condition), relaxes the balance of payments con-
straint, leading to the underprediction of the real rate of growth Y:•
Case 4.- An improvement in the real terms of trade is more than offset by the
volume response of exports and imports: (pa — Pp - e1 ) >0 and (1+ r + y) <0,
tightening the balance of payments constraint on growth, leading to overprediction °y•
Finally, if YBI is a good predictor of y, it means either that the volume response of
exports and imports to changes in relative prices and the pure terms of trade effect have
offset each other, as expressed by the following equation:
(+W)(pappe,)=—(pjz—pp—e,)	 (6.26)
or that relative price movements measured in the domestic currency have remained
unchanged, (Pd: Pp - e,) = 0.
Table VL1 shows movements in the real exchange rate index over the 1968-1990
penod.6 Variations of the real exchange rate index are relatively smaller during the
6 See section VL5.1 below for the method of calculation of the real exchange rate index.
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1970's than during the 1980's.
Table VL1
Source: Banco de Mexico
The level of the real exchange rate index in 1980 is only 7.8 percent higher than in
1970. Even though the real exchange rate index in 1985 is only 6.8 percent higher than in
1970, its volatility during the 1980's does not indicate a stable behaviour of relative
prices measured in a common currency during this decade. This behaviour is reflected in
the empirical results later where it is found that the Harrod trade multiplier model (with
capital flows) predicts well when the terms of trade have been relatively constant, but
badly when the terms of trade changed dramatically.
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Let us now consider the relationship between the dynamic Harrod trade multiplier
(equation (6.13)) and the extended model as expressed in equation (6.21), in both of
which a constant real terms of trade is assumed. It can be seen that the dynamic Harrod
trade multiplier YB: will equal YB:** if either there are no capital inflows, =0, or the






=> Xl C$Jjz	 (6.29)
Otherwise, YB: will over or underpredict yB,** according to the relationship between
x, and (c, — pa). If x, > (c, —pa) then YB: will overpredict yB,** and if X <(c, —pj,)
then YB, will underpredict 	 The degree of oveiprediction is given by:
C--(x, - (c, —Pd:))
(630)
it
and the degree of underprediction is given by:
C





which are obtained by subtracting equation (6.21) from equation (6.13) in the first case,
and by subtracting equation (6.13) from equation (6.21) in the second case.
\'I.3 Empirical Evidence
The dynamic Harrod trade multiplier has proved to predict well the real rate of
growth of developed countries where capital inflows do not play such an important role
as in developing countries. Thiriwall (1979) shows that for a set of fifteen developed
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countries, the ratio - gives, in general, a close approximation to the real rate of growth
of these countries over a period of twenty years from the early 1950's to the mid 1970's.
Using Houthakker and Magee's (1969) estimated price and income elasticities of imports
and exports, Thiriwall finds that the foreign trade multiplier overpredicts by a low margin
the actual raze of growth of the countries analysed. If correct, this overprediction would
imply the accumulation of current account swpluses in these countries. However,
Thiriwall argues that the overprediction is probably due to underestimation of the income
elasticity of demand for imports which is estimated for a previous time period, as well as
to the real terms of trade effect which cannot be completely neglected. The close approx-
imation of the dynamic foreign trade multiplier to the actual rate of growth across coun-
tries, in spite of the restrictive assumptions it is subject to, has led the dynamic foreign
trade multiplier to be considered as a governing law of long run output growth in open
economies.
Bairam (1988) takes the same set of countries used by Thiilwall and tests the model
for the 1970-1985 period finding support for the hypothesis that long term growth is
determined by the dynamic foreign trade multiplier. Bairam tests the predictive power of
this hypothesis using the equation:
y=13iyi*	 (632)
whereyistheactualrateofgrowth,y 1*(i=1,2)aretheestiniatedratesofgrowthcon-
siszent with balance of payments equilibrium:	 =	 and y 2* = - for each countiy.
The test of hypothesis is done on the , coefficient stating the null hypothesis as
H0 : =1. If the null hypothesis is accepted then Thirlwail's theory is valid. Bairam's
results show that the null hypothesis is rejected wheny 1 * is used and accepted when y2*
is used, arguing that in the former case y1 * overpredicts the actual rate of growth due to
unreliable estimates of the income elasticity of demand for exports €. He concludes that
Y2 = L accurately predicts the actual rate of growth suppornng Thiilwafl's simple nile.
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Soukiazis (1990) estimates income and price elasticities for thirteen developed
countries to test Thiriwall's simple model over the 1960-1985 period. Using the same test
as Bairam, he finds that while y = underpredicts the actual rate of growth, the Harrod
cz.	 .trade multiplier in the fonn of y = - is a good predictor of y, accepting m this case the
null hypothesis j =1. Soukia'ic reports another test perfonned on the value of the
income elasticity of demand for imports to test the accuracy of Thiriwall's model (see
also Bairam and Dempster (1989)). The value of the income elasticity of demand for
imporsthatbydefinitionequatesyj*toyisca1cu1atedas7ti1=Lor1tz=&.. fF
then by implication it follows that y, = y. The null hypothesis H0: (it - ltj ') =0 is tested
using the statistic t =	 where s' is the standard error of it'. So,ikiaic finds that
SW
for nine out of thirteen countries of the sample, the difference between it and it2' is not
statistically significant and accepts the null hypothesis. These results lead him to con-
clude that Thiriwall's model is valid for developed countries.
McCombie (1985) also estimates the balance of payments equilibrium growth rate7
for six industrialised countries over two time periods: 195 1-1973 and 1973-1980. He
finds that the equilibrium growth rate does approximate the observed real rates of growth
and concludes that the rate of expansion of exports is the most important determinant of
long run growth of an economy since it is the only component of demand that provides
foreign exchange at the same time that it expands the level of demand.
The empirical evidence seems to support the rule that long term growth in
developed countries can be approximated by the ratio of export growth to the income
elasticity of import demand, implying long run balance of payments equilibrium. In turn,
this result implies that either the effects of relative price movements measured in a com-
McConbie reaches the balance of payments equilibrium growth rate through the Hicks'
super-multiplier.
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mon currency and capital flows on growth are offsetting each other, which seems highly
coincidental especially if several countries are being considered, or that relative price
movements play only a minor role in the determination of output growth. The weakness
of the effect of relative price movements indicates that it is mainly through changes in the
level of income that the current account of the balance of payments equilibrates.
Given the reliance of developing countries on capital inflows as a source of develop-
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ment finance, it is expected that the simple ratio - will not be a good approximation to
their actual raze of growth since the balance of payments of these countries has been
characterised by a persistent deficit on current account. If the deficit on current account
can be financed by capital inflows, it is not equilibrium in the balance of payments that
constrains output growth but the amount of capital that a country can attract from abroad.
Thiriwall and Hussain (1982) fit equations (6.13) and (6.21) to data for twenty
developing countries during the 1950's, 1960's and 1970's. They find that the extended
model in which capital inflows are incorporated gives on average a better approximation
to the actual growth rate than the simple dynamic Harrod trade multiplier. To clarify the
effect of relative price changes and of capital inflows on the rate of growth they analyse
and elaborate the relationship between the estimated Harrod trade multiplier YBr = and
the actual rate of growth of these countries Yt. They divide the country sample into two
groups: the first one includes those countries where YB, underpredicts the actual rate of
growth, and the second one includes those where YB: overpredicts the actual rate of
growth. For the first group, they find, as expected, that the rate of growth of real capital
inflows is higher than the rate of growth of exports for all countries, while for the second
one they find the opposite. Then, they calculate the implied effect of relative price move-
ments as the residual between the difference of the actual rate of growth and the rate of
growth predicted by the extended model )B,**. That is, the implied relative price effect
equals (y, _yB,**). The interpretation of the above expression in the case of the first
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group is that if (y _yB,**)> 0, it means that on top of the effect of (c, -p,,) being
higher than x,, the balance of payments is further relaxed by a favourable effect of rela-
tive price movements. However, if (y, _yB,**) <0, it means that the effect on growth of
(c, - p ) being higher than x, is offset by an adverse relative price effect. The same
analysis is done for the second group of countries for which the trade multiplier over-
predicts the actual growth rate.
On this basis, Thirlwall and Hussain find that on average, changes in the real terms
of trade have adversely affected the actual rate of growth of the countries included in the
sample. For the fist group of countries, they estimate that the average contribution to
growth of real capital inflows (by relaxing the balance of payments constraint) is 2.03
percent, which is partially offset by -0.65 percentage points because of adverse relative
price movements. For the second group, they find that the overestimation of the real rate
of growth is due more to the adverse effect of relative price movements tightening the
balance of payments than to the real rate of growth of capital inflows being lower than
the rate of growth of exports. On average, they estimate that for these countries, the
difference between (c, —p ,) and x, equals -0.80 percentage points, while the effect of
relative price movements is equal to -1.61 percentage points.
Bairam (1990) estimates price and income elasticities for flIteen developing coun-
tries during different time periods to test the predictive accuracy of the Harrod trade mul-
tiplier. He finds that for nine out of the fifteen countries included in the sample, the null
hypothesis H0 : it - it' =0 is accepted. Interestingly, four of the six countries for which
the null hypothesis is rejected are oil exporting countries (Iran, Nigeria, S.Arabia and
U.A. Emirates). For these countries, the Harrod trade multiplier overpredicts the actual
rate of growth meaning that rather than being constrained by the balance of payments,
these countries are generafly supply constrained by labour and capital internal
bottlenecks' (Bairam, 1990, p.714). Bairarn finds support for Thiriwall's approach in the
case of developing countries, except when the country under consideration is an oil
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exporting countiy with a surplus on current account.
Thiriwail, Femandes and de Siqucira (1983) examine the Brazilian experience from
1965 until 1978. Brazil experienced a deficit on current account from 1967 and accumu-
lated a large external debt. As expected, the Harrod trade multiplier considerably
underestimates the actual rate of growth. Three reasons are given to explain this:
significant inflows of capital, continuous depreciation of the national currency and sub-
stantial fluctuations of the real terms of trade. Besides estimating -, they fit equations
(6.11)) and (6.21) to Br27.ili2ri data. Their estimations show that the price elasticities of
imports and exports do not satisfy the Marshall-Lemer condition. Therefore, the
deterioration of the real terms of trade would tighten the balance of payments constraint
on growth. Thiriwall, Fernandes and de Siqueira show that on average, equations (6.11).
and (6.13) give similar results considering the whole period (5.28 and 5.40 respectively)
which reflects the importance of changes in the level of income to adjust equilibrium in
the balance of payments. Both values underestimate the average actual real rate of growth
equal to 9.32. However, the extended model (equation (6.21)) estimates a rate of growth
consistent with overall balance of payments equilibrium equal to 10.8. These results
show that capital inflows allowed Brazil to grow at a higher rate than the one compatible
with equilibrium on current account of the balance of payments at the same time that the
real terms of trade deteriorated and had adverse effects on growth.
VI.4 Income and Price Elasticities of Export and Import Demand
This section reviews empirical evidence found on income and price elasticities of
the demand for exports and imports and the functional form used in their estimation. It
reveals high and statistically significant values of income elasticities while price elastici-
ties are either not statistically significant or have the wrong sign, and generally have
lower values than the income elasticities for both export and import demand. In general,
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these results support the balance of payments constrained growth model's assumption of
weak price elasticity values and significant income elasticity values for both import and
export demand.
Houthakker and Magee (1969) estimate import and export equations for 29 coun-
tries in a logarithmic form as a function of income and relative prices:
PMlogM =f(log Y, log(	 ))	 (6.33)
wPI
and
PxlogX =f(log YW, log (	 (6.34)
where Y is GNP, PM is the price index of imports, WPI is the domestic price index, 1W is
a weighted index of the world's output, PX is the index of the country's export prices and
PXW is the index of export prices of the rest of the world. For the fifteen developed coun-
tries included in their sample, they find the income elasticity of imports to be always sta-
tisticafly significant within the range value of 0.90 to 2.19. The estimated price elasticity
of imports is statistically significant in five cases out of fifteen with values of -0.76 to
-1.66. Concerning exports, they find the income elasticity to be always significant with
estimated values from 0.86 to 2.44, and the price elasticity is found to be statistically
significant in seven cases, ranging from -0.58 to -2.27. As far as developing countries are
concerned, they find the income elasticities of both exports and imports to be statistically
significant in all cases. The income elasticity of imports has estimated values from 0.52
to 1.39, and for exports the values range from 0.34 to 4.00. They find non-statistically
significant estimates of the price elasticity of imports, wbile only four of the price elasti-
cities of exports were statistically significant out of a sample of eleven countries.
Thursby and Thursby (1984) test the appropriate functional form of import demand
equations. They estimate the model M =f(P, Y) for five industrial countries, whereM is
imports, P is the price of imports relative to all other goods and Y is income, including
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lagged dependent and independent variables in both linear and logarithmic forms. Their
results show that the model including the lagged dependent variable as a regressor and
specified in a logarithmic form performed best in the sense that it is the most often
accepted model based on specific econometric tests.
Khan and Ross (1977) also find support for the log-linear import demand function
including the lagged dependent variable as a regressor. They argue that a partial adjust-
ment mechanism for imports should be specified to relax the continuous equilibrium
assumption, in which the change in imports is related to the difference between the
demand for imports in time t and the actual level of imports in the previous peiiod
(6.35)
where y is the adjustment coefficient, if import demand is specified as a function of prices
and income such as:
M, = a0 + a1 P, + a2Y	 (6.36)
then,
M,=ya0 + ?a1 P, +ya2 Y, +(1 —y)M1 _ 1 	 (6.37)
The authors conclude after estimating the last equation for three industrial countries
that for estimating short and long run elasticities of import demand, the log-linear is the
correct and convenient functional form.
Salas (1982) estimates an import demand function for the case of Mexico during the
1961-1979 period. It is different from the rest of the works reviewed here, and therefore
not strictly comparable. It concentrates on estimating the private sector's import demand
by type of good: capital, intermediate and consumption. The estimated function is of the
type: M=f(Q, P. P", E,, 0,) where M is import demand in real terms, Q is national
income (or a proxy variable consistent with the dependent variable), P'4 is the price of
imported goods and pd is the price of domestic goods, E, is the exchange rate (Mexican
pesos per dollar) and 0, is a vector of other variables that affect the level of imports such
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as a capacity utiisation index and the lagged ratio of the current account to GDP. The
equation is specified in a logarithmic form. Concerning private sector capital goods
imports, the author finds estimates for the price 8 and income elasticities of -1.409 and
0.506 respectively, both statistically significant. In the case of intermediate goods
imports, the estimated price and income elasticities are 2.302 and 0.422 respectively.
These results lead the author to argue that the private sector's capital and intermediate
goods import demand is of a 'semi-smictural' nature, with both income and prices being
important determinants of the level of imports. However, none of the estimated parame-
ters are significant in the case of consumer good import demand.
With regard to export functions, Bond (1985) analyses the determinants of exports
of developing countries classifying them in four different groups according to their
export characteristics. She defines the following groups: low-income non-oil exporting
countries, middle-income non-oil exporting countries, major exporters of manufactures
net oil importers, and major exporters of manufactures net oil exporters. Mexico is
classified in the last group as a manufacture and net oil exporter. The equation she esti-
mates is specified as follows:
InXV'J =d0 +d 1 REER'J -fd2 lnGNP'+d3 lnQT' +d4lnZ'	 (6.38)
where XV" is the flow of exports from exporting group ito importing group j, REER' is
the real effective exchange rate, GNP' is the importing group's GNP, QT' is the devia-
tion of output from trend in exporting group i and Z' reflects other factors that influence
exports from group i. For the 1972-1981 period, the author finds an estimated price and
income elasticity of -1.35 and 1.97 respectively of exports from net oil exporter countries
to industrial countries. In general for all countries, she finds income elasticity of export
values from 0.51 to 2.91; the highest values corresponding to major exporters of
The relative price vaxiable is expressed as the ratio of the United States producer price index
to the Mexican wholesale price index. The exchange rate is included as a separate regressor. Since
U exchange raze remained fixed until 1976, its inclusion as a regressor resembles a dummy vari-
able.
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manufactures to industrial countries. Bond concludes that both the real effective
exchange rate and output growth in importing countries play an important role in the
determination of exports.
Finally, the estimated elasticities of export and import demand obtained by
Soukiazis (1990) are reported. The author estimates equations (6.5) and (6.6) in loga-
rithms for eleven European countries, Japan and the United States. Concerning import
demand, he finds positive and significant estimates of the income elasticity ranging from
1.19 to 2.19, while the estimated price elasticity is not statistically significant in five
cases and shows lower absolute values ranging from -0.34 to -0.83. As far as export
demand is concerned, the income elasticity shows high values which go from 138 to
3.64, while the estimated price elasticity is not statistically significant in ten countries out
of the thirteen countries included in the sample.
V13 Methodology and Estimation Results
VLSi Estimation of Income and Price Elasticities of Import and Export Demand
for Mexico
Table VI.2 shows the percentage structure of imports and exports of goods in Mex-
ico for the 1975-1990 period. It can be seen that capital and intermediate goods account,
on average for the whole period, for 90 percent of total imports. It is only after 1982 that
capital imports' share in the total decreased from 31 percent to 18.7 percent in 1989,
while there has been an increasing participation of consumption goods from 7.2 percent
in 1983 to 16.3 percent in 1990. This pattern reflects the fail in real investment after the
1982 debt crisis (see Chapter III).
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Table V1.2
Percentage Structure of Imports and Exports
	
__________	 1975-1990 ____________________________________
Year	 imports of Goods	 Exports of Goods
Consumption lntenuediaie Capital Agriculture Exiractive Manufactures
	
______	 (%)	 (%)	 (%)	 (%)	 (%)	 (%)
1975	 6.8	 64.4	 28.8	 29.1	 21.1	 49.8
1976	 8.9	 60.4	 30.6	 322	 20.5	 47.3
1977	 8.8	 65.2	 26.0	 28.2	 26.0	 45.8
1978	 8.2	 66.8	 25.0	 24.8	 32.8	 42.4
1979	 8.3	 61.8	 29.8	 20.2	 48.9	 30.9
1980	 13.0	 59.7	 27.3	 9.9	 70.6	 19.4
1981	 11.7	 56.7	 31.6	 7.4	 75.9	 16.7
1982	 10.5	 58.3	 31.2	 5.8	 80.0	 14.2
1983	 7.2	 67.1	 25.7	 5.3	 74.1	 20.5
1984	 7.5	 69.6	 22.9	 6.0	 70.8	 23.1
1985	 8.2	 67.9	 23.9	 63	 703	 2.30
1986	 7.4	 66.8	 25.8	 13.1	 42.5	 44.4
1987	 5.8	 743	 19.8	 7.5	 44.9	 47.6
1988	 93	 70.7	 19.9	 8.1	 35.9	 56.0
1989	 13.8	 67.5	 18.8	 7.7	 37.1	 55.2
1990	 163	 62.0	 21.7	 8.0	 40.0	 52.0
Avg.
	
1975-1990	 9.5	 65.0	 253	 13.7	 493	 36.8
Source: Banco de Mexico
Total exports' main component during the 1975-1990 period is extractive goods,
mainly crude oil. However, there has been an increase in manufactured goods, and export
diversification especially after 1986 when the price of oil dropped. Also noticeable is the
decreasing share of agricultural products in total exports, falling from almost 30 percent
inthemid 1970'sto8percent in 1990.
From the above analysis, and according to the empirical evidence reviewed in the
last section, high values of the income elasticity of imports and exports are expected for
the case of Mexico. A high income elasticity of import demand is expected given the
dependence of output growth on imports of capital and intermediate goods (see also
chapter I), and a relatively high income elasticity of exports is expected because of the
large share of oil and manufactures in total exports (see Bond, 1985).
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Following Thiriwall's approach, and in the light of the works reviewed, export and
import demand are specified as functions of relative prices measured in a common
currency (to take account of movements in the exchange rate) and of income, as
expressed by equations (6.5) and (6.6) respectively. Total imports and exports are meas-
ured in real terms as well as domestic income (real GDP) and income abroad.
Table VL3 shows Mexico's major trading partners for the 1971-1988 period. The
data reveal that the United States imports 63 percent, on average, of Mexican exports,
while more than 64 percent of Mexican imports come from the United States. 9 Given the
outstanding participation of the United States in Mexico's external trade, the variable Z,
the world's output, is proxied in this study by the United States real GNP (taken from the
International Financial Statistics, IMF).
Table V13
Mexco. Ma3or Tradmg Partner,
_____ ___________ Peivauage Sbaie (%)	 __________
_____	 U.S.	 Japan	 Germany	 U.K.
Yr	 Expona Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Impotta
1971	 63.0	 61.4	 4.4	 -	 1.8	 -	 0.6	 -
1973	 58.8	 62.2	 6.6	 4.6	 2.6	 8.1	 0.6	 2.2
1976	 60.9	 62.5	 5.1	 5.1	 2.6	 7.0	 0.8	 3.1
1978	 68.1	 60.4	 3.4	 8.1	 1.9	 7.1	 0.9	 2.5
1979	 69.6	 62.6	 2.8	 6.5	 2.4	 6.4	 0.5	 2.4
1980	 63.2	 65.6	 3.7	 5.3	 1.7	 5.2	 0.5	 2.2
1981	 55.3	 63.8	 6.0	 5.0	 4.6	 4.9	 1.2	 1.8
1982	 52.0	 59.9	 6.7	 5.7	 4.3	 6.1	 4.2	 1.8
1983	 58.4	 60.5	 6.8	 3.9	 1.2	 4.0	 4.1	 1.9
1984	 58.4	 62.3	 7.5	 4.2	 0.9	 4.1	 4.1	 1.8
1985	 60.4	 66.6	 7.7	 5.4	 1.3	 4.0	 3.1	 2.1
1986	 67.3	 67.1	 6.4	 6.3	 2.3	 5.9	 1.0	 1.8
1987	 69.2	 73.1	 5.5	 7.0	 1.4	 4.1	 1.3	 1.6
1988	 73.0	 74.9	 4.9	 6.4	 1.3	 33	 0.8	 1.2
Averse	 63.0	 64.4	 5.6	 5.7	 2.2	 5.4	 1.8	 2.0
Source Statistical Abatmct d Latin America
It is expected for this share to increase, especially with the new trade agreements between
Mexico, the United States and Csnsda
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For the relative prices variable we used the real exchange rate index calculated by
Banco de M&ico. This index is defined as the ratio of international prices (expressed in
domestic currency) to domestic prices. The index is calculated considering the participa-
tion of each country in Mexico's foreign trade as the weighting measure (Banco de
Mexico, 1986, p.134). However, this index is calculated with consumer price indices
instead of exports and imports price indices. It is a shortcoming of this analysis that
aggregate indices of export and import prices are not published for Mexico.1°
The equations are estimated in both static and dynamic specifications in logarithmic
form, using the ordinary least squares method and correcting with the Cochrane-Orcutt
technique in case of serial autocorrelation of the errors. The results of estimating the
static specification of export (X,) and import (M1 ) demand are the following11:
logX,=-0.85+ 1.11lozZ _O.l9lo( ft, )	 (6.39)
	
(-0.17) (2.01)	 (-2.03)
R 2 =0.99 DW=l.24 F(318) =542.7 n=23 3=O.95
(23.1)
and,





R 2 = 0.95 DW = 1.92 F(318) = 12.3.7 n =23 = 0.46
(1.95)
The Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) calculates, since 1971, a ieal terms
of trade index for Mexico (United Nations, 1980). Given the similar pattern of this index with the
one calculated by Banco de Mexico's (see Banco de M6xico's Economic Indicators and United
Nations' Economic Survey for Latin America), this work considei the latter in order to take ad-
vantage of the larger sample.
The sample is 1968-1990 because of data unavailability for the 1960-1967 period.
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The equations are estimated with the Cochrane-Orcutt correction for autocorrela-
tion. Concerning export elasticities, it can be seen that both the income and the price elas-
ticities have the expected signs and are statistically significant at the five percent
confidence level, with the estimated average price elasticity with an absolute value equal
10 0.19, and the average income elasticity of exports which shows an estimated value
equal to 1.11. With regard to the elasticities of import demand, a positive and statistically
significant average income elasticity is estimated equal to 1.62, while the estimated price
elasticity is not statistically significant.
In the case of the dynamic specification of the export and import equations, a
dummy variable is included in both. The export equation12 includes a dummy for 1982,
a year in which the economy practically veered from an inward to an outward oriented
policy, exports then taking a leading role (see chapter I). The import equation includes a
dummy variable for 1983 to take account of the effect that the exchange control and the
higher tariffs established at the end of 1982 had on the level of imports. The estimating
equations are, for the case of export and import demand respectively, as follows:
logX, = —2.85 + 0.66 logZ, —0.15 log(	 ) + 0.74 logX,_ 1 + 0.16 DU82	 (6.41)PftE,
(-1.24) (1.92)	 (-1.53)	 (7.12)	 (2.72)
R 2 = 0.99 h—durbin = 0.38 F(4l8) = 585.2 , =
Serial Correlation :	 0.08
Functional Form : 	 1.09
Normality : X(2)2 = 0.27
He:eroscedasricity X(1)2 0.14
12 The dummy variable for 1982 is not statistically significant in the previous equation, there-
fore, it is not included in the static specification.
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and,
= —2.23 + 0.72 logY, - 0.18 log(-) + 0.56 logM, ... - 0.36 DU83 	 (6.42)
(-2.00) (2.86)	 (-1.44)	 (3.25)	 (-3.85)
R 2 = 0.97 h—durbin = 0.84 F(4,18) = 138.4 fl = 23
Serial Correlation : 	 = 0.08
Functional Form :	 = 2.85
Normality : X2) = 1.67
Heteroscedasriciry : 	 = 0.57
Both equations are well determined, show no sign of error autocorrelation and the
estimated coefficients show the expected signs. However, the relative price variable is not
statistically significant in either of the equations. According to these results, the calcu-
lated long run income elasticities are 2.54 in the case of exports and 1.64 in the case of
imports. The long run income elasticity of exports seems to be much higher than the
constant elasticity estimated with the static specification, while the long run income elas-
ticity of imports demand appears to be almost the same. Considering either the static or
the dynamic specifications, changes in income seem to have a larger effect on imports
and exports than relative price movements, hence complying with the balance of pay-
ments constrained growth model's assumption concerning the effect of the movement of
the real terms of trade on growth.
Either considering the static or the dynamic specification of the import and export
equations, the low absolute values and the non-statistical significance of the price elasti-
cities of both export and import demand suggest that the Marshall-Lerner condition is not
satisfied for the case of Mexico during the period analysed.
Having the estimated values of the income and price elasticities of export and
import demand, the balance of payments constrained model can now be estimated.
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VLS.2 The Balance of Payments Constraint and Economic Growth: the Case of
Mexico
Tables VLA.2 and VLA.3 in the appendix show the annual data and results of the
model. The first of these tables shows the results when the elasticity values it = 1.62 and
£ = 1.11 are used, and the second table shows the results of the model when the long run
elasticity values it = 1.64 and £ = 2.54 are used. 13 The tables show, from column (1) to
(9) respectively, the annual values of the following variables: the share of export earnings
in total foreign exchange receipts,	 the rate of growth of real exports (expressed in
domestic currency), x1 ; the share of real capital inflows in total receipts, the rate of
growth of real capital inflows (expressed in domestic currency), (c, –pm); the estimated
dynamic Harrod trade multiplier result, ; the estimated dynamic Harrod trade multi-
£ %,
plier result in the form —; the result of the extended model as expressed by equation
(6.21), yB,**; the result of the extended model as expressed in equation (6.20), yBt*; and
the actual real rate of growth.
Since the main interest lies on the long run results, the analysis concentrates on the
average results obtained for the whole period under consideration, 1961-1990. However,
as it is of interest to examine the results of the model before and after the debt crisis
began, two sub-periods have been define& the first one from 1961 to 1981 and the second
one from 1982 to 1990.
Table VL4 shows the average results of the model for the three periods: 1961-1990,
1962-1981 and 1982-1990, using the estimated elasticity values it = 1.62 and z = 1.11.






______	 ____	 _____(%)	 _______ ______ ______
Period	 L	 y3" y,	 Actual Difference Difference	 Implied	 Pure
	
Growth between	 between	 relative	 real
	
extended	 actual	 pnce	 terms of
and imple growth and movenient bade effect
	
model	 and iimp4c	 effect	 on growth
model
(1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)
_________	 ______	 _______ (3)41)	 (5)41)	 (7)46) __________
1961.1990 49	 2.2	 5.7	 34	 5.1	 0.8	 0.2	 -0.6	 -1.3
1961-1981	 5.1	 24	 6.4	 4.3	 6.9	 1.3	 1.8	 0.5	 0.1
1982-1990 45	 1.9	 43	 1.9	 0.9	 0.0	 -3.6	 -3.6	 -3.3
__= = =
It can be seen that the simple Hanod trade multiplier gives a close approximation to
the actual growth raze for the whole 1961-1990 period when the rate of growth of exports
is used, -. The result of the trade multiplier when c z is used, however, clearly underes-
timates the actual rate of growth, leading us to think that £=1.11 underestimates the
actual value of the income elasticity of exports. The same happens with the extended
model. While yB, (as in equation (6.21)) gives a close approximation to the actual
growth raze, the value predicted by yg,* (as in equation (6.20)) is far from the actaal aver-
age raze of growth of the 1961-1990 period.
Given the above, only the predictions resulting from the model using L (column
E C
(1)) and "	 "	 (column (3)) will be considered in this case.
it
Although the predicted value by the trade multiplier is very close to the actual
growth rate, it can be seen that the former slightly underpredicts the latter by 0.2 percen-
tage points, while the extended model overpredicts it. This result implies that the rate of
growth of real capital inflows should be higher, on average, than export growth, as
expected by the results given in equations (6.30) and (6.31).' According to the model,
The calculated average rate of growth of real capital inflows over the 1961-1990 period is
15.5 percet* while the average rate of growth of exports for the same period is 8.0 pelcezi.
277
capital inflows growing faster than exports, allowed, on average, for a 0.8 percentage
points higher rate of economic growth, as shown in column (6). However, this effect is
partially offset by adverse relative price movements. The implied relative price move-
ment effect on growth, given in column (8), equals, on average for the 1961-1990 period,
-0.6 percentage points. This same result can also be obtained as the difference between
yBs ** and the actual growth rate y,. Hence, the results show that the positive effect of
capital inflows relaxing the balance of payments constraint is partially offset by adverse
effects of changes in the real terms of trade. Column (9) in table VL4 shows the pure
terms of trade effect on growth 15; this value shows that, on average, the real terms of
trade deteriorated, adversely affecting the rate of growth by -1.3 percentage points. Furth-
ermore, comparing the pure terms of trade effect with the implied relative price move-
ment effect, columns (9) and (8) respectively, it follows that the volume response of
exports and imports to changes in the real terms of trade did not offset the pure real terms
of trade effect on growth (according to the results obtained). This last result corresponds
to Case 1, as explained in section VL2.l.
During the 1961-1981 period, the average rate of growth of capital inflows, equal to
17.2 percent, is higher than the average rate of growth of exports by 8.9 percentage
points. It is therefore not suiprising to find a bigger difference between the extended
model prediction and the prediction of the simple trade multiplier result. This difference
amounts to 1.3 percentage points (column (6)), meaning that the rate of growth of output
was allowed to grow 1.3 percentage points faster, on average, than if growth was con-
strained by equilibrium on the current account of the balance of payments. Moreover,
according to the results obtained, the balance of payments constraint was additionally
relaxed by the improvement of the real terms of trade, allowing growth to further
increase by 0.5 percentage points as given by the implied relative price movement effect
The pure real tenns of trade effect on growth is calculated as the average rate of growth of
the real exchange rate index, divided by the income elasticity of demand for imports.
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on growth (column (8)).
The results show that on average for the 1961-1981 period, the balance of payments
constraint on growth was relaxed by both capital inflows and a small but positive
improvement in the real terms of trade, allowing a total 1.8 percentage points faster
growth than otherwise. Additionally, as shown by the difference between column (8) and
(9), the improvement in the real terms of trade was reinforced by the volume response of
exports and imports to changes in the real terms of trade, corresponding to Case 2 as pre-
viously explained.
Contrary to the results obtained above, the predictions of the model for the
1982-1990 period are far from good. Both the simple trade multiplier and the extended
model predict the same growth rate of 4.5 percent, when the actual average growth raze
for that period is 0.9 percent. Both models predict the same value because, according to
the data, the average value of the share of capital inflows in total receipts for this sub-
period equals zero, therefore yp = -. The oveiprediction of actual growth by the
trade multiplier is then explained in this case by the negative effect on growth of the
deterioration of the real terms of trade. However, there is one point not explicitly contem-
plated by the model, which, if considered, could lead to different results. This question is
now examined. Either in Table VIA.2 or VLA.3 in the appendix it can be observed that
in 1983 and 1987, both the share in total receipts, and the real rate of growth of capital
inflows, is negative. According to equations (6.20) and (6.21), these negative values
imply a positive effect of the product - (c, —pa) on growth. Nonetheless, is seems
unlikely for either an increasing or a decreasing outflow of capital, as indicated by the
negative share, to have a positive effect on output growth (see Chapter V). This issue can



























YB:* =	 if - <0 and (c1 –pj,) < 0
it	 R
(6.20')
Or for equation (6.21):
The incorporation of equations (6.20), (6.20'), (6.21) and (6.21') allows for special
consideration to be given to cases where both the share , and the real rate of growth of
capital inflows (c, –pa), are negative. If this variation is included in the model, the aver-
age growth rate predicted by the extended model either in the form of equation (6.20) or
(6.21), should be calculated as the average of the annual output growth rates predicted,
i.e. YB: * or YB:**, instead of calculating it as the result of the average values of the vari-
ables included in the model: , x,, , and (c –pj,). These two values are different.










As shown in Appendix ViAl, these values differ because the summation of a pro-
E	 E
duct is not equal to the product of a summation, i.e. ( 	 - x) ^ (	 -) (tx) (see Appen-
dix VIAl). If the average YB:** is calculated as in form (1), which considers the average
C
values of - and (c, - ps), the yeazs when these variables are both negative cannot be
given special consideration, therefore, YB:** in these cases should be calculated as in
form (2). Table VL5 shows the results of the model using the same elasticity values as in
the previous table £ = 1.11 and it = 1.62, but calculating YB,* and YBI ** as the average of
the predicted annual growth rates as in form (2).
Table VI.5
Penod Average Rcsuhs
x - 1.62 and £ -1.11
______	 ____	 _____(%)	 _______ _______ _______
Penod	 A.	 - Y	 y,• Actual - Difference Difference	 Implied	 Pure
	
Growth between	 between	 relative	 real
	
extended	 nctual	 price	 temis of
and utmple growth and movement trade effect
	
model	 and simple	 effect	 on growth
model
(1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)
_____	 ___	 ____ (3)-(1)	 (5)-(1)	 (7H6) ______
1961-1990 49	 2.2	 5.2	 30	 5.1	 0.3	 0.2	 -0.1	 -1.3
1961-1981	 5.1	 2.4	 7.3	 5.1	 6.9	 2.2	 1.8	 .0.4	 0.1
1982.1990 4.5	 1.9	 0.4	 -2.1	 0.9	 .4.1	 -3.6	 0.5	 -3.3=
In this case, the rate of growth values predicted by the extended model YB:** are
closer to the actual growth rate for the three periods than in the previous case. This can be
especially noticed in the case of the 1982-1990 period for which the model predicts a rate
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of growth of 0.4 percent and the actual growth rate is 0.9 percent. On average for the
whole 1961-1990 period, the difference in the growth rate value predicted by the simple
trade multiplier and the extended model is very small, 0.3 percentage points, meaning
that the actual long run growth rate has been, on average, consistent with equilibrium in
the balance of payments. While during the 1961-1981 period, the rate of growth of capi-
tal imports had a positive effect on growth by relaxing the balance of payments con-
straint, equal on average to 2.2 percentage points, this effect became negative during the
debt-crisis period, equal to -4.1 percentage points. According to the results obtained in
Table VL5, this negative effect explains the major part of the fall of the actual growth
rate below the growth rate consistent with equilibrium on the current account of the bal-
ance of payments, during the 1982-1990 period.
Turning now to the results obtained using the estimated long run elasticity values
£ = 2.54 and t = 1.64, Table VL6 shows the outcome when form (1) is used to calculate
the average values of yB,** and yB:*.
Table VL6
Period Avenge Resulza
x - 1.64 and e - 2.54
______	 ____	 _____(%)	 _______ ______ ______
Period	 Ya" Yb' Actual Difference Difference	 Implied	 Pure
	
Growth between	 between	 relative	 real
	
extended	 actual	 puce	 terms of
and ample growth and movement tiade effect
	
model	 and simple	 effect	 on growth
model
(1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)
________	 _____	 _______ (4)-(2)	 (5)-(2)	 (7)-(6)	 _________
1961-1990 49	 5.0	 5.6	 5.7	 5.1	 0.7	 0.1	 -0.6	 -1.3
1961-1981	 51	 54	 6.3	 6.6	 6.9	 1.2	 13	 0.3	 0.1
1982-1990 4.5	 4.2	 4.5	 4.2	 0.9	 0.0	 -3.3	 -3.3	 -3.3
= =
When the estimated long run income elasticities of exports and imports are used, the
predictions given by equations (6.12) and (6.13) are similar as well as those given by
equations (6.20) and (6.21). The analysis of Table VL6 leads to similar conclusions as
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those derived from Table VL4, with the difference that in Table VL6 the predictions of
the balance of payments constrained growth model approximate the actual rate of growth
for the 1961-1990 period in both cases, either when x 1 is used or when £z, is used. As in
Table VL4, the estimated growth rate exceeds the actual value for the 1982-1990 period.
To take into account the effect of the negative share in total receipts and the negative real
rate of growth of capital inflows, the results of the model when equations (6.20') and
(6.21') are included are given in Table VL7.
Table VL7
Penod Average Resulzz
R - L64 and £ - 2.54
______	 ____	 _____(%)	 _______ _______ _______
Period	 ya	 ya,	 Acna1 Difference Difference	 Implied	 Pure
	
Growth between	 between	 relative	 real
	
extended	 tua1	 price	 temis of
and minple growth and movenient trade effent
	
model	 and s3Jnple	 effent	 on growth
model
(1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)
________	 _____	 _______ (4X2)	 (5X2)	 (7)46) _________
1961 . 1990 49	 5.0	 5.1	 5.4	 5.1	 0.4	 0.1	 -0.3	 -1.3
1961-1981	 51	 54	 7.2	 7.5	 6.9	 2.1	 1.5	 -0.6	 0.1
1982-1990 4.5	 4.2	 0.4	 05	 0.9	 -3.7	 -3.3	 0.4	 -3.3
Of all the Tables analysed, Table VL7 presents the most accurate predictions of the
actual growth raze given by the balance of payments constrained growth model. Concen-
trating first on the 1961-1990 period, it can be seen that the four predicted values closely
approximate the actual growth rate, with the value of the extended model's prediction
YB:** being actually the same as the growth rate. These results seem to confirm that in the
long nm, the rate of growth of output cannot exceed the rate of growth consistent with
balance of payments equilibrium on current account. However, if the sub-period
1961-1981 is considered, the data show that the average growth rate exceeded the balance
of payments equilibrium growth rate by 1.5 percentage points (column (7)). According to
these results, economic growth could be higher because of real capital inflows relaxing
the balance of payments constraint on growth. Finally, considering the 1982-1990
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period, it can be seen that the low average actual growth raze seems to be due more to the
effect of real capital inflows tightening the balance of payments than to relative price
movements.
The analysis ends up with several findings. On the whole, the balance of payments
equilibrium growth rate closely approximates the long run actual growth rate for the case
of Mexico, supporting Thirlwall's basic proposition that in the long run no country can
grow faster than the rate of growth consistent with balance of payments equilibrium on
current account. When the shorter sub-periods are considered, it is found that the
extended model approximates better to the actual growth rate, meaning that capital flows
played an important role relaxing or tightening the balance of payments constraint hence
promoting or hampering economic growth. As well, the results indicate that on average
for the whole period, the real terms of trade effect on growth is low, suggesting that in
the long run, relative prices measured in a common currency stay fairly stable.
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VL6 Conclusions
The chapter has analysed the balance of payments constrained growth model and
estimated it for Mexico. Several approaches were followed to fit the model to Mexican
data. Firstly, two different sets of estimated price and income elasticity values were used,
one resulting from the static specification of the import and export demand functions,
giving estimates of constant elasticity values, and one resulting from the dynamic
specification from which the long run estimates of the elasticity values are derived.
Secondly, special consideration had to be given to the specific situation where both the
share in total receipts and the rate of growth of real capital inflows are negative, which, if
neglected, could lead to biased predictions. In turn, this led us to calculate the average
values predicted by the model in two different ways: one as the rate of growth resulting
from the average values of the model, and the other one as the average of the annual
predicted rates of growth, both of which lead to different results as shown in the appen-
dix. These possibilities end up in four different tables displaying the average predictions
of the simple Harrod trade multiplier and the extended model for the whole 1961-1990
period and the two sub-periods considered.
Excluding the predicted values given by the simple and the extended models when
the constant income elasticities are used, which clearly underpredict the actual rates of
growth (probably because the income elasticity of exports is underestimated), the average
predicted growth rates, ranging from 4.9 to 5.7 percent, are very close to the average
actual real rate of growth for the 1961-1990 period equal to 5.1 percent.
These results support Thiriwall's model, highlighting the importance of export
capacity and the income elasticity of imports as determinants of long run growth, since
they confiim that in the long run, the rate of growth of output should be compatible with
the constraints imposed by the balance of payments. Moreover, the results imply that the
long run effect of changes in the real terms of trade on growth is, if not insignificant, very
small.
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The results obtained for the 1961-1981 and 1982-1990 sub-periods are also interest-
ing and much information about the economy can be derived. It is found that for the case
of these sub-periods the extended model, which incorporates capital flows, approximates
better to the actual average growth rates, especially when the years 1983 and 1987 are
treated as special cases. According to the results it is shown that during the 1961-1981
period, capital inflows allowed a faster rate of growth (2.1 percent on average) than that
compatible with equilibrium on the current account of the balance of payments. While
during the 1982-1990 period, growth was curtailed by the conditions imposed by the
external sector (by -3.7 percent on average). On the whole, capital flows have had a
small positive effect on growth for the 1961-1990 period (on average equal to 0.4 per-
cent).
Concerning the real terms of trade effect on growth, the data show a small but nega-
tive average effect on growth for the 1961-1990 period. However, the results obtained for
the sub-periods are not veiy clear as far as the effect of the relative price movements on
growth is concerned. That is, the results obtained are not consistent since they differ
according to the method of calculation used to obtain the average predicted growth rate
values. This inconsistency does not allow us to make conclusions on the relative effects
that the pure terms of trade, and the volume response of exports and imports to changes











Calculation of the Average Value of the Extended Model y,**
The first form of calculating the average y** implies:
E — E
()x, +	 + (c1 —pa)
(1) y *=B:
It
This, in turn, is equal to:
E	 E
Z(c,—pa)
It	 It	 n	 n	 n	 n
By grouping terms in the last equation we get:
=
This last result is different from the second form of calculating the average yB,**,











The thesis has examined both general and specific aspects of the financing of the
Mexican economy over the 1960-1990 period from both internal and external sources.
While chapter one introduces an overall perspective of the Mexican economy, the
findings of the rest of the chapters have been of a specific nature.
In historically tracing the financial policy followed by the government between
1960 and 1990, chapter one finds that not unlike other developing economies, the financ-
ing of Mexico's growth and development has depended on both domestic and foreign
sources, and that to a large extent, the performance of the economy is associated with the
availability of external financing.
The relative unavailability of external financing after the debt crisis began in 1982
led the Mexican economy to increase its reliance on domestic sources of finance. With
the purpose of increasing domestic financing and improving the ailocative efficiency of
resources, the financial sector was gradually liberalised. After having examined the
interrelationship between financial variables and real variables of the Mexican economy,
the following are some of the results expected of the financial liberalisation process.
One of the main hypotheses of financial liberalisation models is that a rise in the
real interest rate to its equilibrium level will increase the total level of savings and invest-
ment and will improve the productivity of total investment. However, the analysis under-
taken in this thesis concludes that the effect of movements in the real interest rate on total
savings, investment and economic growth is weak on both theoretical and empirical
grounds.
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Theoretically, the effect of a rise in the real interest rate on total savings is weak
because it is subject to a substitution and an income effect that can offset each other and
leave the level of total savings unchanged after a rise in the real interest rate. In the case
of Mexico, the empirical evidence found showed that movements in the real interest rate
do not significantly affect the level of total real domestic savings, the latter being pri-
marily a function of the level of income. It was found that a rise in the real interest rate
can have a negative impact on total domestic savings by negatively affecting public sav-
ings: a rise in the real interest rate increases the government's internal debt service pay-
ments. The higher the domestic public debt, the larger the impact of changes in the real
interest rate on the level of total domestic savings. This was shown by the negative and
statistically significant coefficient of the real interest rate during the period when the pub-
lic sector's deficit was at its highest levels.
With regard to private domestic savings, which is a component of total savings that
financial liberalisation is intended to encourage through raising real interest rates, there is
no empirical evidence of the former reacting to changes in the latter. As in the case of
total domestic savings, private savings are primarily determined by the level of income
and hence there seems to be no reason to expect a rise in the real level of private or total
domestic savings as a consequence of higher real interest rates.
However, movements in the real interest rate do affect the level of financial savings,
i.e. the amount of savings that is channelled via financial assets. The study undertaken in
chapter three demonstrates that there is a positive correlation between the real interest
rate and financial savings. Nevertheless, periods of rising financial savings coinciding
with negative real interest rates are also observed (for example between 1977 and 1981).
This is because financial savings are also highly correlated with the level of income.
The results of the analysis undertaken in chapters two and three lead to the conclu-
sion that a rise in financial savings does not necessarily imply a rise in total savings.
Financial savings can increase when the interest rate rises not as a consequence of an
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increase in the total level of savings but as a result of a substitution process between
alternative wealth holding assets, with the amount of total real savings remaining con-
stant. The sensitivity of financial savings to the differential between domestic and
foreign real interest rates shows that savings deposited abroad can be substituted for
domestic financial savings.
Even though no evidence was found of financial liberalisation raising the level of
total or private real savings, its effect on financial savings can have a positive impact on
investment and growth if financial savings are more productive than other forms of sav-
ings. It is possible that idle resources find more efficient use through financial intermedi-
aries if financial savings lead to productive investment and do not remain in the financial
sector for speculation purposes. However, it cannot be assumed that savings automati-
cally find productive investment outlets. This finding underlines the importance of a
sound economic environment for private investment to take place. In the case of Mexico,
besides the need for an expanding market and the expectation of high returns on invest-
ment, the confidence of the private sector in the government's economic policies plays a
crucial role in the private sector's decisions to invest. Hence, it is important for economic
policy to restore and maintain the confidence of the private sector in the government. In
the aftermath of the debt crisis (1982) one of the major obstacles facing private invest-
ment within the counuy was the lack of confidence of the private sector in the
government's economic policies. This led financial resources either to flee abroad or to
remain in the highly unregulated domestic speculative sphere. With the onset of the
government's liberalisation policies (including the financial sector's liberalisation in
1989), ii appears that the confidence of the private sector in the continuation of the
government's economic policies is in the process of being restored, as shown by the rise
in private investment after 1989. To maintain the confidence of the private sector in the
continuity of the government's economic policies, several actions have been taken by the
government to anchor the continuation of a market-forces led economy. Among the most
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important measures are the negotiation of a free trade agreement with Canada and the
United States and the recent independence of the Central Bank from the government.1
Empirical evidence shows a positive correlation between financial savings and the
total amount of credit given by the banking sector to the private sector, even though the
latter also depends on the reserve requirement that the Central Bank imposes on the com-
mercial banks. Credit given to the private sector by the banking sector proved to be an
important determinant of total investment. Therefore, if financial savings can find invest-
ment outlets easier and faster than other forms of holding savings, financial liberalisation
and the implied rise in real interest rates can have a positive impact on total investment.
However, the relationship between investment and the real interest rate has other aspects
to consider. If the deposit real interest rate is taken as a proxy for the real loan interest
rate, or if financial assets are considered as a competing asset with the accumulation of
capital, then a rise in the real interest rate can hamper investment. Investment is thus
subject to a positive effect from a rise in the real interest rate through an expansion of the
availability of credit, but it is also subject to a negative effect. The results in chapter
three show that in the case of Mexico, the latter effect is dominant, implying that the net
effect of a rise in the real interest rate on investment is negative.
Real interest rates therefore should be at a level at which savings are attracted into
the financial sector while ensuring that its level is not too high so that productive invest-
ment is discouraged. Additionally, the study has shown that both demand and supply fac-
tors are important in determining total investment. Investment demand is sensitive to the
supply of credit and to changes in expected demand and profits.
Financial liberalisation and market oriented models argue that any form of credit
In May 1993 the Mexican government granted autonomy to the Central Bank over monetaly
policy.
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allocation which is not directed by market forces leads to an inefficient allocation of
resources. It is implied, therefore, that the financing of public investment, which is not
allocated by market forces, might lead to an inefficient allocation of resources. Chapter
four has tested econometrically the productivity of public and private investment and no
evidence was found of public investment being less productive than private investment
during the 1970-1990 period.
More than two decades of high rates of economic growth with government interven-
tion in economic activities, and the empirical evidence presented in chapter four, give no
reason to think that public investment has been less productive than private investment.
Moreover, empirical evidence which indicates that public investment has a positive effect
on private investment lead us to argue that the stagnation of private investment after 1982
and until 1989 was partially caused by the drastic fall of public investment in this period.
The relation between public and private investment is of a complementary nature and not
of substitution, as the net effect of a rise in public investment on private investment is
positive. Further, no clear evidence of public investment crowding out private investment
was found either financially or physically.
Is is appropriate to raise the point that in a country like Mexico, where income is
highly concentrated2, the social costs of low public expenditure and of low public invest-
ment can be high and can put at risk the social and political stability of the country.3
After almost a decade of falling public investment (1982-1988) the government
responded in 1989 to the need to increase public investment and social expenditure. It did
this by establishing a new institution with the responsibility of allocating credit to
deprived sectors of the population. Through the National Solidarity Programme (Pro-
2 In 1989, 10 percent of the population received 40 percent of total income (against 26 percent
in OECD countries) while 20 percent live in extreme poverty earning 4.4 percent of total income
(OECD, 1990).
3 In the 1988 presidential elections there was widespread discontent with the government's pot-
iaes with regaid to providing basic amenities to the growing rural and urban poor, who constitute
the base of the ruling party's political power.
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grama Nacional de Solidaridad, PRONASOL) the state provides services to rural and
urban communities. State funds are used to increase the number of schools and clinics,
provide potable water, electricity, maintain and lay new roads and street paving. It has
been established that PRONASOL receives its budget from resources obtained through
the privatisation of state-owned banks and industries. The government claims that this
institution responds to the new criteria of a smaller but more effective public sector by
providing finance to specific needs of the population. Given the social and political suc-
cess of PRONASOL's activities in the large disaffected urban and rural areas, it is clear
that future economic policy will find ways and means of financing programmes long after
the funds which are presently available from massive privatisation have dried up.
Past experience in developing countries has caused financial liberalisation theorists
to consider the reduction of the public sector's deficit, and of the public sector's borrow-
ing requirement, as one of the conditions to achieve macroeconomic stability, which in
turn is considered as a necessary condition for successful liberalisarion of the financial
system. The Mexican government was successful in achieving this goal during the last
two years of the period analysed. The reduction of the public sector's deficit reflects both
a lower participation of the public sector in economic activity and a lower demand for
financial resources by the public sector. Mention must be made that the latter was possi-
ble because of the massive privatisation programme undertaken by the government,
which has been taking place since 1983 but intensified after 1989, allowing a rapid
increase in the public sector's income. The financial sector is now operating with less
regulations and less government intervention. A lower demand for financial resources by
the public sector, together with a rise in financial savings, did allow an increase in the
amount of credit given by the banking sector in the last two years of the period analysed
(1989-1990) when the economy showed signs of recovery and total investment increased.
At the moment of writing this conclusion, it remains to be seen if the public sector will
sustain a surplus or a small deficit when income from the privatisation of public
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enterprises comes to an end. Otherwise, to finance a deficit balance, the public sector
will have to resort either to the issuance of government bonds to the banking system and
to the public through open market operations, or to compuisory lending from the com-
mercial banks or to direct credit from the Central Bank. 4 Any fonn of financing of the
public deficit should not constrain the supply of credit to the private sector, which proves
to be, together with public investment, an important determinant of private and total
investment.
Concerning the productivity of investment, no evidence was found of financial vari-
ables having a significant effect on the incremental capital-output ratio. This result under-
mines the hypothesis that a rise in the real interest rate and the financial deepening ratio
necessarily improves the productivity of investment. On the other hand, chapter four has
found empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that the productivity of investment is
a function of the rate of growth of output. Further, one of the results obtained in chapter
three, has shown that the productivity of foreign savings is high compared to that of pub-
lic savings. This result is interesting for a country like Mexico which has relied heavily
in the past on foreign financing and is relevant given that Mexico is currently pursuing a
policy to attract foreign savings, especially in the form of direct foreign investment.
Chapter five examined the impact of foreign savings on domestic savings, invest-
ment and economic growth, and showed the empirical evidence obtained in the case of
Mexico during the 1960-1990 period. The analysis undertaken in this chapter has pointed
out the importance of foreign savings not only as complementing domestic savings but
relieving the foreign exchange constraint. The empirical analysis gives support to the
hypothesis that foreign savings supplement rather than substitute domestic savings. This
In May 1993 the government ruled that the Central Bank will no longer be obliged to satisfy
the public sector's financial requirements with direct adit. While this has been a int develop-
ment and a historic break in Mexico's financial tradition, it nevertheless falls out of the scope of
enquiry of this thesis.
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result applies to both foreign savings received by the public sector and by the private sec-
tor in the form of long term capital inflows, which has been the major form of foreign
financing during the period analysed. The hypotheses that foreign savings reduce public
savings by reducing the public sector's efforts to increase savings, and that private sav-
ings are reduced because foreign savings discourage the private sector to save, received
no support from the empirical evidence in the case of Mexico during the 1960-1990
period.
Regarding the effect of foreign savings on investment, which is subject to less
theoretical and empirical debate, the results for Mexico show that foreign savings have a
positive impact on investment, as many other studies have shown for other countries.
Moreover, among the components of foreign savings, the empirical evidence shows that a
rise in foreign private investment has a larger impact on investment relative to the effects
of foreign savings in the form of long term capital inflows. On the other band, support
was found for the hypothesis that long term capital inflows have a positive effect on
investment not only during the current period but also in the long run, the nature of which
makes it difficult to capture econometrically.
Unlike the 1970's and early 1980's when the major part of foreign capital inflows
was used to finance the deficit of the public sector, the period after 1982 has been charac-
tensed by a search to attract capital inflows mainly in the form of foreign private invest-
ment. Since 1984 Mexico has progressively reduced existing impediments to foreign
investment as part of the liberalisation policies by opening areas of the domestic econ-
omy to investors from abroad and by removing all restrictions of technology licencing. It
was not until 1986 that foreign private investment was resumed following the sharp fall
brought about by the debt crisis (1982). However, towards the end of the 1980's and until
the present, foreign private investment gravitated towards the short-term speculative
money market. For example, from 1989 to 1992, the ratio of portfolio investment to total
foreign private investment rose from 14.0 percent to 71.6 percent. The huge increase in
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short-term capital inflows (which are mainly being invested in short-term government
bonds), reflects, on the one hand, the high interest rates offered presently in Mexico rela-
tive to interest rates offered in foreign markets, but more importantly it reflects the uncer-
tain expectations surrounding the performance of the Mexican economy and of future
economic policy. In spite of this entry of capital into the domestic financial system bring-
ing large amounts of foreign currency, its short-term nature makes it extremely vulner-
able to any change in expectations. For instance, a real threat facing foreign and domes-
tic investors is the possibility of a devaluation of the Mexican peso with respect to the
U.S. dollar. Even though this has not prevented the entry of foreign capital, because of
the decision of the government to peg the exchange rate, the growing size of the external
deficit, especially after 1991. can be a disincentive to long term private capital inflows.
With regard to the rate of growth of output, it has been closely linked to the availa-
bility of foreign capital. Not surprisingly, the actual rate of economic growth in Mexico
has been above or below the calculated rate of growth of output financed solely by
domestic savings according to the net transfers of resources being positive or negative
respectively.
The growth model developed in chapter five has found that on average, foreign capi-
tal inflows have had a positive effect on the rate of economic growth in Mexico for the
1960-1990 period. According to the specification of the model, this result implies that on
average, net capital inflows have been higher than the proportion of capital outflows, both
regulated and unregulated, that would otherwise have been invested domestically. That
is, on average, the loss of savings due to capital outflows, which include net factor pay-
ments abroad and the estimated capital flight, has been lower than the average values of
net capital imports. During the 1960-1990 period, foreign capital inflows allowed the
Mexican economy to grow at a faster pace than the rate of growth achievable with only
domestic savings as a source of finance. However, the results of the model have shown,
as expected, that the high contributory effect of foreign capital inflows on output growth
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before 1982 was partially offset by the low and sometimes negative net transfer of
resources after 1982. Moreover, not only was the amount of foreign capital inflows much
lower after 1982 than before, but available foreign financing was linked more with ser-
vicing the external debt than with investment projects. On the other hand, the period in
which the contribution of foreign capital inflows to growth was the highest was during
the 1978-1981 period. According to the results obtained, during this period more than
half the rate of growth of output was financed by foreign capital inflows.
The analysis in chapter five has shown that the positive effects of foreign savings on
economic growth, either by increasing the overall level of productivity, by complement-
ing domestic savings or by relieving the foreign exchange constraint on the balance of
payments have been partially offset by the loss of savings through capital outflows. How-
ever, on average, the effect of foreign savings on growth during the period analysed has
been positive.
In chapter six, emphasis is given to the role of foreign savings in relaxing the con-
straint imposed by the balance of payments on the rate of growth of output. Thirlwall's
(1979, 1982) model, developed in chapter six, starts from the proposition that unless a
country is a net recipient of capital inflows, it cannot grow faster than the rare of growth
of output consistent with balance of payments equilibrium. Given that it is unlikely for a
country to always be a net recipient of foreign capital, as has been demonstrated by the
debt crisis, the long-nm rate of growth of an open developing economy is determined by
its capacity to export and its dependence on imports to expand output. The long run rate
of growth of output is hence determined by the ratio of the rate of growth of exports to
the income elasticity of demand for imports.
In the case of the Mexican economy, the growth rates predicted by the balance of
payments constrained growth rate model are very accurate, supporting Thiriwall's model.
For the 1960-1990 period, the predicted growth rate with overall equilibrium in the bal-
ance of payments was the same as the actual average growth rate. The closeness between
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the predicted growth rate from the extended model, in which foreign capital inflows were
considered, and the growth rate predicted by the simple model imply that the effect of
capital imports relaxing the balance of payments constraint on growth has been, on aver-
age for the 1960-1990 period, positive but small.
The accuracy of the balance of payments constrained growth model in predicting the
growth rate supports the hypothesis that it is the level of income that adjusts to restore
equilibrium in the balance of payments, and suggests a low effect of movements in rela-
tive prices measured in a common currency on the balance of payments and the long-run
rate of growth.
The analysis undertaken in chapter six highlights the importance of improving the
performance of exports and/or reducing the dependence of the economy on imports to
expand output as the means to increase the rate of growth of output consistent with
equilibrium in the balance of payments.
Starting from the beginning of the 1990's until the present has proved to be a severe
testing period for the economic policies set into motion by the present administration.
After four years, the euphoria which accompanied Mexico's liberalisation policies start-
ing ax the end of the last decade have begun to abate. Nevertheless, these policies seem to
have restored the confidence of the private and foreign sectors in the country's economic
future.
In spite of the resumption of capital inflows brought about by the reduction of previ-
ously existing barriers, the economy now faces the challenge of keeping the deficit on the
current account of the balance of payments at a manageable level. Despite the rise and
diversification of exports during the last decade, the growth of imports after 1988 has
caused the deficit in current account to grow from U.S.$2.5 billion in 1988 to U.S.$22.8
billion in 1992. To avoid the external balance in current account causing a devaluation of
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the Mexican currency the government is currently implementing contractionary fiscal and
monetary policies to slow down economic activity and the growth of imports.
One of Mexico's immediate economic concerns, however, is to ensure foreign long
tenn direct investment and not speculative portfolio investment which can be highly
volatile. While the ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement negotiated
in 1991 with the United States and Canada can help to bring about foreign direct invest-
ment, it is still necessary to maintain high levels of domestic investment. It may be men-
tioned in this context that while the liberalisation policies have elicited a positive
response from the private sector, it is important that there is renewed participation of the
public sector in the country's economic activities.
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